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Abstract

In the early 1980s, scholars declared the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM)
co-opted by institutional response. However, domestic violence policy proposals
proliferated in the decade which followed, culminating in the adoption of the Violence
Against Women Act by the U.S. Congress in 1993. While there was no evidence of
resurgence, the BWM was anecdotally credited with these policy accomplishments. The
current project is a qualitative interpretative policy analysis aimed at evaluating these
seemingly contradictory claims by assessing the congruence of the content of domestic
violence related policy proposals with the public messages of the BWM.
Findings suggest that the BWM influenced federal domestic violence policy in
both direct and indirect ways. Consistent with prior research on social movement
influence on public policy, the BWM played a direct role in bringing the issue to
Congress and setting the agenda for possible intervention. Movement frames also defined
the contours of the larger policy domain by identifying a number of policy and
institutional targets. Although members of the movement coalition were consistently
involved in agenda setting, BWM influence on policy proposals lessened over time. The
decrease in influence was facilitated by the influx of new institutional interests created by
v

movement claims-making and decreasing resonance of the movement’s claim to
exclusive knowledge over issues of woman battering. These dynamics resulted in a
mixed set of simultaneous movement frame outcomes including success, cooptation, and
failure. More research is needed to improve our understanding of how changes internal
and external to the policy domain mediate the influence of movement claims-making.
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Chapter One
Introduction
I. Background
Fear of cooptation and references to its inevitability are common themes in the
literature on the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM). Amid the proliferation of state-level
policies related to domestic violence in the early 1980s, scholars began to declare the
movement coopted by “institutional response” (Johnson 1981; Tierney 1982). This charge
implied that as states responded to BWM demands, the movement itself lost momentum and
entered a period of decline. Two arguments were offered as evidence of this decline. First,
state funding for shelters and domestic violence programs undermined the ability of these
organizations to serve as centers for mobilization and direct action (Johnson 1981). Second,
government intervention redefined domestic violence as a legal-, medical-, and social
service-based problem traceable to the pathology of offenders and victims rather than as a
condition of patriarchy (Miccio 2005; Sack 2004; Tuerkheimer 2004).
These claims of cooptation suggest the movement had largely disappeared by the
beginning of the next decade. Yet, national policies on domestic violence continued to
develop. In 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
into law. The act brought widespread attention to domestic violence and dedicated federal
monies for a diverse set of prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts. While there was
no evidence of movement resurgence in the sense of re-emerging BWM social movement
organizations, the “movement” was anecdotally credited with this accomplishment (Dobash
and Dobash 1998; Sack 2004; Schneider 2000). Thus, in an analytic sense, these claims
suggest the movement’s influence outlived the cooptation of its organizations.
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This creates somewhat of a puzzle for current explanations of social movement
influence. We know little about what happens when organizations are no longer viewed as
effective carriers of the movement message. While much has been written about the
influence of the BWM on federal policy, no empirical study has examined national-level
policy activities. As an historical note, it may be enough to acknowledge that a public policy
would not have materialized without the attention brought by the movement. However,
acceptance of this type of reasoning as a statement on social movement outcome does little in
the way of explaining the mechanisms through which movements sustain support and interest
among policy-makers and other institutional actors over time, or how they achieve structural
impact on society. Further, loose pronouncements of policy success generally fail to asses the
consistency or disjuncture between movement demands and the products of resulting policy.
II. Purpose of the Study
This study strives to fill a gap in the analysis of social movement outcomes, through
an examination of BWM claims-making and federal lawmaking on domestic violence. The
purpose of this work is not to provide a general study of the movement, but rather to examine
the extent to which policies proposed in the U.S. Congress addressed or failed to address the
grievances of the BWM aimed at federal lawmakers. I propose that one way to better
understand the mechanisms of social movement influence on public policy outcomes is to
trace the relationship between movement prognostic frames and the subsequent public policy
debate and outcomes. This requires examining outcomes by following not just movement
actors and organizations, but also the movement’s grievances and related prognostic frames.
Movement prognostic frames or messages are how a movement publicly
communicates its identification of a problem or grievance, its attribution of responsibility for
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solving the problem, and/or its prescription of social, political, or cultural change(s) that must
occur to resolve the targeted problem (Johnston 1995). Although limited in scope, prior
research on the outcomes of social movement messages has yielded three theoretical precepts
that provide a framework for examining this question. First, social movement messages are
empirically observable expressions of the movement’s goals and expectations for target
action (Trumpy 2008). Second, we can learn about social movement outcomes by examining
the outcomes of movement messages and target response frames over time (Trumpy 2008). I
use the term target response frame to refer to proposed policy changes within the domestic
violence policy domain by members of Congress. And third, there are underlying
mechanisms leading to movement outcomes that result from the persistence of message
making and the interaction of those messages with target response frames (Stratigaki 2004;
Trumpy 2008). A longitudinal assessment of BWM message outcomes may help us account
for the contradictory perceptions that the movement was coopted during early stages of the
challenge but influenced domestic violence policy development in the long term.
III. Research Questions
This study is guided by two research questions. First, to what extent do subsequent
federal policies on domestic violence represent favorable responses to the Battered Women's
Movement? And second, how can we reconcile or otherwise assess both the claims of
movement cooptation and the perceptions of movement influence on continuing policy
development in the domestic violence policy arena? To accomplish this task, empirical
evidence will be investigated to address five sub-questions:
1. What were the goals of the BWM?
2. What demands did the BWM make on federal lawmakers?
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3. How did federal lawmakers respond to the prognostic messages of the BWM?
4. What were the outcomes of BWM prognostic messages in Congressional policy
proposals?
5. In what ways do these outcomes represent the continuing influence of the BWM on
domestic violence policy?
IV. Scope of the Study
This research centers on national policy messages about battered women or domestic
violence. I have limited the parameters of data collection and analysis to public messages that
were relevant to and accessible for conversations in the national domestic violence policy
domain. Specifically, I focus on the messages attributed to the BWM. In this work, the
Battered Women’s Movement is defined not as a specific set of organizations, but rather as a
broad political effort to change the social conditions that perpetuate women’s experience of
violence in the domestic sphere. The movement was initiated and supported by a complex
field of individual victim-survivors and allied activists and organizations—which I refer to as
the movement coalition. I include some background on the origin of the national agenda.
However, this work does not examine the internal selection or construction of messages by
movement actors.
The BWM was in part a policy-oriented social movement. Policy-oriented social
movements are coalitions of actors or organizations who mobilize to either challenge a
particular policy or set of policies or to realize a new policy goal. The BWM targeted a
number of social institutions including local, state, and federal governments. I identify some
of these demands where they overlap with the national policy domain, but the target under
examination in this work is the U.S. Congress and demands on other targets are outside the
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scope of this work. Movement-target interactions are analyzed to determine outcomes for the
movement’s public policy-oriented prognostic messages.
V. Methodology
This project is an interpretative policy analysis of a single-case study, the Battered
Women’s Movement’s targeting of federal policy related to domestic violence. Interpretative
policy analysis is a qualitative approach to identifying the “architecture” of policy arguments,
aimed at exposing the symbolic and consequential meanings embedded in policy work
(Yanow 2000). This method is an extension of traditional policy analysis in that it allows for
identifying how meanings are created or changed through the policy process as different
“interpretations” of a policy issue are transmitted during policy formulation, consideration,
and action.
Movement policy-oriented messages were derived from two sources. First, I
identified newsletters, monographs, books, and other published works produced by members
of the movement coalition and intended for a national audience. Selected movement
publications are largely those intended for both movement and public audiences with
regional or national distribution. These documents helped identify policy messages and
connect them to the movement’s broader goals and agenda. The second source for movement
message data was comprised of transcripts of hearings before committees and subcommittees
of the U.S. House and Senate with testimony by members of the movement coalition. The
determination of outcomes relies heavily on the testimony data. Both of these data sources
were coded for BWM public prognostic messages relevant to national policy concerns. Two
data sources were utilized to ensure that the messages relayed in public testimonies were
consistent with the movement’s public articulation of a national policy agenda.
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Target response data were culled from bill proposals introduced in the U.S. Congress.
This work utilizes the population of bills that addressed battered women’s issues or domestic
violence prevention or intervention programs introduced into the U.S. House and Senate
between 1977 and 1994 (95th through the 103rd Congresses). First, I identified bills that were
coded by the Congressional Bills Project with the index “domestic violence.” Second, I
searched the full bill texts for each Congressional session using key words to identify bills
attending to issues of woman battering, domestic violence, or violence against women in
LexisNexis Congressional Universe and Thomas.gov. After reviewing each bill description, I
identified 214 bills relevant to the study. In order to compare target responses with
movement prognostic messages, each bill was coded and then broken into the distinct
provisions addressing domestic violence or target response frames as defined above. I used a
system of emergent coding to identify and document both movement prognostic messages
and target response frames. The record of movement messages and target response frames
was arranged chronologically and divided into periods corresponding to Congressional
sessions.
An outcome determination was made for individual movement messages for each
Congressional session. Message outcomes refer to the status of the movement’s prognostic
claim following the target’s response. The outcomes are determined using an adapted version
of Gamson’s (1975) outcome matrix. Within the marked analytic periods, I examine
movement messages and target response frames to determine whether each frame received
Congressional acceptance (or non-acceptance) and new advantages. In this work, acceptance
refers to whether or not movement messages draw the attention of lawmakers. Acceptance is
documented affirmatively when lawmakers introduce proposals to address the prognoses
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articulated by members of the movement coalition. Since this work is examining outcomes
for the messages themselves, I utilize the term inclusion rather than the traditional label of
new advantages. Inclusion here means new advantages consistent with the movement’s
prognoses are included in the policies proposed by members of Congress.
The matrix of acceptance (non-acceptance) and inclusion (non-inclusion) yield four
possible frame outcomes: success (reform), cooptation, preemption, and failure. Frame
success occurs when the movement’s message receives both acceptance and inclusion in
Congressional proposals. Because this work is focusing on message outcomes, policy
adoption is not required for a frame to be identified with an outcome of success. I reserve the
use of the term reform for cases where both frame success and policy adoption occur.
Message cooptation happens when the target, Congress, recognizes and accepts the
movement’s prognostic message, but the proposed policy either contains no policy change or
proposes changes that are inconsistent with those of the movement message. Frame
preemption and failure both occur in instances where the target does not introduce proposals
consistent with the movement frame. In the case of preemption, the target rejects the
movement’s prognosis but subsequent proposals include alternative elements that yield a
benefit for battered women or the movement. Frame failure occurs when neither acceptance
nor inclusion are present.
VI. Delimitations and Limitations
This work deals specifically with messages derived from the movement associated
with woman battering by an intimate partner. Domestic or family violence is a broad concept
that includes woman battering. The term violence against women is also an expansive
concept that includes both physical and sexual violence and violence perpetrated by both
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those known and unknown to the woman. While many BWM actors recognized the
relatedness of these types of violence to the status of women in society, the movement
discussed in this work was very specific in its focus on ending violence against women
perpetrated by intimate partners—predominantly, husbands and boyfriends. Further, I chose
to define this movement as a coalition of actors. This means no single organization or type of
organization is identified as “the movement.” This decision may complicate comparing the
findings of this work with the body of research that situates an organization or set of
organizations as the movement actor, but has the distinct advantage of treating the movement
as a broad cultural phenomenon that transcends any one set of organizations.
Interpretative policy analysis requires the researcher to assume that policy frames
have multiple and sometimes competing meanings that require interpretation by the observer.
I chose interpretative policy analysis and emergent coding over a more traditional content
analysis for two reasons. First, there were no previous accounts of the BWM’s federal policy
agenda available. Movement policy frames were not known in advance and had to be
identified from the source data. Second, lawmakers often used different language to
demarcate woman battering. As such, matching the movement’s demands to policy
provisions required identifying corollaries to movement frames and understanding the
context of the provisions within the larger proposal. For example, proposals to fund shelter
would yield different outcomes on the basis of whether or not the provision specified battered
women’s shelters or funded homeless shelters more broadly.
The research questions guiding this project are limited to determining outcomes for
the movement’s publicly articulated demands. As such, data sources are restricted to the
public record. This work cannot account for negotiations or alliances that take place outside
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of formal publications or events. This work also seeks to understand movement outcomes
from the standpoint of the movement’s grievances and prognoses for change. The findings
presented here do not address outcomes for movement organizations, enacted policies, or the
actual benefits accruing to the population of battered women. The focus on message
outcomes is also limited to federal lawmaker response. As a result, I have limited movement
data sources to those that were intended for a national (or nearly national audience) or those
that were direct appeals to members of the U.S. Congress. This decision was motivated by
the focus on federal policy-making. As such, discussion of the “movement message” and the
“policy agenda” should be interpreted in this manner. Except for a few instances of
intersection, this work does not take into account movement policy-oriented message making
at local and state levels, nor do I address messages aimed at other institutions.
Battered women’s activism as a whole addressed a wide variety of cultural and
structural problems that contributed to the persistence of violence against women. This work
does not answer the question of whether or not the movement was influential in the broad
sense. We know that violence against women is still a serious problem throughout the United
States and the rest of the world. Rather, the findings of this work are narrowly focused on the
movement’s targeted challenge of federal laws and programs in the U.S. Although narrowly
focused, the type of challenge examined in this work is a common strategy employed by
policy-oriented social movements. Additional insight into how these challenges playout can
contribute to a broader understanding of movement outcomes in policy domain contests.
VII. Chapter Outline
In the next chapter, I review the literature related to the study of social movement
message outcomes, specifically focusing on the conceptualization of message cooptation and
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the mechanisms through which message outcomes are derived. In Chapter Three, I
operationalize the key concepts defined above as necessary for examining message
cooptation. I also detail data sources, identify data collection strategies and discuss coding
and analysis techniques, and examine issues related to validity and generalizability. I present
findings in three chapters. Chapter 4 details the origins and history of claims-making of the
BWM, including the documentation of the goals of the movement and the development of
movement preferences for social interventions related to those goals. Chapter 5 provides a
description of movement prognostic frames aimed at federal public policy on domestic
violence and Chapter 6 documents frame alignment outcomes for movement messages across
nine congressional sessions. The Conclusion (Chapter 7) explores the significance of these
findings for understanding movement messaging and policy outcomes, and considers the
generalizability of these findings for conceptualizing outcomes in policy-oriented movements
more broadly.
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Chapter Two
Conceptualizing Message Cooptation

I. Introduction
In the last chapter, I documented contradictory claims about movement cooptation
and influence on the Violence Against Women Act. This contradiction led to the questions
guiding this work. First, to what extent do subsequent federal policies on domestic violence
represent favorable responses to the Battered Women’s Movement? And second, how can we
reconcile or otherwise assess both the claims of movement cooptation and the perceptions of
movement influence on continuing policy development in the domestic violence policy
arena? In this chapter, I examine the theoretical development of the concept of social
movement cooptation. I begin by providing a brief discussion of the policy-making process
as a social movement target. I will then review existing typologies of social movement
outcomes and definitions of cooptation. Next, I present a model for examining policyoriented movement outcomes as a series of interactions over time. The final task of this
chapter is to address the limitations and benefits of this perspective for explaining policyoriented movement outcomes.
II. Public-Policy as a Social Movement Target
Policy change is often dubiously linked to social movement presence and activity.
While the goals of social movements are often revolutionary in nature (e.g. overturning
governments, eliminating patriarchy), movement scholars generally recognize policy reform
as part of the legacy of movement actions. Increasingly, policy-oriented movements are
becoming a common form of democratic politics (Meyer 2003; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly
2001). Sometimes public policy is an unintended consequence of a social movement
11

challenge (Andrews 2001). At other times, policy change is the result of a direct challenge to
the state, intended to either change an existing policy or enact a new policy to address a
movement grievance (Grattet and Jenness 2001; Jenness 1999). Policy changes at all levels
of government have the potential to create a constituency of both supporters and opponents.
Sometimes these movements take up policy challenges as a means to a larger end. At other
times, the policy challenge is an end unto itself. Constituencies opposed to the status quo at
times will coalesce into policy-oriented social movements, or coalitions of actors or
organizations who mobilize to either challenge a particular policy or set of policies or to
realize a new policy goal (Meyer 2003).
Scholarship examining policy-oriented movements largely treat the political process
as a static, linear, bureaucratic practice engaged in by a set of actors who evaluate the need
for and consequences of a policy from a rational perspective. But in practice, the policy
process is perhaps more accurately described as “a battle among various actors seeking to
please distinct constituencies” (Meyer 2003, 5). While the U.S. legislative policy-making
process has a set of procedures for generating, amending, and repealing laws—defining the
boundaries of both individual and collective constituencies is less clear cut. What makes
movements a special case in the study of the policy process is the presumed “outsider” status
of the constituency.
The definitional requirement of locating constituencies and organizations as outsiders
to the policy-making apparatus complicates the study of policy-oriented social movements.
King, Cornwall, and Dahlin (2005) suggest that the policy process is subject to a legislative
logic. As the policy process proceeds, each stage becomes more rule driven, but also more
consequential. Assessments of challenger influence suggest that these organizations have
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more influence at earlier stages, including getting an item on the legislative agenda and
formulating an actual proposal. A movement may be successful at getting an issue on the
agenda; however, the proposal itself can be revised inside the process in ways that diminish
movement input. In order to extend movement influence, actors sometimes form alliances
with policy-makers and others with deeper connections inside the process. Firm ties with
individuals or political coalitions inside the policy process can diminish the movement’s
claim of “outsider” status. For this reason, theories of social movement mobilization
articulate a fragile relationship between movement influence and institutional response.
In addition to the rule-based nature of the process, it is often difficult to locate
movement organizations and actors. Studies that focus on determining movement
organization influence on policy-outcomes must be able to identify organizational presence
inside the process. Studies of cooptation at times focus on what happens to the organization
or actor, rather than the actual outcome of the challenge. Conclusions about social
movements as either a co-opted or ineffective require that we also examine the ways in
which challenger claims are treated by policy-makers, and the ways in which institutional
response stimulates or inhibits continued claims-making. When these organizations are given
a platform inside the process, their efforts can potentially play a larger role in shaping policy
outputs (Rochon and Mazmanian 1993). However, continued external claims-making and
insistence on a particular set of prognostic frames can also spur policy-makers to incorporate
movement demands in either symbolic or substantive ways—which constitute rather different
outcomes.
One result of this perspective is that scholars have begun to recognize the need to
examine movement policy-oriented activities in a similar way to investigations of other more
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routine forms of policy-oriented group political behavior (Andrews and Edwards 2004,
Burstein and Hirsh 2007, Rochon and Mazmanian 1993; see also Meyer et al. 2005). The
primary mechanism connecting conventional political interest groups to policy outcomes is
the role of these groups as information brokers for legislative decision-makers (Baumgartner
and Leech 1998). Research on interest group activities suggests that not only do these
organizations commit a great deal of resources in generating information, but their principal
activities involve presenting relevant information to decision-makers (Schlozman and
Tierney 1983).
Not all movement groups utilize conventional political strategies, but most have a
message and take measures to relay that message to an identified target. By message, I am
referring to the public transmission of the movement’s identification of a problem or
grievance, an attribution of responsibility for solving the problem, and/or prescription of
social, political, or cultural change(s) that must occur to resolve the problem (Johnston 1995).
How movements relay messages (strategy) has received a great deal of scholarly attention.
But when it comes to assessing movement influence on policy outcomes, most scholars have
so far failed to incorporate not only the structure of the policy process, but also how these
messages travel back and forth between the movement and policy-makers (King, Cornwall,
and Dahlin 2005). This line of work is important to understanding both social movement
outcomes in general, and more specifically the mechanisms connecting institutional response
to movement claims-making. Meyer (2003) contends that in order to fully understand social
movement influence on policy production, researchers must go beyond the examination of
discrete outcomes and find ways to account for how complex and iterative interactions
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between movements and policy-makers produce potentially dynamic outcomes over time.
This dissertation strives to do just this.
Situating the relationship between movements and public policy as longitudinal
allows for an assessment of the evolution of movement positions, policy alternatives, and
changing relationships among the coalitions that make up the movement itself as well as
changes occurring in the larger policy domain (Grattet and Jenness 2001). In their study of
the development of hate crimes policy, Grattet and Jenness (2001) aimed to document “the
birth and structuring of a domain of public policy” (669). They describe the creation and
implementation of hate crime legislation as a process which required “a significant
mobilization of people, bureaucracies, and institutions” (669). Further, Grattet and Jenness
found that different segments of the coalition that constituted the hate crimes movement took
center stage at different points in time, and in different political environments. The same
could be said of political actors and public support for the policy. Further, the structure of the
resulting policies and policy domains determined not only the response to a problem, but also
defined the scope of the problem itself. These authors conclude that “the causes and
consequences of a problem cannot be fully comprehended apart from an understanding of the
larger processes that identified, defined, and ultimately propelled it” (669). In other words, in
order to understand the “outcomes” of policy-oriented social movements and determine
which of these outcomes constitute “success” we have to go beyond examining the
prevalence and content of the final adopted policy, and look into the process from which the
final policy was formed.
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) put forward a generic model of “contentious
politics,” in which they argue that regardless of the type of challenger, episodic political
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challenges by groups without routine access to the decision-making apparatus are similar in
nature. Social movements, external governments or government agencies, political interest
groups and other actors differ in terms of their position within political process, the strategies
that they employ, and the make-up of their respective constituencies. However, they propose
that we can better understand political actions of all kinds, if we examine political challenges
by putting “each of the actors in motion,” allowing for the formation, negotiation, and
disintegration of coalitions over time, and examining the ways these boundaries “blur,
organization changes, and political position shifts (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 12).
These authors argue that the goal of this examination is to identify reoccurring mechanisms
that connect challenges to outcomes. In the current project, an assessment of these
mechanisms may help us better understand the underlying process—specifically as it relates
to movement messages. In order to accomplish this task, we have to define social movement
outcomes and distinguish between forms of success and failure, including cooptation.
III. Defining Social Movement Cooptation
Cooptation is commonly understood both as an action taken by the state or other
targets of social movement demands and a possible outcome of social movement challenges.
Phillip Selznick (1948) defined cooptation as “the process of absorbing new elements into
the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting
threats to its stability or existence” (p. 34). If the organization's legitimacy is threatened by a
challenge, they will co-opt "elements which in some way reflect the sentiment, or possess the
confidence of the public" (34). In this sense, cooptation is a strategy that is deployed in order
to decrease risk for the target. The picture that forms is one in which the target attempts to
capture the movement in some way—a keep your enemies close philosophy.
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While Selznick was focused on the formal target's outcomes, social movement
scholars have focused on how movements can avoid being coopted by their targets. Three
perspectives are relevant to the current discussion. First, in the resource mobilization
tradition, organizational and financial autonomy were important to the resiliency of social
movement organizations faced with an attempted cooptation (McCarthy and Zald 1977;
Oberschall 1973). This perspective defines a movement in terms of the development of
organizations to procure, manage, and expend resources. The organization carries the
movement challenge. As they form and grow, they increasingly must take on tasks and
expend resources in ways that contribute to organizational maintenance. Targets at times will
make concessions to challenge groups, concessions that carry additional resource burdens
that will ultimately limit the organization’s ability to continue acting as a challenger.
Concessions are generally offered to the more conservative segment of the movement and
may entail offering an insider role to a leader, providing funding to an organization, or some
similar action.
For example, if the state provided funding to a women’s organization to run a
battered women’s shelter, the shelter might be asked to develop a professional staff to carry
out bureaucratic tasks, conform to industry standards on emergency housing, etc. The group
accepts the money, but these tasks combined with laws regulating lobbying by organizations
receiving state support prevent them from making further challenge. At best, the capture of
one movement organization represents the fracturing of a coalition that forms the movement.
This outcome will be viewed as compromise by some actors and cooptation by others;
analytically, the key difference may depend on whether the new ‘insider’ demonstrates
ongoing autonomy sufficient to allow him/her to raise new challenges to the status quo, in
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keeping with movement priorities. It may also be determined by whether the fracture
represents a widespread reduction in autonomy for the movement as a whole. In other words,
whether or not “capture” of one person or organization can be viewed as cooptation of the
movement also depends on the centrality of the person/organization to the movement’s
strategy.
A second perspective appears in Doug McAdam’s (1982) articulation of the political
process model. McAdam observed the use of what he described as coercive cooptation of
movement leaders and organizations in the U.S. Civil Rights movement. Sometimes referred
to as “divide and rule,” this strategy is intentionally utilized by the target of the challenge as a
social-psychological mechanism to create a conflict of interest among challengers (Lawler
1983). The resulting conflict decreases solidarity and thereby damages the movement and
ultimately inhibits action against the target of the challenge. From this perspective,
cooptation is a gentler version of repression. Outright suppression of a movement is not
always in the best interest of policy-makers, especially where the movement’s message is
culturally resonant, appealing to both targeted and broad audiences (Benford and Snow 2000;
Snow et al. 1986). Cooptation is still articulated as an intentional effort to inhibit or bring
about the decline of a social movement—but with the hope of making it look like a
compromise to the movement’s supporters and the public at large (Marx 1979).
In both of the previous explanations for cooptation, the decline of the movement or
discontinuation of the challenge is situated as the outcome in need of explanation. Cooptation
is viewed as a mechanism that can lead to movement decline. A third approach to
conceptualizing cooptation is offered in William Gamson’s (1975) Strategy of Social Protest.
Gamson defined social movement outcomes in terms of two types of institutional response:
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acceptance and new advantages. Acceptance refers to the acknowledgement by the target that
movement actors are legitimate spokespersons on the issue at hand or for the population to be
affected by the outcome of the desired change. New advantages are identified when the
movement gains something it sought during the challenge. Gamson was not concerned with
determining “success” or explaining decline. Rather, his focus was on assessing how
organizational form and strategy impacted the outcome of a challenge. While recognizing
that both acceptance and new advantages may occur on a continuum, Gamson produced a
typology by treating each as either present or absent. Collapse is defined as the absence of
both acceptance and new advantages. Full response is defined as the presence of both. Preemption is an incomplete form of full response, where the movement is not accepted as a
legitimate spokesperson, but the target eventually grants new advantages. In this formulation
of movement outcomes, cooptation occurs when institutional response is limited to
acceptance and no new advantages are gained.
Gamson’s analysis of the impact of organization and strategy deployment suggests
that group size is an important determinant for whether partial response comes in the form of
preemption or cooptation. Small groups tend to get preempted, and large groups tend to get
coopted. Another distinction can also be found by examining group strategy. In some
movements, organizations are committed to autonomy and eschew any attempt to be viewed
as cooperating with the target of the challenge. These groups primarily use “outsider”
strategies, like protest demonstration. Where response from the target is forthcoming,
challenges by such groups are more likely to result in preemption than cooptation. A group
for whom legitimacy and acceptance are important will give up new advantages in order to
secure and maintain acceptance. Assessing outcomes and their effect on determining
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movement success or failure requires that we take into account the movement’s goals,
actions, and response to target concessions.
Although cooptation has been a central concern to those who study social
movements, few have conceptualized the process through which cooptation is achieved.
Cooptation has largely been treated empirically as a single observation or event. Recent work
on the cooptation of movement messages has provided some guidance in terms of
conceptualizing the process of cooptation in policy-oriented or policy-process involved
movements. These approaches have expanded the discussion of cooptation to include
recognizing the process even in challenges where institutionalization of movement demands
is the goal.
A. Co-opting Movement Messages
Building on Gamson’s typology of social movement outcomes, others have begun to
assess the outcome of movement messages in policy-oriented challenges. In these works the
movement message is often conceptualized in terms of diagnostic and prognostic frames.
Frames are “interpretive orientations” that “organize interests, values, and beliefs” to
“organize experiences and guide action” (Snow et al. 1986, 464). Frames are a heuristic that
provide a basis for mobilization—aligning individual orientations to those of an organization
or group. Not only are these appeals used to aid in building the organization’s resource base,
but they are also employed in competition with opponents over meaning. Two core tasks for
a challenger group are diagnostic and prognostic framing. A diagnostic frame involves the
identification of the problem and the attribution of the problem to a source (Benford and
Snow 2000). Once the source/target is identified, challenger groups must develop and
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disseminate a prognostic frame—the identified solution or what can be done to address the
problem (Benford and Snow 2000).
Stratigaki (2004) examined the cooptation of work-life reconciliation in European
Union social policy. She defined message cooptation as adoption of and/or use of movement
ideas, concepts, and messages by policy writers but without maintaining the meaning or
intent of movement. At times, message cooptation leads to the use of the movement’s
terminology to refer to ideas that contradict those of the movement. She found that the
concept of reconciliation proposed by activists was intended to promote gender-equality in
both home and work life; however, as policy-makers debated work-life reconciliation and
constructed policies related to the concept, the definition changed. The adopted policies
defined work-life reconciliation in terms of workforce flexibility, a market-oriented
objective—making the workplace more woman friendly as opposed to balancing gender
equity. Stratigaki’s work highlights the manipulation of public acceptance for the
movement’s message by policy-makers. Action was taken and potentially some new
advantages resulted (just not the ones the movement desired). This is more akin to the
concept of “borrowing” (Holzer 2008, 197). Holzer’s work suggests that movement targets
will at times “borrow” movement resources (here a culturally resonant message) without
actually aligning itself with the movement. Once the resource has been effectively borrowed,
the target may use it to its own end.
Trumpy (2008) examined message cooptation where the target of the movement
(Greenpeace) was a corporation (Coca Cola and their refrigeration practices) rather than the
state. She defined cooptation as “the ability to maintain SMO [social movement
organization] support without acquiescing to SMO demands” (Trumpy 2008). Using this
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definition she proposed that cooptation can be accomplished by the target when it accepts the
movement’s attribution of blame for the problem and articulated solutions but without any
actual change in practice with regard to the aggrieved behavior (e.g. a media campaign
acknowledging the industry’s role in the perpetuation of the problem and claiming that
change is needed; but no actual policy or practice change).
Message cooptation can render a movement (or at least the movement’s message)
impotent. The use of the movement’s terminology, with a transformed meaning, can lead to
the deterioration of its policy impact (Stratigaki 2004). In the case of EU policy, the
movement was seeking a policy to address “work-life reconciliation.” A policy identified by
work-life reconciliation language was written and adopted; however, the content of the
policy was not what the movement was seeking. The use of the movement’s language
increased the difficulty of continuing to argue for work-life balance policies—even where
gender equity issues at home had not been addressed. Similarly, the acceptance of the
movement’s message without any action can still serve as an alibi of sorts for policy-makers,
who can point to the adopted message as evidence that they are addressing the movement’s
issue. Coca Cola accepted the attribution of blame for the use of ozone depleting chemicals
in their product dispensing refrigerators (a fact that could not easily be denied) and indicated
that the company, like Greenpeace, was committed to a sustainable environment. However,
they continued to make and distribute the equipment without changes to the refrigeration
unit. Certainly, the cooptation of a movement message can decrease the potency of a
challenge for the target constituency, some or all of the movement constituency, and the
public at large. However, one instance of message cooptation is not enough to end a
challenge or mark the decline of a movement.
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While these works both focus on the movement’s message, these definitions of
cooptation are tied to what happens to the movement or the movement organization. This is
consistent with Gamson’s definition, but lacks conceptually clarity. I define message
cooptation as the recognition and acceptance of a movement’s prognostic message by
policymakers, where the proposed policy solution contains either no policy change or
changes that are inconsistent with those of the movement message. In the next section, I will
draw on Trumpy’s analysis to further clarify the difference between cooptation and other
possible outcomes for the movement message and then extend this idea to allow for
identifying outcomes for the prognostic frame rather than organizational outcomes.
IV. Modeling Movement Messages in Corporate Target Interactions
Alexa Trumpy (2008) articulated a model of corporate cooptation of social
movements in her examination of Greenpeace’s challenge to Coca Cola’s refrigeration
policies and practices. Trumpy set out to improve understanding of how corporate targets
respond to social movement messages. The purpose of this work was to assess the efficacy of
movement actions where access to and participation in the policy making process are limited
or even non-existent. Following Gamson, she defined challenge outcomes in terms of not
only the target’s response to the movement (acceptance and new advantages) but also in how
the movement reacts to the target’s response (acceptance or non-acceptance of the target’s
response and whether or not there was a continued challenge).
Like Gamson, Trumpy was interested in movement strategy. Specifically, she wanted
to understand the mechanisms that link movement messages to challenge outcomes. She
presupposed that movements use frames to make demands of a target and to reward targets
for conforming to movement goals. The movement frame may be used for cooptive purposes
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by the target. She suggested that identifying the mechanisms linking movement messages to
challenge outcomes could reveal the circumstances under which a movement organization
would switch message deployment strategies and targets. As such, she focused on the content
and manner of deployment of Greenpeace’s message over time. The model advances the
analytic scope of Gamson’s strategy by returning to the examination of a single case and
focusing on outcomes for individual interactions within a movement challenge and by
following these interactions and outcomes over the life course of the challenge. Further, by
situating movement messages as a central feature of the interaction, she was able to assess
whether the message itself received acceptance as a legitimate prognosis for the problem.
This model requires an examination of both social movement organization and target
frames, an assessment of whether or not these frames align with one another, the target’s
action regarding the fulfillment of the prognosis in the movement frame, and the movement’s
response to the target’s action. The model for examining each interaction is summarized
below in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Model for Assessing SMO and Target Interactions, Trumpy (2008)
SMO Demands (Frames) → SMO Action → Target Frames → Target Action → Outcome →
SMO Response (continued challenge or acceptance of target action and end to the challenge)

Trumpy contends that movement response to a target’s prognostic frame and any
subsequent action can lead to four primary interaction outcomes: failure, cooptation,
compromise, and reform. Defining the opposite ends of the spectrum is easy. Failure occurs
when the target rejects the challenger’s prognosis (failed frame alignment), and the target
either takes no action or offers a contradictory prognosis and related action. Reform occurs
when the target accepts the challenger’s prognosis (frame alignment) and takes action
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consistent with that defined in the frame. Trumpy did not examine outcomes that correspond
to Gamson’s criteria for preemption, where the target rejects the challenger’s prognosis, but
takes action congruent with movement demands.
Both cooptation and compromise outcomes require the alignment of challenger and
target prognostic frames. A message is coopted when the target aligns its prognostic frame
with that of the challenger but fails to take action to alter policies or procedures that address
the prognosis. Compromise occurs when the target’s frame mirrors the frame of the
challenger (in whole or part) and the target takes action that partially fulfills the challenger’s
prognosis.
Trumpy proposed examining movement/target interactions over time to determine
long-term process and outcomes of claims-making. The determination of challenge outcomes
depends on the movement’s response to the action (or lack thereof) taken by the target in the
interaction. An interaction with a failed alignment only results in challenge failure if the
movement discontinues efforts to bring the target’s frame in line with their own. The same
can be said for interactions that lead to cooptation. Interaction outcomes only come to define
the challenge outcome when the movement discontinues their efforts to obtain acceptance for
their prognosis or new advantages from the target. Continuing with this line of reasoning, an
interaction ending in compromise may not signal the end of challenge. If the challenger
continues to pursue the other elements of the original prognosis, the challenge may
eventually reach the level of full reform. However, continued challenge may also lead to a
roll back of earlier compromise and the challenge could result in failure.
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A. Limitations of Trumpy’s Approach
There are some aspects of movement policy-oriented challenges that Trumpy’s
approach does not address. First, assessing policy-oriented movement outcomes requires
some accounting of the political environment. Since Trumpy’s analysis was aimed at
understanding corporate cooptation of social movements, she did not account for the
potential for conflict or change for the target, outside of those resulting from pressure by the
movement. Trumpy examined an alternative opportunity structure she identified as
“corporate industry structure”, which is similar to political opportunity in the sense that it
establishes the field of interaction and placed limitations on permeability of the decisionmaking process (Trumpy 2008, 20).
Political opportunity is a common, but contested, concept in the study of policyoriented social movements. Political activities can spur mobilization; likewise, movement
decline can be linked to a number of endogenous and exogenous factors that include shifts in
the political landscape (Meyer 2003). For example, elections may change the composition of
Congress and shift support among policymakers for a movement’s cause. Goodwin and
Jasper (1999) argue that political opportunity is “built into the definition of social
movement” (31). Opportunity is necessary for movement emergence and sustained challenge.
As such, they suggest the idea of political opportunity be thought of as a “sensitizing
concept” (28).
I will use a broad definition of political environment that will allow me to analyze
how changes in the “world outside” the movement may impact message alignment and
policy production (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1457). Like Trumpy, I will identify changes in
the social, cultural, and political environment over the course of the challenge and when
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illustrative discuss how these changes contribute to an understanding of movement/target
message alignment and interaction outcomes.
The second limitation is that Trumpy takes mobilization, movement cohesion, and
message consistency for granted. By the late 1990s, Greenpeace was a well-established
organization with substantial resources. Clearly, the dynamics of initial and sustained
mobilization are important to carrying out a long-term institutional policy challenge, whether
the target is a corporation or the state. The Battered Women’s Movement is a coalition
movement. It has no static form over time. Further, Trumpy centralized the movement
message in her analysis, but the message was essentially synonymous with the organization.
As such, there was no need to examine or account for the persistence of the message outside
of Greenpeace’s activities. The current work will have to define the parameters of the
coalitions that comprise the Battered Women’s Movement and allow for the possibility of
multiple messages at any given interaction or challenge. When we define movement success
by the success of an organization, acceptance can be construed to represent a symbolic gain
for the movement, one that may have real consequences for the organizations and actors
themselves. It is not clear how messages are impacted by attempted and successful
cooptation by a movement’s target. This work will attempt to assess whether and how
messages change as a result of target framing and response.
V. Modeling Movement Message/Target Response in Public Policy Interactions
Trumpy focused on corporate framing; but public policy-makers also engage in
diagnostic and prognostic framing. Public policy change is typically a gradual and
incremental process. Baumgartner and Jones (1991; 1993) suggest that “policy
entrepreneurs” (typically outsiders to the policy making process) are at times successful at
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refashioning “policy images” (to bring policy-maker’s frames in line with their own).
Alignment of these images can result in seemingly dramatic policy changes. Policy issues are
defined and redefined as they “rise and fall” in importance on the public agenda (True, Jones,
and Baumgartner 2007, 156). As a result of fluctuations in public interest, policies attending
to issues are subject to re-evaluation. If an issue and its policy prescription falls from favor or
the problem is viewed as less important, then associated policies may be dramatically
eliminated; similarly, if a new and urgent issue arises policies may be created rapidly to
address the problem. For example, McCammon and colleagues find that where suffrage
advocates utilized “separate spheres framing,” promoting the special knowledge of women
on domestic matters over arguments for equality, states more quickly adopted laws that gave
women both the rights to vote and to serve on juries (McCammon et al. 2001; McCammon et
al. 2007). The success of framing on political outcomes depends then on creating congruency
between advocate beliefs and those of political actors and the public more generally.
A. Conceptualizing Movement Message/Target Interactions and Outcomes
This project will utilize Trumpy’s conceptualization of a movement challenge as a
series of interactions. The matrix in Figure 2 details possible interaction and challenge
outcomes for each identified path extending from the movement’s prognosis. The matrix
represents the order of operations for observing the process of movement message
interactions with the policy-making apparatus. It provides a rubric for systematically
assessing the interaction of movement messages with the policy process and outputs. One
column must be preceded by the other in time. If an interaction ends, but the movement
continues to press the challenge then subsequent interactions will be tracked along the same
matrix, from the beginning. Challenges can then be described chronologically as a series of
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interactions. By assessing outcomes of interactions over time, we may improve our
understanding of final outcomes (like cooptation).
The application of this matrix to coalition movement challenges in the public policy
realm requires some modification from Trumpy’s original design. In the sections which
follow, I will define each part of the interaction/outcome matrix and identify deviations from
Trumpy’s conceptualization of the process and its outcomes.
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Figure2. Interaction/Challenge Policy-Outcome Matrix Adapted from Trumpy (2008)
Challenger Frame
Development
Diagnostic and
Prognostic framing
Diagnostic and
Prognostic framing
Diagnostic and
Prognostic framing
Diagnostic and
Prognostic framing
Diagnostic and
Prognostic framing
Diagnostic and
Prognostic framing
Diagnostic and
Prognostic framing
Diagnostic and
Prognostic framing
Diagnostic and
Prognostic framing

Challenger
Action
Prognostic frame
deployed
Prognostic frame
deployed
Prognostic frame
deployed
Prognostic frame
deployed
Prognostic frame
deployed
Prognostic frame
deployed
Prognostic frame
deployed
Prognostic frame
deployed
Prognostic frame
deployed

Target
Frame
Rejects challenger
prognostic frame
Rejects challenger
prognostic frame
Rejects challenger
prognostic frame
Rejects challenger
prognostic frame
Accepts challenger
prognostic frame
Accepts challenger
prognostic frame
Accepts challenger
prognostic frame
Accepts challenger
prognostic frame
Accepts challenger
prognostic frame

Target
Action
No action
No action
Action
Action
No action
No action
Partial action
Partial action
Full action
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Challenger
Response
Prognostic
frame deployed
None/ Target
Supportive
Prognostic
frame deployed
None/ Target
Supportive
Prognostic
frame deployed
None/ Target
Supportive
Prognostic
frame deployed
None/ Target
Supportive
None/ Target
Supportive

Interaction
Outcome
Failed
Alignment
Failed
Alignment
Failed attempt
at preemption
Preemption

Challenge
Outcome
Challenge
Continues
Failure

Failed attempt
at cooptation
Cooptation

Challenge
Continues
Cooptation

Failed attempt
at compromise
Compromise

Challenge
Continues
Compromise

Reform

Reform

Challenge
Continues
Preemption

1. Challenger Frame Development
The first column in the matrix represents the movement’s internal framing
activities. Initial diagnostic and prognostic framing is largely accomplished outside of the
policymaking process and may not involve direct interaction with decision-makers.
Prognostic frames are the result of internal movement work, or activities that produce
what Johnston (1995) calls private frames. Private frames are those articulated during
conversations among and in meetings and internal correspondence by leaders,
organizational staff, membership, and constituents. Public frames are those for which the
movement intends for either indirect or direct consumption by the target (e.g.
announcements to media, announcements to public, conference proceedings, movement
publications). During a challenge, movement actor(s) must relay the prognostic message
to the target identified in the diagnosis of the problem. In evaluating message cooptation,
we are evaluating the outcome of the public frame.
This work will focus on following the public message once it is deployed.
Battered Women’s Movement historians have already documented mobilization and
grievance construction within the movement (see Martin 1976; Schechter 1982; and
Miller 2010). This column is included to allow for the possibility that movement frames
can be internally renegotiated over the course of a challenge. Observed changes in the
movement’s public message may require some investigation in order to separate shifts in
movement position from those that derive from internal tensions as opposed to efforts to
align with target frames.
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2. Challenger Action
The deployment of the message (making the message public) can be
accomplished through a variety of strategies. Organizations may produce informative
literature and/or engage in media campaigns in their attempts to influence public opinion
and/or decision-maker beliefs about the problem and its solutions (Benford and Snow
2000). Protest activity is at times utilized to draw attention to problems and the failure of
the political system to address the concerns of the aggrieved group (McAdam 1982;
Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1998); an activity carried out in hopes of creating
“bargaining leverage” with policy-makers (Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1982). Challengers
may also seek alliances with individuals inside the policy process (see King, Cornwall,
and Dahlin 2005 on suffragist participation in candidate campaigning; and Tilly 1978).
This is what Trumpy identifies as the movement’s action. Trumpy was concerned about
the effects of different types of deployment. The current project seeks to evaluate whether
and in what form messages themselves appear, reappear, and disappear in policy debates.
As such, I will define challenger action as the presence of a message or set of messages in
the public realm, where it has the opportunity to intersect with the policy process. I will
give attention to the strategy of deployment where needed to understand observed
interactions and outcomes.
3. Target Frame
The public frame of policy-making targets (here the U.S. Congress) are contained
in policy proposals and official communications related to the introduction,
consideration, and decisions on legislation. Like movements, policymakers also engage
in diagnostic and prognostic frame development. Regardless of how they are developed,
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proposals represent a publicly articulated prognostic frame. The target frame may mirror
that of the challenger, encompass some of the attributions proposed by the challenger, or
offer a completely different take on the solution for the problem.
4. Target Action
In the current project, target action is also embedded in the policy proposal and
subsequent actions of Congress on the proposal. Target action will consist of whether or
not policies contain actual prescriptions consistent with the challenger’s prognosis for
addressing the grievance. The classification of a prescription as action also depends in
part on congressional activities related to the consideration of a policy proposal after its
introduction—including holding committee hearings, committee votes, floor votes,
proposal amendments, and the ultimate passage or rejection of policy proposals. Similar
to the target frame, target actions may be either partially or fully consistent with or in
opposition to the challenger’s message.
5. Challenger Response
The challenger response column represents the assessment of challenger action
subsequent to the target’s response to the prognostic frame. The challenger can offer no
response, a target supportive response, or a reassert the prognostic frame. The former two
responses indicate an acceptance of the target’s frame and action. The continued
promotion of the prognostic frame represents the rejection of the target’s response, which
may lead to the continuation of the challenge.
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Outcomes
The matrix includes five possible outcomes: failure, preemption, 1 cooptation,
compromise and reform. These outcomes are defined using Gamson’s conceptual rubric,
while maintaining the possibility of reform being either partial or complete. Acceptance
and non-acceptance will be identified by frame alignment between challenger messages
and policy proposals. New advantages will be identified by whether or not the policy
proposal provides an action consistent with the challenger’s prognosis. In order to
determine the outcome of a challenge, outcomes from interactions within the challenge
will be assessed over time.
B. Conceptualizing Outcomes in a Coalition Movement
Cooptation is a dynamic process which may be illuminated by examining
challenger/target interactions. By articulating a challenge as a series of interactions, it
creates the possibility of identifying new challenges and new challengers. This takes us
beyond attempts to define movements and movement outcomes as predetermined static
elements, freeing the analysis to explore shifts in movement composition, messages, and
strategies over time. The primary benefit to this approach is the potential to refine
concepts for which social movement research has primarily ceded to proxy measurement,
while at the same time drawing out mechanisms that connect movement messages to
policy outcomes.

1

Similar to failure, preemption occurs when the target rejects the challenger frame (failed frame alignment).
But unlike outright failure, the target takes action that is consistent with the challenger’s prognosis. So the
interaction is a failure for the challenger, because and the resulting action cannot be attributed to the
acceptance of the prognosis and thus the challenger cannot easily take credit for the outcome. This is less
important in the current work, since the focus is on message persistence rather than attribution of influence.
I include it to allow for the possibility that the target may take action without acknowledging the
challengers message.
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For a number of practical reasons, research often treats single organizations as
lone movement actors. Trumpy (and Gamson for that matter) postulated a one to one
correspondence between a single organization and a single target. The relationship
between interaction and challenge outcomes may play out differently where the challenge
is being carried out by multiple movement actors. Scholars also recognize that most
movements are comprised of coalitions of actors and organizations with varying degrees
of connectivity and coordination (McCammon et al. 2001; Meyer 2003; Meyer and
Corrigall-Brown 2005). There has also been some recognition of movement/policy-maker
coalition formation (Sterns and Almeida 2004; Santoro and McGuire 1997). For coalition
movements, multiple types of responses may follow an attempted cooptation, since each
segment of the coalition can choose a different response. The composition of a coalition
at any given point in time is an empirical question.
Trumpy’s approach can be extended to be more consistent with the idea of a
social movement as a coalition of actors and organizations. The extent of cooperation in
any coalition varies both in degree and over time. Cooptation attempts may be rejected by
part or all of a movement coalition, yielding a more complex story on movement
influence and outcomes than has previously been examined. In the proposed approach,
whether or not the challenge continues is a variable that requires assessment of the
presence of challenge, which may be carried by different challengers in different places
and time. Identifying the carrier of the message at each interaction is a deductive process,
where the carrier is included as a movement actor not by organizational affiliation, but
rather by whether or not they carry the movement’s message (excluding the target of
course).
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C. Frame Alignment
In order for the BWM to be considered “influential” in the federal public policy
domain, one would also expect to see the inclusion of movement prognoses in the
proposals themselves. Frame alignment is defined as the outcome of strategic efforts to
link diagnostic and prognostic frames with those of actual or prospective constituents,
resource providers, or targets (Snow et al. 1986). The interaction of policy-oriented
movements with the political process can be thought of as an attempt to align policy with
the movement’s ideas on the source of the problem and what can be done to bring about a
remedy. These efforts are carried out through the movement’s public activities and can
involve numerous interactions over time. The goal of these interactions is to transform
the target’s diagnostic and prognostic frames to match those of the movement. Benford
and Snow (2000) describe frame alignment as contested processes, both in the
development of movement frames internally as well as in the broader public sphere
where the target, competing movements, the media, public opinion, and other sociocultural structures all play a role. As a result of the contested nature of the process, the
outcome of alignment efforts are never guaranteed and may require an extended
challenge to achieve success. These qualities suggest the need for continued assessment
of the movement’s role in agenda setting and proposal content over time—documenting
both movement participation in the policy debate and analyzing the provisions of policy
proposals for congruence with movement prognostic frames.
Challenges that are sustained over long periods of time pose additional challenges
for understanding success and failure for social movements. Following Gamson (1990),
movement scholars have assessed the role of organizational variables (size, stability,
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strategy, leadership and access to decision-makers) in determining social movement
influence on public policy (for examples of this work see Burstein and Linton 2002;
Johnson 2008; King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; Staggenborg 1988). Like Trumpy, these
works generally define the movements by organizations. However, it is possible that
individuals, other types of social institutions, and/or broad shifts in socio-cultural
understanding of the problem can sustain the message over time. So in one period, the
movement may have to work hard to promote their message, but over time the idea may
take hold outside of the movement community. The message can become a common
interpretation of the problem; and rather than something in need of promotion, the
“settled” idea is a resource for subsequent movement action (Swidler 1986).
Public frames not only become embedded in the public discourse, but also
become part of the political discourse as well (Johnston 1995). When policy-makers
accept the movement message, even in the absence of subsequent action, the message is
no longer dependent on the movement actor for persistence (Zucker 1977). Phillips and
Grattet (2000) argue that once a movement deploys a frame into a “legal environment,”
the frame is either accepted (aligned) or rejected by the legal discourse surrounding the
issue. They suggest that if the frame is accepted, then the movement’s message begins to
“settle” into legal meaning. Over time, these meanings are institutionalized in legal
discourse on the issue, becoming a script for subsequent legal debate. By aligning (either
in part or in full) with the movement’s frame, the target contributes to the
institutionalization and cultural persistence of the movement’s message. Even if frame
alignment does not lead to policy reform (like in Trumpy’s observation of attempted
cooptation), it may lead to the message taking on the characteristic of objectivity. If the
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challenge continues, coopted interactions may be one important step toward policy
reform.
VI. Conclusion
Early in this chapter, I presented the question: how can we reconcile or otherwise
assess both the claims of movement cooptation and the perceptions of movement
influence on continuing policy development in the domestic violence policy arena? I
propose that one way to answer this question, and thus to create a better understanding of
the mechanisms of social movement influence on public policy outcomes, is through the
examination of prognostic frame interactions that focus on the presence and outcomes of
the messages themselves. Although limited in scope, the recent research on the outcomes
of social movement prognostic messages has yielded three theoretical precepts that
provide a framework for examining this question. First, social movement messages are
empirically observable expressions of the movement’s goals and expectations for target
action. Second, we can learn about social movement outcomes by examining the
outcomes of movement messages and target response frames over time. And third, there
are underlying mechanisms leading to movement outcomes that result from the
persistence of message making. A longitudinal assessment of BWM message outcomes
may help us account for the contradictory perceptions that the movement was coopted
during early stages of the challenge but influenced domestic violence policy development
in the long term. To accomplish this task, empirical evidence will be investigated to
address five sub-questions:
1. What were the goals of the BWM?
2. What demands did the BWM make on federal lawmakers?

38

3. How did federal lawmakers respond to the prognostic messages of the BWM?
4. What were the outcomes for BWM prognostic messages in Congressional policy
proposals?
5. In what ways do these outcomes represent the continuing influence of the BWM
on domestic violence policy?
The current work extends the analysis of policy-oriented movement/target
interactions in a couple of ways. First, I will use Trumpy’s model and strategy to examine
a case study. However, the unit of analysis will be the prognostic frame, rather than the
particular social movement organization. I will also look at multiple policy challenges
within the case of the Battered Women’s Movement. This will allow for a comparison
not only of message outcomes at different interactions, but also allow for an examination
of how messages persist, differ, or evolve across challenges. Second, addressing
movement outcomes based on a single organizational outcome is misleading. I will use
this approach to assess interactions that involve different organizations and to answer
questions regarding not only whether or not cooptation happened, but also to whom it
happened, what message was coopted, and whether or not cooptation actually represented
compromise or reform for any particular part of the movement.
In addition to resolving the inconsistency between claims of movement cooptation
and movement influence on policy outcomes, this approach also contributes to the
theoretical development of three additional areas of social movement scholarship. First,
examining movement interactions with policy-makers may help us improve the
conceptualization of movement policy oriented strategies and reconcile these strategies
with an otherwise “outsider” status. Second, examining movement challenges as a series
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of interactions may lead to a better understanding of how and why movement messages
change over time as policy challenges play out. Lastly, the approach can lead to a better
understanding of how a once “radical” message becomes commonplace or
institutionalized through the policy process.
In Chapter Three, I operationalize the key concepts defined above as necessary
for examining message cooptation. I also detail data sources, identify data collection
strategies and discuss coding and analysis techniques, and examine issues related to
validity and generalizability.
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Chapter Three
Methodology

I. Introduction
In this dissertation, I analyze the relationship between social movements and
public policy; more specifically, I explore how public policy responds to movement
messaging (and vice versa), and the mechanisms through which this occurs. Specifically,
I focus on two overarching questions: (1) to what extent do federal policies on domestic
violence represent favorable responses to the Battered Women's Movement? And (2) how
can we reconcile or otherwise assess both the claims of movement cooptation and the
perceptions of movement influence on continuing policy development in the domestic
violence policy arena? My interests here focus on but are not limited to social movement
cooptation. This work specifically looks at the extent to which the content of domestic
violence policy proposals represents either favorable response to or cooptation of the
public messages of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM) from 1977 to 1994. This
chapter describes the research strategy including case selection, study design, data
collection, and method of analysis.
II. Case Selection
The BWM is an appropriate case for examining the model of cooptation proposed
in this research for several reasons. First, evaluating policy production requires having a
significant period of time in which to observe both outcomes and the presence of
interested parties as proposals are revised and reintroduced. The BWM began policyoriented claims-making in the mid-1970s. The first substantial policy achievement in the
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U.S. Congress, the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Between the initiation
of movement claims-making and the adoption of VAWA, numerous related policy
proposals were introduced.
Second, while scholars continue to link the battered women’s movement and its
activists to both state and federal policy change, there is little to no empirical evidence to
support this connection. Only a handful of published works examine this connection (see
Gagne 1998 on a single-state movement for clemency for women who kill their batterers;
Jenness 1999 on advocate participation in VAWA proceedings; Murphy 1997 on statelevel adoption of police reform laws; Reinelt 1995 on single-state coalition formation;
and Schechter 1982 on the origins of the BWM movement). BWM advocates participated
in Congressional hearings on domestic violence proposals. Schechter (1982) documents
the participation of BWM advocates in the first Congressional hearings on federal
domestic violence legislation in 1978. Jenness (1999) found that advocate participation in
VAWA hearings in the early 1990s was limited, but advocates were represented in these
hearings prior to proposal adoption in 1994. Furthermore, there were a number of
domestic violence bills introduced during intervening Congressional sessions. These
proposals and the participation of BWM advocacy have not been compared over time.
Third, BWM advocacy has routinely targeted government response to violence
against women in society. In so doing, the movement offers an excellent case study of the
blurring of boundaries between conventional politics and outsider activism. This is in part
derived from the relationship between BWM advocacy and the larger Women’s
Movement, where the feminist conceptualization of violence against women sees such
violence as rooted in systemic patriarchy (Gagne 1998). As such, advocates have targeted
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the state to secure equal rights for women. In doing so, BWM advocacy has involved the
constant integration of activism with conventional politics (Reinelt 1995). Furthermore,
this work was undertaken by a variety of institutions and organizations, so much so that it
is frequently dismissed as either social service provision or criminal justice interest group
politics. The BWM movement is comprised not only of SMOs, but also a diverse base of
non-profit organizations that provide services, support, and system advocacy to women
and families affected by domestic violence (Broad and Jenness 1996). The suggestion
that the BWM movement was co-opted by institutional response (Johnson 1981; Tierney
1982) is rooted in the blurring of the boundaries between outsider advocacy and
conventional politics. Gagne (1998) suggests that the national representation of the BWM
movement was compromised when the NCADV accepted funding from the Department
of Justice in the 1980s. While this may have prohibited representatives from direct
lobbying, it does not exclude NACDV or any other such organization either from
advocating movement goals or participating in Congressional hearings. The proposed
question specifically requires an exploration of the interweaving of activism with
conventional politics and conceptualizes the movement as a broad coalition of
organizations and agents in order to allow an investigation of these boundaries.
III. Study Design
The current project utilized a qualitative research design. First, I used a case study
design to document the origin, mobilization, and claims-making history of the BWM.
The case study approach is appropriate for the production of a macroscopic overview of
particular movement or movement component where the goal is to illuminate “focal
actions, events and/or processes” (Snow and Trom 2002). For this work, I focused on
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producing a rich description of the origin and evolution of the BWM’s claims-making
over time. Historical case studies produce context-dependent knowledge. And while this
type of knowledge is rooted in time and space, it improves the ability of research to
assess the relevance of and understand the impact of discrete events (Flyvbjerg 2006).
Historical documents produced by movement activists and organizations, published
movement histories, research reports, and records of public testimony by movement
activists were collected, coded and analyzed.
Second, a longitudinal interpretative policy analysis method was used to examine
the outcome of movement claims-making on the content of federal policy proposals.
“Interpretative policy analysis” is a qualitative approach to identifying the “architecture”
of policy arguments, aimed at exposing the symbolic and consequential meanings
imbedded in policy work (Yanow 2000). The method extends traditional policy analysis
strategies to include the goal of identifying how meanings are created or changed through
the policy process as different “interpretations” of a policy issue are transmitted during
policy formulation, consideration and action. Yanow (2000) contends that understanding
policy-making and outcomes requires conceptualizing these activities within the
community context both in which the issue arose and in which the policy would be
enacted. Congressional bill proposals related to the issue of woman battering and
domestic violence were retrieved and ordered to construct a chronological history of
federal policy-making. The legislative history was then compared with chronological
development of BWM messages derived during the movement case study. These
intertwining histories of public claims-making were analyzed to evaluate the dynamics of
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policy response to movement prognostic messages. The details of data collection, coding,
and analysis are discussed in detail below.
IV. Data Collection and Coding
I collected multiple sources of data in order to document both movement and
target messages. The project involved two separate data collections: (1) publicly available
works by activists, organizations, and scholars of the battered women’s movement, and
(2) congressional bills data, proposals, and related documents.
A. Identifying the Battered Women’s Movement Coalition
The first step was defining and conceptualizing the boundaries of the movement.
As discussed in the previous chapter, movements are comprised of coalitions of actors
and organizations with varying degrees of connectivity and coordination (McCammon et
al. 2001; Meyer 2003; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005). Movements also may organize
within a particular policy domain which is defined as “a component of the political
system that is organized around substantive issues” (Burstein 1991, 328). Furthermore,
movements function in larger organizational fields. The organizational field is defined as
“those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional
life” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 148). Noy (2009) studied homeless policy in San
Francisco and identified the “field” as all of the “organizations and political offices
within San Francisco that were someway involved in (1) shaping the city’s homeless
policy; (2) providing input to policy makers about city homeless policy and programs; or
(3) implementing city homeless policy” (226). By this definition, both movement and
target (policy makers/gatekeepers) are part of the organizational field, along with a host
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of other agencies that work in the area of homeless services (advocates, service providers,
businesses, and government agencies).
Thus, the battered woman policy domain or organizational field includes not only
social movement organizations, but also local, state, and federal government policymakers and agencies, civic organizations engaged in social problems interventions,
medical, mental health, and social service agencies and practitioners, researchers and
educators engaged in both knowledge production and training of professionals in a
variety of fields. The domain would include any individual, group, or agency with a stake
in social policy related to the problem of woman battering.
The composition of a coalition movement is an empirical question to be answered
by observation of movement activities at any given point in time. For the purpose of this
data collection, the BWM is the coalition of individuals and organizations that organized
to challenge the social conditions that caused, facilitated, and normalized woman
battering in society. Some components of the movement coalition are easy to identify:
feminist shelter activists and feminist organizations with platforms on sexism, sexual
assault, sexual harassment, and pornography. Not all feminist groups articulated a public
message on woman battering, but many did. Others are more difficult to distinguish from
other types of groups in the organizational field. For example, battered women’s shelters
are considered to be the primary incubators of the movement (Schechter 1982). But,
shelters with different ideological orientations formed simultaneously with those that
would be considered part of the movement (e.g. Al Anon, Community Crisis Center in
Elgin, IL). The approach to determining carriers of the movement message centered on
whether the publicly articulated message presented a challenge to existing norms,
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policies, or practices related to the social reproduction of woman battering. The provision
of shelter or services alone was not enough to be included in the movement coalition.
Additionally, these groups at times provided competing or counter messages. Chapters 4
and 5 will provide a more detailed identification of actors and organizations that
influenced, shaped, and carried the movement’s message.
As stated above, the organizational field includes those that would be considered
the target of social movement activity. For this work, the target is specifically identified
as the policy-makers in the U.S. Congress. The movement also targeted other
stakeholders within the policy domain: professional medical, social work and criminal
justice organizations, non-feminist oriented civic groups, local and state governments and
their agents. While many of these groups began their own public advocacy related to
issues of domestic and family violence, they were not part of the movement coalition.
Evaluating the outcome of movement challenges across all possible targets is beyond the
scope of this work. However, the movement’s public claims frequently criticize and call
for reform among these areas of the policy domain. The tension between the movement
and this group of allies/competitors is discussed in the description of the movement’s
public messages in the first section of Chapter 5.
B. Movement Messages and Action
The documentation of movement prognostic frames (movement messages) for the
coalition of actors engaged in BWM work required a focus on public sources rather than
organizational specific sources. Public movement messages were derived from original
source documents, including: published books, newsletters, transcripts from testimony at
public hearings, research articles and reports, manuals on policy and program strategies,
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and personal papers of movement activists. 2 Documents were collected for years 1972 to
1996. This time period allowed for the identification of early public messages of the
movement prior to the introduction of domestic violence related legislation in the U.S.
Congress and those that continued to be offered after the passage of the Violence Against
Women Act in 1993.
Movement data was collected in three stages. First, I began data collection by
identifying existing written histories in book or monograph form. These documents
included Del Martin’s (1976) Battered Wives, Women and Male Violence: The Visions
and Struggles of the Battered Women’s Movement by activist Susan Schechter (1982),
Women, Violence, & Social Change by historians Emerson and Russell Dobash (1992),
Donileen R. Loseke’s (1992) The Battered Woman and Shelters: The Social Construction
of Wife Abuse, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking by Elizabeth Schneider (2000),
Kirsten Rambo’s (2009) Trivial Complaints: The Role of Privacy in Domestic Violence
Law and Activism in the U.S. and additional works focusing on particular aspects of the
BWM or its policy history. Some of these works were more than historical references;
those published during the time frame of this analysis were also considered movement
message sources. Second, I documented and downloaded transcripts of congressional or
other government agency hearings and testimonies where battered women and their
advocates made claims directly to lawmakers. These documents provide insight into
direct movement/policy-maker framing opportunities. The third stage of data collection
was to procure movement literature to supplement the historical and official policy
record. Articles related to woman battering were abstracted from Aegis: Magazine on

2

A complete list of source documents can be found in the references under the heading Data Sources.
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Ending Violence Against Women, 3 monographs and research reports produced by
movement organizations produced between 1974 and 1996. In total, 81 documents were
included. Table 1 shows the distribution of movement data sources by type. Citations for
movement data sources are provided in Appendix A.
Table 1. Number of Source Documents for Movement Data by Document Type
Type of Source Document
Movement histories, books, chapters, theses/dissertations
Congressional or government agency hearing transcripts
Movement Publications (newsletters and monographs)
Total

Number
10
39
32
81

C. Coding Movement Messages
Movement documents were coded using a conventional qualitative content
analysis coding technique. Conventional content analysis technique involves the
identification and systematic categorization of themes or patterns from the text itself as
opposed to beginning with key concepts or categories from coding as they are defined in
theory (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). This approach is appropriate where the goal is the
interpretation of the content of text data and the aim of research is describing a
phenomenon for which existing research is limited (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1278).
While themes were coded inductively, I approached movement documents looking
specifically for three categories of information: movement definition of the problem,
movement prognostic framing of the solution, and movement policy preferences.
Many of the documents used in this effort were in book or monograph form, some on
loan from libraries. As such, it was not feasible to utilize coding software. The
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Ageis: Magazine on Ending Violence Against Women was published between 1978 and 1987 and is
archived online by the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence and can be found at
http://pubs.pcadv.net/AEGIS_Newsletters/.
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information derived from documents was abstracted onto coding forms and entered into a
spreadsheet matrix. The matrix was organized by categories reflecting the type of
information contained in the document: definitions of woman battering or domestic
violence, diagnosis of the problem, prognostic messages, and policy preferences. As
themes emerged, the matrix was expanded to include codes for common themes within
these categories. Some material contained overlapping themes; these items were entered
into all relevant areas of the matrix. In addition, mentions of specific events, policies, or
organizations were documented and included in the movement history time line (see
Appendix B). I have provided a description of movement data sources and thematic
categories of diagnostic and prognostic messages a Chapter 5.
D. Target Messages and Action
The primary data source for target messages are the documents making up the
official Congressional record for policy proposals involving domestic violence
prevention, intervention, and service provision bills introduced between 1975 and 1994. I
generated a complete list of bills for each Congressional using two methods. First, I
searched the bill database maintained by Congressional Bills Project at the University of
Washington and located at www.congressionalbills.org. 4 These datasets are organized by
Congress and index all bills introduced during each session in both the House and Senate
between 1947 and 2002. In addition to bill identifiers (number, title, and topic), the
database documents bill sponsor, demographic and committee assignment information for
the sponsor, the number of co-sponsors, committee assignment information, and actions
taken on the bill during the session. I began bill identification by pulling all bills coded
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E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, Congressional Bills Project: (1976-1994), NSF 00880066 and
00880061. The views expressed are those of the authors and not the National Science Foundation.
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by the Congressional Bills Project with the index: “domestic violence.” 5 Second, I
searched the full bill text for key word combinations using the LexisNexis Congressional
Universe and Thomas.gov. 6 I reviewed the bill descriptions and selected those pertaining
to domestic violence, violence against women, intimate partner violence, sex assault,
rape, victim rights for further review. The results of this search were compared with those
found using the congressional bills index. Since the goal was to identify all domestic
violence related bills, including broad bills with domestic violence related provisions, the
results of both searches were combined and duplicate entries were deleted. Further, bills
using the term “domestic violence” to distinguish violence within the United States as
opposed to foreign conflict were also deleted. In total, I identified 150 House and 105
Senate bills that met the search criteria. Citations for target data sources are provided in
Appendix C.
Once I identified the population of domestic violence bills, I retrieved all related
congressional documents for each bill, including (when applicable): the bill text as
originally introduced, committee reports and transcripts of public hearings, reports
compiled by the Congressional Research Service, bill mark-ups (revisions) completed in
committee, the final bill text as considered in floor votes, including any amendments, and
roll call voting records. These documents are mostly available in full-text from
LexisNexis Congressional Universe (Proquest). LexisNexis indexes Congressional
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I excluded a number of bills that were indexed as “domestic violence,” including: bills concerned
exclusively with child or elder abuse, bills wherein the term “domestic violence” connotes acts of domestic
terrorism against U.S. citizens, and bills broadly related to violence and violent crime not specifically
aimed at woman battering or household/domestic violence against women.
6
Search terms were divided into two categories: one representing woman (woman, women, sex, gender,
domestic, spouse, spousal, marriage, martial, wife, sexual, intimate, family, household, victim), one
representing battered (abuse, assault, battered, battery, violence, rape, offend, offense, crime).
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documents and publications from the 91st Congress (1969-1970) to the present 7. In some
cases, identified documents could not be retrieved in full text from this source. Some
documents were retrieved from hard copy government documents available through
interlibrary loan or the University of New Mexico Libraries.
E. Coding Target Messages
As bill documents were collected, I assembled a record for each domestic
violence proposal introduced between 1977 and 1994. The record was arranged
chronologically, documenting Congressional consideration and decision-making for each
bill. For some bills, this was relatively simple, including only the original proposal as
introduced, the bill sponsor, and perhaps the committee to which it was assigned.
Multiple bills with similar content were often introduced during the same session. Some
of these bills did not result in any formal action beyond the bill introduction process. For
others, the record is much larger as committee hearing transcripts, reports, and bill markups were added.
Similar to the movement data, bills and related policy documents were coded
using the conventional inductive content analysis coding technique. Also similar to
movement document coding, these documents were approached with broad analytic
categories: definition of the problem, prognostic framing of the solution, and policy
products aimed at addressing the problem. During coding, 41 additional bills were
identified as unrelated to this project. The elimination of these cases resulted in a final
count of 214 bills (House N = 124, Senate N = 90). In total, 248 separate codes were
assigned to one of the six categories of prognostic frames identified during movement

7

Indexed documents include: committee prints, Congressional Research Service reports, hearing
transcripts, House and Senate reports, bill text, and legislative histories.
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coding: (1) awareness, research, and education; (2) civil rights; (3) crime, criminal
justice, and crime victim reforms; (4) social welfare, services, and public health
initiatives; (5) shelter and domestic violence service programs; and (6) social, economic,
and cultural change provisions. In addition to the six prognostic frame categories, I also
coded definitions of the problem (when provided in the bill) and identified
implementation preferences. Codes were added to an SPSS database that was constructed
with the bill descriptors obtained from the Congressional Bills Data project.
The history of federal domestic violence lawmaking has not been well
documented. Assembling this record allowed me to establish a descriptive account of the
volume, types, and the evolution of BWM proposals over time. Chapter 6 provides a
description of the number of bills introduced each interaction period and the
characteristics of these introductions (Congressional body of introduction, types of policy
changes proposed, sponsor characteristics, committee activities, Congressional voting
activity, and whether or not the bills became law).
V. Method of Analysis
Interpretative policy analysis is conducted in a number of ways. The basic outline
of the approach involves analyzing policy artifacts, objects, language and acts and trying
to understand the meanings from the standpoint of one or more interpretive communities
(Yanow 2000). I approached the analysis by first assembling interaction periods. The
next step was to assemble coded data for prognostic frame category comparisons between
movement messages and policy proposals. These activities are described in detail below.
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A. Assembling Interactions
Interactions were assembled by “Congress.” Each two year Congressional session
was treated as the period of target response to BWM claims-making. BWM messages
prior to and during the congressional period were considered prognostic framing or
claims-making for the period under analysis. Movement messages following the period
were interpreted as movement response (or non-response) to the target’s action. In total,
ten periods of interaction were constructed. Table 2 provides the breakdown of years by
message/action type by Congress.
Table 2. Interaction Periods for Movement Framing and Target Response
Congress
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Period of Movement
Prognostic Framing
1975-1976
1977-1978
1979-1980
1981-1982
1983-1984
1985-1986
1987-1988
1989-1990
1991-1992

Period of Target
Response
1977-1978
1979-1980
1981-1982
1983-1984
1985-1986
1987-1988
1989-1990
1991-1992
1993-1994

Period of Movement
Response Framing
1979-1980
1981-1982
1983-1984
1985-1986
1987-1988
1989-1990
1991-1992
1993-1994
1995-1996

Clearly, one period of target response overlaps with the next period of movement
framing. I will also be looking at movement messages relayed through testimony at
Congressional hearings within the time period of target response. On the surface,
overlapping time periods may seem problematic. Quantitative event history analysis
models require discrete time periods with a clear demarcation of the occurrence of
independent and dependent variables. However, the project of conceptualizing social
movement message framing and a qualitative analysis of frame alignment requires a more
fluid approach. The dates of each period are rough estimates meant to preserve an idea of
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proximity of message deployment to the development and introduction of policy
proposals. Analyzing hearings held during the target response period provides the
opportunity to observe direct debate, alignment, or disagreement between movement
actors (when they are included) and policymakers. The overlapping nature of these
categories reflects the social and political reality of framing activities.
B. Comparison
The goal of the comparison was to document correspondence with, divergence
from, and cooptation of movement messages by federal policy proposals. The first step in
this process was to document and compare the categories of prognostic messages that
emerged from the respective document sources. A rubric of movement message themes
and target policy themes across interaction periods was constructed. An example of the
rubric is provided in Figure 3. Each movement and target frame was entered as a row in
an excel spreadsheet with the time period and prognostic frame category so that the rubric
could be manipulated by both time period and dimension. Messages were then grouped
into interaction periods for analysis of the movement message outcomes. The success of
policy proposals was not the primary focus of this work; however, the rubric also
includes fields to document the progression of bills through the policy process (e.g.
hearings, votes, and adoption of public laws). Tables were constructed to compare the
“architecture” of the primary categories and dimensions of prognostic frames appearing
in both movement and policy sources. From these tables, interactions with findings of
prognostic frame alignment were identified. The documents making up the record for
these items were explored more in-depth to determine whether the alignment yielded
actions consistent with new advantages or attempts at cooptation.
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Figure 3. Sample Rubric for Comparing Movement and Congressional Messages
Congress Year

Prognostic
ClaimsFrame
maker
Dimensions
1978 Crisis
Movement
Intervention
Resources

Document
ID

Prognostic Frame

95

Tinker 1978,
EDL-0016

Government funding
should be provided to
battered women’s shelters
as directly as possible
Shelter should be available
to all women without
income eligibility
requirements
Grant program for
emergency or crisis shelter
and services for domestic
violence victims

95

1978 Crisis
Movement Fields 1978,
Intervention
TEC-0040
Resources

95

1978 Crisis
Congress
Intervention
Resources

HR 7927,
1978

C. Frame Alignment and Outcomes
Frame alignment is defined as the outcome of strategic efforts to link diagnostic
and prognostic frames with those of actual or prospective constituents, resource
providers, or targets (Snow et al. 1986). The interaction of policy-oriented movements
with the political process can be thought of as an attempt to align policy with the
movement’s ideas on the source of the problem and what can be done to bring about a
remedy. The outcome assessment matrix adapted from Trumpy and presented in Chapter
2 includes five possible outcomes: failure, preemption, cooptation, compromise and
reform. These outcomes are defined using Gamson’s conceptual rubric. For simplicity, I
have dropped Trumpy’s designation of compromise as a separate outcome and merged
partial reform with full reform. The distinction of partial and full success will still be
noted in the text. The rubric in Figure 4 details the definitions used to determine four
frame outcomes: frame success, frame cooptation, frame preemption, and frame failure.
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Figure 4. Rubric of Frame Outcomes

Acceptance

No
Acceptance

Inclusion
Success: Proposal introduced into
congress to address the problem
identified by the movement;
Proposal prescription for change
is consistent with that requested in
the associated movement
diagnostic and prognostic frames

No Inclusion
Cooptation: Proposal introduced
into Congress to address the
problem identified by the
movement; Proposal prescription for
change is inconsistent with that
requested in the associated
movement diagnostic and prognostic
frames
Preemption: Proposals
Failure: No proposals introduced
introduced in Congress that
into Congress to address the
address issues not raised by the
problem identified by the
movement, but providing a
movement; or proposals are
prescription for change that would introduced in Congress that
yield advantages for the
demonstrate a rejection of the
movement or the beneficiary
movement diagnostic and prognostic
population
frames—proposing an alternative
solution that would not yield
advantages for the movement or the
beneficiary population

Acceptance and non-acceptance will be identified by comparing prognostic
frames between movement messages and policy proposals. Acceptance is the
acknowledgment by the target that movement actors are legitimate spokesperson on the
issue at hand or for the population to be affected by the outcome of the desired change. In
this work, acceptance is demonstrated by Congress articulating a proposal to address an
issue raised by the movement. For example, the movement demands direct funding for
shelter operations and Congress introduces a bill related to the need for shelter. Counterframing by policymakers or a failure to address the movement’s prognostic frame
altogether constitutes non-acceptance.
Inclusion is identified when target policy proposals contain prescriptions for
change consistent with the challenger’s prognosis for addressing the grievance. Since this
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work is dealing with messages and not the actual products of the policy, I will refer to
inclusion rather than the traditional new advantages. Inclusion accrues when the
movement gained something it sought during the challenge. Here this means Congress
included a prescription for change in the proposal that was consistent with the change
requested by the movement. For example, the movement demands direct funding for
shelter operation and congress introduces a bill to provide direct grants to shelters for
funding operations. Bills that do not include such prescriptions would be defined by noninclusion.
Since the focus of this work is on the outcome of movement prognostic framing,
the identification of acceptance and new advantages does not require the policy proposal
to be successful. Johnston (1995) recommends studying frame alignment by analyzing
the details of movement frames—rather than focusing on trying to reconcile outcomes
with a movement’s global goal. In other words, evidence of movement influence through
frame analysis requires assessing the micro-level aspects of the frame instead of trying to
match the movement goal to a policy accomplishment. The latter is too abstract and
requires a more speculative and subjective interpretation. By tying frames to their
empirical expressions, we can better assess agreement between the movement frame and
proposed policies. In this study, the presence of movement messages in policy proposals
(whether enacted or not) constitutes evidence of acceptance of the movements claims and
therefore can be identified as an indicator of influence. However, it is still important to
recognize that an adopted policy may carry more impact in future frame interactions than
a frame alignment in a failed proposal. To capture these dynamics, two types of outcomes
will be discussed: frame outcomes and policy outcomes. Frame outcomes will be
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determined as described above. I use the term success rather than reform to distinguish
between the outcome of the frame and the outcome of the policy overall. Policy
outcomes, including policy reform, preemption, cooptation, and failure will also be noted
in the findings. Policy outcomes are determined based on the frame outcome and whether
or not the bill is adopted by Congress and signed into law.
VI. Validity
One of the strengths of this method is the inclusion of diverse sources of data. My
goal was to provide “substantive validation” for my findings. Angen (2000) describes
substantive validation as having three components: the researcher must identify their own
interpretations, clearly present the understandings derived from other sources, and
account for the process of generating these understandings in the written record of the
research. I have included a number of historical works on the BWM in the data collection
process. While none of these works examine both the movement and policy history over
the same period of time, these sources can be used collectively to verify divergences
between my interpretation and those of activists and policy makers producing the artifacts
subjected to interpretation. Diversions of my representation of movement messages and
policy content presented in this work from those of existing works will be noted.
VII. Generalizability
The presumed lack of generalizability of a case study is perhaps the most frequent
criticism of this type of work. However, Snow and Trom (2002) note that the case study
is an appropriate method for making generalizations about theoretical refinement. This is
particularly the case when the context of the process under study is subject to changing
conditions and contexts (Cress and Snow 2000). This work seeks to improve the
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conceptualization of message cooptation and other outcomes that result when social
movements make public messages about social policy issues. While the conditions of this
case are contextually bound, the theoretical refinement of the concept may be generalized
to future works examining social movement message cooptation.
VIII. Conclusion
I present findings in three chapters. The next chapter details the origins and
history of claims-making of the BWM, including the documentation of the goals of the
movement and the development of movement preferences for social interventions related
to those goals. Chapter 5 provides a description of movement prognostic frames aimed at
federal public policy on domestic violence and Chapter 6 documents frame alignment
success and failure across different messages and congressional sessions. The Conclusion
(Chapter 7) explores the significance of these findings for understanding movement
messaging and policy outcomes, and considers the generalizability of these findings for
conceptualizing outcomes in policy-oriented movements more broadly.
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Chapter Four
History of a Publicly Articulated Message on Battered Women: Movement Origins,
Evolution, and Ideological Orientations

I. Introduction
This chapter details the origins of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM). For
the purposes of this work, I defined the Battered Women’s Movement not as a specific set
of social movement organizations, but rather as a broad political effort to change the
social conditions that perpetuate women’s experience of violence in the domestic sphere.
The movement was initiated and supported by a complex field of individual victimsurvivors and allied activists and organizations that worked toward the goal of ending
violence against women. While women’s movement activists and organizations often
addressed issues of violence against women in general, the BWM was primarily focused
on violence that occurs in the “domestic sphere” meaning spousal or intimate partner
violence against wives and women by their husbands or intimate partners. The movement
was political in the sense that the targets for change were external to the individuals and
groups involved in the movement, and often focused on social policy at the state or
federal level. A good portion of the dialogue in this movement and about this movement
had a feminist orientation. However, there were numerous participants and allied parties
that did not adopt feminist principals or forms of organization. Nonetheless, the ideas of
the women’s rights and women’s liberation movement are central elements to the
movement’s story. First, I provide a brief description of other social movements and
events that created the foundation for the development of a social critique of woman
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battering. 8 In the second section, I cover the sources and development of Battered
Women’s Movement messages in the latter half of the 20th Century, focusing on the
publicly articulated call for a policy response to the problem of domestic violence. Other
works have documented the development of the Battered Women’s Movement and
associated organizations (Schechter 1982; Miller 2010). For reference, a time line of key
events in the movement is provided in Appendix B.
II. Social Criticism of Woman Battering
Feminist scholars identified the rise and dominance of the patriarchal family and
the centrality of this unit to social organization as the underlying source of women’s
oppression (Pleck 1987; Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982; Shepard 2005). The patriarchal
family has been defined as one in which men have “control over the labor of women and
children” (Coontz 2000). Stephanie Coontz (2000) argued that in early American society
the patriarchal family combined with a preference for a social order with an “insistence
on hierarchy, inequality, and the forcible subordination of “inferiors” to “superiors”
(291). The result was both a family and social structure that dictated the role of women as
subordinate and subject to socially sanctioned forcible correction if needed.
This family form was supported by cultural expectations of a “true womanhood” that
defined women solely by their roles within that family structure. Ideally this meant that
women would be submissive, chaste, and focused on the domestic duties of wife and
mother (Pleck 1987; Rambo 2009; Welter 1983). As property, women were subject to
8

I identify these movements in order to discuss the contribution of each to the development of a social
critique of woman battering. For more in depth treatment of the intersections of these movements, see:
Karen Sanchez-Eppler (1997) Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of the Body; Janet
Zollinger Giele (1995) Two Paths to Women’s Equality; Carol Mattingly (1998) Well Tempered Women:
Nineteenth Century Temperance Rhetoric; Steven Buechler (1990) Women’s Movements in the United
States; Susan Brownmiller (1975) Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape; and Maria Bevacqua (2000)
Rape on the Public Agenda: Feminism and the Politics of Sexual Assault.
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chastisement by men (fathers and husbands) when they waivered from this role (Pleck
1987; Rambo 2009; Welter 1983). Physical abuse or battering was both an acceptable
deterrent to and punishment for violating one’s role in the family structure.
These dynamics combined with both a social and legally supported ideal of
“domestic privacy,” where families were seen as autonomous units to be protected from
government and outside intrusion (Rambo 2009). Women and children were denied
public redress of any grievance arising in the home (Pleck 1987). In the 19th century,
even when women would have their husbands arrested and charged with battery,
husbands were typically not convicted. When women appealed these court decisions,
state supreme courts would ultimately defer to the right of privacy in the family
household. Not only did these early rulings support the husband’s right to discipline his
wife, the justices offering opinions suggested that such privacy protected battered women
from the negative impact public knowledge of their misbehavior and subsequent
correction would have on their reputation (Rambo 2009).
In the 19th century, social agitation on a variety of other problems created a
foundation for a publicly articulated message about battered women. Three social
movements contributed to a shift in the way woman battering was perceived and
discussed in the wider society: the abolitionist/anti-slavery movement, the temperance
movement, and the women’s suffrage movement (Rambo 2009; Young 2007). These
movements differed in terms of ideology, grievances, and strategies, but overlapped in
some areas, including membership. This section briefly summarizes how others have
recognized these movements as laying the groundwork for the social (and later legal)
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rejection of women as property subject to chastisement by men and moved the issue of
woman battering into the public realm.
A. Abolition/Anti-Slavery, Temperance, and Women’s Suffrage
The abolitionist or anti-slavery movement (1830s to 1860s) articulated a counter
argument to the “right of chastisement” as it related to slaveholders. This movement
connected the ideas of personal freedom and bodily integrity (Sanchez-Eppler 1993).
Specifically, abolitionists associated interpersonal violence and social control by
highlighting the use of violence against slaves as a tool for achieving submission and
therefore preserving the relations of power between slaves and slaveholders (SanchezEppler 1993). This critique called into question the conceptualization of a woman’s
behavior as the cause for her husband’s exercise of the right of chastisement. The public
response to the problem began to shift and the right to chastisement began to lose support
in society and eventually the courts as well (Rambo 2009).
The temperance movement sought to prohibit the sale and consumption of alcohol
(1820s to 1930s). Temperance activists questioned the accusation that it was a woman’s
aberrant behavior that led to physical punishment by her husband. Rather, wife beating
was most often the result of men’s consumption of alcohol (Giele 1995). The contention
was that alcohol-fueled misbehaviors were a threat to family structure and social order.
This argument framed woman as a victim, but never articulated the problem as one of
women’s oppression (Pleck 1987). The temperance movement did not challenge the idea
of “true womanhood” but rather suggested men’s drinking was interfering in their ability
to fulfill the domestic role (Rambo 2009). This movement was significant to the
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development of a public message on woman battering because it was the first to identify
violence in the home as a problem requiring a policy solution (Rambo 2009).
The women’s suffrage movement (1840s to 1920) challenged the government for
woman’s right to vote. The suffrage movement emphasized a broad concept of equality
between women and men in both the public and domestic spheres (Buecheler 1990). The
connection between their cause (winning the vote) and woman battering was less direct.
Suffragists would use extreme stories of injury and death to make the case that women
needed to have more power to define their own lives both in and outside of the home:
equal partners in marriage, right to divorce, and the right to seek redress for their
grievances independent of their husbands (Pleck 1987; Rambo 2009). They offered these
examples as a criticism of men’s oppression over women, but never fully took on the
issue of battering as tool used systematically in order to maintaining male dominance.
Rambo (2009) contends that these movements broke through the existing narrative on
woman battering by creating a “climate of social change,” which resulted in shifts in
popular and legal attitudes about violence in the domestic sphere (43).
Perhaps more fundamentally, if less directly, all three movements generated both
a perception and a reality of women as public actors and players in a political drama that
mattered for the nation as a whole. This newfound status – forged by women’s own
agency in the public arena – helped lay the foundation for public recognition of battering
as a denial of women’s public moral status.
III. Taking Action Against Oppression
As these movements came to a close in the early 20th century, public acceptance
of the right to chastisement declined and women began to take a larger role in public life.
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But the explanation for woman battering continued to focus on the behavior of the
woman, rather than that of the batterer. Family courts staffed by social workers gained
popularity as a method for dealing with disruptive families. The fields of social work and
psychiatry approached family violence as a problem between individuals (not a systemic
oppression of women). This approach reinforced the idea that battering and a generalized
propensity for “family violence” was the result of personality or personal pathologies—
for both offender and victim (Pleck 1987; Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). Feminists and
grassroots activists objected to pathology-focused, victim blaming explanations for
woman battering that appeared in the work of psychologists, sociologists, and social work
practice (Schecter 1982). In addition, state supreme courts further solidified the insularity
of the family—establishing the right to privacy in the family as covered by the 14th
Amendment (Rambo 2009). This development would aid feminist activists in some areas
of concern in the latter half of the 20th century (reproductive rights) but continued to
cause problems for social intervention in situations of family violence (Rambo 2009).
While these professions focused on treating or otherwise dealing with personal
pathologies, a new cycle of social movement activity drew attention to the ways in which
pathologizing individuals based on group membership (racial group, sex/gender) aided in
systematic exclusion of some from the activities (and subsequent achievements) that were
perceived as markers of superiority for others.
A. Late 20th Century Civil Rights and Liberation Movements
Following the end of World Wars II, a new cycle of social movements emerged,
focused largely on status-based social inequalities. A number of these movements shaped
the message and strategies of what would become the BWM. The black civil rights
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movement and the anti-war movement contributed organizing structures and provided a
normalization of protest among groups with social grievances. But perhaps the most
significant contribution of these movements was the explication of a message that
promoted civil rights, and therefore policy solutions, to addressing structural inequalities.
The civil rights frame proposed that, “blame is externalized in that unjust differences in
life circumstances are attributed to encrusted, discriminatory structural arrangements
rather than to the victim’s imperfections” (Snow and Benford 1992, 139). The civil rights
frame dominated public movement messages during this period, but not without counterframing and resistance. Civil rights oriented solutions acknowledged group
discrimination, but still relied upon individuals to take the initiative in order to bring
about corrective action. Liberation movements questioned the viability of using the
existing system to bring about a solution to oppression (Bumiller 1992; 2008). The more
radically minded liberation frame focused on raising women’s consciousness about the
connection between their experience of violence and their status as women and desired
solutions that involved dismantling existing structures and replacing them with
alternative institutions (Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). Both civil rights and liberation
oriented messages influenced the development of prognostic frames related to the
problem of woman battering. Specifically, three movements had direct influence on the
BWM framing of the problem, including: women’s rights, women’s liberation, and antirape activism.
B. Women’s Rights Movement
The Women’s Rights Movement (1960s) drew its messages directly from the civil
rights frame. These activists sought to bring about women’s equality through a process of
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institutional reform aimed at procuring civil rights from the state (Buechler 1990; Daniels
1997; Freeman 1973). Freeman (1973) noted that the origins of the “liberal” feminist
movement were tied to the 1961 establishment of the Commission on the Status of
Women by President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent establishment of state level
commissions. These organizations were formally structured and attracted professional,
politically active women. Commissions prepared reports on the status of women on a
variety of factors including: education, employment and wages, health, poverty, housing,
and family life. Freeman (1973) argued that combined with the addition of sex to the
1964 Civil Rights Act, these commissions spurred the development of the National
Organization for Women. Women’s rights groups focused on eliminating discriminatory
laws and practices that inhibited women from reaching their natural potential to be equals
with men.
The Women’s Rights Movement articulated the problem of violence against
women as “an issue of rights and citizenship” (Naranch 1997, 21). Woman battering was
the result of the subordination of her role in the patriarchal family, and perpetuated by her
unequal status created by systemic discrimination against and lack of protections for
women in public life. Like the Suffragettes before them, activists in this movement
articulated solutions that called for women’s full inclusion and equal partnership with
men in both private and public life (Schechter 1982). The push for equality included
demands for equal access to housing, custody rights, and the right to seek a divorce
without her husband’s agreement (Schechter 1982). Rights advocates also called for
equal protection under the law with regard to criminal proceedings related to violence in
the home. They pushed for increased responsiveness by police and the courts to battered
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women as crime victims, while at the same time sought to improve the criminal justice
system’s treatment of women who used self-defense against their batterers (Gagne 1998).
Critics of the civil rights approach claim that this merely shifted patriarchal control from
the family to the state. Civil rights were articulated as “legal protections” for individuals;
the activation of such protections required a “victim” to lodge a complaint of some sort
(Bumiller 1992, 2). Bumiller (2008) suggested that by aligning with the state, liberal
feminists joined forces with “a neo-liberal project of social control” (15). The solutions
that were offered for battered women by the civil rights approach depended upon framing
women as “victims” in need of management of their personal problems. According to
Bumiller (2008), these efforts redirected attention and resources away from disrupting the
system of social control that systematically create women as an oppressed group. This
perspective led some activists to adopt a more radical approach.
C. Women’s Liberation Movement
The Battered Women’s Movement was formed during the same time period as
feminist activists began to divide into groups based on differing philosophies of women’s
rights and women’s liberation (Schechter 1982). For some women in the movement, the
idea of simply procuring the same rights as men in the public sphere was believed
insufficient for bringing about gender equality. Activists in the Women’s Liberation
Movement or “radical feminists” argued that a capitalist economy was male-dominated
and male-preferential system. The maintenance of this system required a gender
hierarchy in both public and private realms, including the continued use of women’s
unpaid labor in the home (Bumiller 2008). In other words, the system was built for
producing and maintaining a gendered hierarchy in all areas of life. From this view the
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idea that women could be “equal” to men was not possible as long as society was
organized according to the needs of a capitalist economy. Radical feminists called for the
restructuring of female and male relationships in both spheres and implied that
public/private divisions were not separate spaces at all (Schechter 1982).
Proponents of the women’s liberation perspective offered a theory of woman
battering that connected it to this gendered division of labor in society. Inequality was not
just the result of public discrimination against women. Specifically, these activists
suggested that men benefited both privately and publicly from the isolation and
domination of women in the home. In their view, this was the purpose of the patriarchal
nuclear family in the 20th Century. Violence was both evidence of that domination and a
tool or “weapon that a man uses to control his wife” (Jones 1970, 47). Economic, socialpolitical, and cultural systems are all implicated in the production of women’s
disadvantage and either implicitly or explicitly promoted or at least assented in the use of
violence against women in the home (Bumiller 2008). Liberationists sought to educate
and empower women to recognize the inherent politics of the private sphere and the ways
in which violence against women supported and facilitated the continuation of women’s
oppression (Schechter 1982). These activists focused on dismantling the structures in
society that perpetuated male dominance and as a result ending the systematic use of
violence against women (Schechter 1982). The primary means of accomplishing this goal
was the creation of consciousness of oppression and developing alternative institutions
for women (Freeman 1973; Schechter 1982).
Those working in the movement from this philosophy eschewed reformist
messages and their organizational structures. Freeman (1973) described the women’s
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liberation groups as “younger” and consisting of “small groups—engaged in a variety of
activities—whose contact with each other is, at best, tenuous” (796). Writing in the midst
of this division, Freeman (1973) questioned the ability of liberationist or radical oriented
groups to be viewed as a legitimate threat by existing institutions. Radical groups
organized on the basis of local, friendship networks and group size stayed relatively
small. Most organizations were based on a participatory democratic decision making
structure, that allowed all participants to “voice” their experiences, their ideas, and their
preferences (Schechter 1982). A preference for a decentralized decision-making structure
had advantages for grassroots organization and building consensus within the group, but
hindered the ability of these groups to organize on a large scale (Freeman 1970). The
informality of these groups also led to frequent splintering. Freeman described these
divisions as “friendly,” generally based on diverging interests on the issues (809). Some
groups focused on developing centers, bookstores, or other alternative spaces for women,
while others continued consciousness raising groups that focused on intersecting
inequalities like race or sexuality (Fried 1994). Similarly, some groups turned their
attention specifically to issues and services related to violence. Subsequent feminist
analyses sometimes questioned the erosion of the public-private divide implied by the
radical feminist position. Specifically, this view was problematized on the grounds that
the distinction also helped shelter all individuals, including women, from the gaze of an
intrusive state and society. Still, the radical feminist perspective intertwining home and
family with the larger social structure exposed the way oppression is created and
mutually supported in both realms.
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D. Anti-Rape Movement
The Anti-Rape Movement originated in the 1970s through consciousness raising
groups and autonomous service organizations like crisis hotlines, women’s counseling
centers, and self-defense classes (Schechter 1982). Movement activists challenged the
notion that rape was an “impulsive act” and that women who were raped had either
provoked the attack or failed in some way to keep themselves from harm’s way
(Schechter 1982). Instead, anti-rape activists put forward the feminist argument that rape
is a particular form of domination based on gendered social relationships of unequal
power. In her work detailing the social history of rape, Susan Brownmiller (1975)
claimed that rape was a way of enforcing oppressive relations between women and men
both in practice and as a constant threat to women’s safety. Brownmiller’s thesis also
sought to shift the conversation about rape from one of sex to one of violence. Sexual
acts of violence against women robbed them of one of the most fundamental dimensions
of human dignity, their bodily integrity. Rape crisis services sought to empower women
to restore autonomy over their own bodies and their own lives (Schechter 1982). While
early organizational forms mirrored the loosely structured liberation philosophy, over
time, the movement also articulated messages consistent with the civil rights frame (Fried
1994). Women’s rights advocates also embraced reforms related to legal statutes and
procedures, the provision of victim advocates who would provide assistance to women in
their encounters with law enforcement and prosecutor’s offices, and engaged in
sensitivity training and education in public agencies (Fried 1994).
Both the anti-rape and the battered women’s movements grew out of an increased
gender consciousness and the idea that women had the right to control their own bodies
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(Rambo 2009). Anti-rape activists led the dissemination of claims related to the feminist
explanation of rape as an act of aggression and a crime, rather than the result of a
woman’s own actions (Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). This idea became a central tennet
of messages related to woman battering (Schechter 1982). In some communities the
relationship between these two movements was based on more than just a similar
message about the gendered use of violence against women. Rape crisis hotlines and
centers began hearing from battered women and identified a need for groups and services
for these women (Schechter 1982). Small groups began to form specifically to address
this form of violence. Emerging battered women’s groups borrowed strategies from the
anti-rape movement and developed consciousness raising groups, crisis hotlines, and
began conducting speak outs and other activities aimed at increasing public awareness
about violence against women in the home (Rambo 2009).
Rape crisis centers frequently experienced the problems of organization identified
by Freeman (1973). They faced challenges in funding, and even when funding was
provided by local, state, and federal governments, the conditions of funding acceptance
were often counter to the philosophy of center organizers. In one example, the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration provided grants to rape crisis centers, but
stipulated that victims would be required to report rape to the police in order to receive
assistance (Schechter 1982). The usurping of victim autonomy was viewed as another
form of denying women control over their bodies. Many organizations refused the money
and collapsed as a result (Schechter 1982). In other cases, funder’s conditions led to
changes in staffing and the transformation of the agency mission. Movement actors
viewed the professionalization of service provision as an affront to the feminist analysis
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of rape. This movement exemplified the difficulties of engaging simultaneously in a
political movement and the provision of victim services. Funding and support could be
obtained (and were more easily obtained) by a focus on serving the victim without the
need for feminist empowerment. As a result, the message of the movement itself was
marginalized and feminist political work became increasingly separated from victim
services (Schechter 1982). Thus, the key critical edge of the movement – the feminist
critique of patriarchal dynamics in state and society – came into tension with the
movement’s need to acquire resources from that very state and society.
IV. The Battered Women’s Movement
The beginning of the Battered Women’s Movement has been most directly tied to
the consciousness raising and feminist service projects of the women’s liberation
movement. The first publicly articulated messages identified with the movement
appeared in the early 1970s. Over the course of the next two decades the messages of the
movement began to diversify and included both liberationist and civil rights orientations.
Regardless of the philosophical orientation, the BWM claimed two primary goals: the
first goal was to provide immediate safety for battered women, and the second goal was
to dismantle the institutions and/or institutional rules that facilitated woman battering by
perpetuating women’s disadvantaged status in society. In this section, I describe three
ideological orientations that shaped the BWM development of grievances. Next, I
provide a description of the formation of the BWM (from the establishment of shelters to
national organizations) and outline the emergent movement’s national platform.
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A. Diagnostic Frames
In its struggle to control the explanation of the origin and perpetuation of woman
battering in society, the BWM confronted three identifiable ideological paradigms about
dealing with violence against women in society: clinical, feminist, and criminal justice
paradigms (Cramer 2005; Tierney 1982). These three orientations are not exclusive to
any particular group or organization but developed unevenly over time as family violence
began to be viewed as abnormal (Tierney 1982). In some ways, the development of these
ideological orientations followed the chronological development of a social critique of
woman battering: challenging pathology, challenging existing social norms, and seeking
legal and policy reforms. These paradigms diverged in their explanations of the origin of
woman battering, the definition of battering, and the role of social institutions in the
cause and solution for battering. All three threads were present throughout the
development of the BWM and continued to surface in later conversations surrounding the
issue of woman battering. Movement publications and the public testimonies of
movement actors are also heavily shaped by either support or objection to specific
proposals that fall within these paradigms. This section describes each paradigm and
identifies the types of policy messages derived from BWM activities.
1. Social Work, Public Health, and Medical Perspectives
The clinical psychology/social work paradigm suggested individual-level
explanations for family violence (like those expressed in the temperance movement).
Individuals with psychological or pathological problems were either engaging in violence
in the family or causing a disruption in the family unit (Cramer 2005). The logical
inference was that individual pathology created stress that led to family dysfunction.
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Battering, then, was the repetitive use of violence against a family member when the
individual or the environment was stressed. When woman battering was viewed from this
perspective, the solutions were primarily aimed at intervening in the individual problem
with social work case management or psychological counseling (Schechter 1982). The
goal of these interventions was to strengthen both individual and group coping strategies
so that families would remain intact (Schechter 1982). Additionally, this perspective
inferred that “family violence” was all the same regardless of which member of the
family becomes the target (wife, husband, child, sibling, etc…) (Cramer 2005).
2. Feminist Perspectives
The feminist paradigm of woman battering suggested patriarchal social order and
gender socialization create a cultural expectation of women’s submission to men. Woman
battering was historically rooted in the cultural, economic, and legal history of women’s
experiences. Batterers intentionally used violence to obtain and maintain control over
their partners (Cramer 2005). Additionally, battering was viewed as more than just
physical violence. Similar to the ways public discrimination disenfranchised women,
batterers utilized isolation, economic coercion, emotional abuse, threats and intimidation
to marginalize women from both public and private life (Pence and Paymar 1993). Since
both batterers and battered women were subjected to the socialization to a gendered
hierarchy, victims often minimized the abuse or believed they were at fault (Schechter
1982). As such, feminist solutions to battering depended on nurturing the battered
woman’s consciousness so that victims recognized the reason for their victimization was
external to their own behavior and therefore required a political solution (Cramer 2005;
Gagne 1998). Specifically, proponents of this perspective held that battered woman must
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develop a politicized identification of womanhood. Feminists sought to end violence
against women by creating this consciousness of woman as a political identity that could
be used to resist and challenge a male-dominated hierarchy (Gagne 1998).
3. Crime, Criminal Justice, and Crime Victims
The third ideological approach to the issue of woman battering was the criminal
justice paradigm (Cramer 2005). This orientation viewed woman battering in terms of the
criminal acts that constituted violence. Perspectives on the origin of violence were
diverse. Advocates of this perspective articulated explanations for violence as the
outcome of individual pathology, similar to that of the social work/psychiatry paradigm
or as a frustration response to social strain or stressors like poverty or unemployment
(Schechter 1982). Solutions to the problem of woman battering were oriented toward the
provision of “protection for victims and consequences to abusers” (Cramer 2005, 276).
Public responsibility for battering was limited to prevention and intervention activities for
the components of battering that could be treated as a “crime” (Cramer 2005, 276). From
this perspective, battering ceased to be viewed in terms of a systematic use of violence
and became merely a series of incidents of physical violence. As a result, many of the
behaviors batterers used to exert control (e.g. economic coercion, verbal abuse and
isolation) would remain the personal problem of battered women (Cramer 2005).
B. Shelter as the Battered Women’s Movement Preferred Intervention
The BWM rejected the social service and criminal justice diagnostic frames and
posited a prognostic claim that the problem of battering was best addressed through the
development of an alternative institution — feminist battered women’s shelters. Early
battered women’s shelters originated from women’s consciousness raising groups in local
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communities. In a sense, the provision of shelter constituted the “protest” activity of the
movement. Consciousness raising groups provided a safe space for women to disclose
their personal abuse histories (Schechter 1982). As women began to share stories of
battering and their lack of options for seeking safety, other women would offer refuge in
their own homes (Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). In many feminist communities, safety
for battered women became a primary concern (Schechter 1982). Battered women’s
shelters hardly seem delinquent today, but providing shelter to a woman (and her
children) and hiding her from a lawful husband (and father) was a transgression that
challenged the sanctity and privacy of the family.
Over time women engaged in providing refuge became overwhelmed by the
demand for shelter and began to seek homes or facilities that would allow for the
expansion of this activity. The first documented feminist shelters opened in the U.S. in
1975, Women’s Advocates in St. Paul, Minnesota (Johnson 1981, Martin 1976, Schechter
1982) and Transition House in Boston, Massachusetts in 1976 (Schechter 1982).
Although both functioned as shelters for battered women, providing this service was
neither the impetus for opening nor the sole purpose of these organizations. Rather, these
groups viewed the shelter as a natural response to their “collective representation” of the
problem of battering (Loseke 1992). The shelter was an alternative institution that served
as a safe refuge and at the same time created an oppression free environment for women
to experience equality, gain independence and self-sufficiency, and to develop a political
awareness (Loseke 1992; Rambo 2009). The model of self-help, egalitarianism, and
collectivist organizational structures developed by these first two shelters influenced
shelter philosophy throughout the country (Schechter 1982).
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The expansion of grassroots shelters in the U.S. also added to the feminist critique
of existing social institutions. Just as consciousness raising groups provided a space for
women to disclose battering, similar sessions within the shelter uncovered the ways in
which battered women were marginalized from the assistance of civic organizations,
family law, social welfare, and criminal justice agencies.
Prior to the development of women’s shelters, the only publicly available
alternative for women fleeing abusive homes was to seek services from civil or religious
groups who provided homeless services. Since these women technically had homes, they
were often turned away (Schechter 1982). In 1960s, women in the Alcoholics
Anonymous family support group Al Anon opened Haven House, the first shelter for
women and their children who were fleeing alcohol-related violence in the U.S. (Johnson
1981; Schechter 1982). Similar to the temperance movement’s analysis of battering,
alcohol was articulated as the underlying cause and the focus of these shelters was on
providing safety for the family until the batterer sobered up. Early shelters, like those
started by women from Al Anon influenced some of the characteristics that would define
battered women shelters and services: use of a self-help model, promotion of peer support
over “professional” interventions, and advocacy for treating women as adults, and
therefore having the right to self-determination, including the decision of whether or not
to leave their husbands (Schechter 1982, 57).
The criminal and civil justice systems were also targeted for criticism in shelters.
Women discussed the failure of police to arrest batterers, their own arrests for engaging
in self-defense, and the dismissal of criminal responsibility by prosecutors and judges
(Gagne 1998; Schechter 1982). Women began to analyze the loss of individual status
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once they became married. They learned from one another about the limitations of their
rights to children, their homes, and other marital assets (Schechter 1982). In many places,
married women were denied access to housing without their husbands’ permission.
Women who chose to leave their husbands were socially stigmatized and denied social
welfare services because of their husbands’ incomes (Schechter 1982). In addition,
conflicts would occur in the family court over child custody when women were
characterized as abandoning their families. The problems identified by women in shelter
were not just the result of insensitive individuals in these agencies, but rather “agency
specialization, rules, and regulations often prohibit them from offering real assistance”
(Loseke 1992).
As battered women came together and discussed the similarities of their
experiences, the notion that they were somehow at fault for their own condition began to
fall away. A set of grievances began to form around the ways in which gender hierarchies
in both public and private institutions contributed to the perpetuation of violence against
women in the home. In this way, shelters also “served a symbolic purpose that furthered
activists’ broader goal of taking domestic violence out of the private realm” (Rambo
2009, 70). Over time, these positions began to solidify and the shelters began to craft a
political vision. Woman battering was articulated as the repetitive and systematic use of
violence that was intentionally used to create and perpetuate male dominance across the
spectrum of institutions. This definition clearly marks battering as an issue that affects all
women either directly or indirectly, because it was a tool for maintaining gendered
hierarchy. While not all women were battered, the permission or absence of dissent to the
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practice by existing social, political, and cultural institutions meant that all women were
under the constant threat of battery.
Shelters operating with this philosophy engaged not only in peer support (and a
preference for staff who were also violence survivors) but also provided political
education to shelter residents. They rejected the label of social services, because the
residents were not being served. Rather, shelter residents were given the opportunity to
take care of themselves and others without the fear of violence (Schechter 1982). The
idea was to provide safety and information and let women make their own, autonomous
decisions about what they needed to move on with their lives.
As the shelters became more populous, and as the population of battered women
diversified, internal conflicts about ideology arose. Not everyone using shelter services
identified with or agreed with the feminist explanation for the origin of violence against
women in society. Women of color and immigrant women saw oppression as more
complex. These women did not experience the shelter as an egalitarian environment and
felt pressured to leave their husbands with whom they shared other types of oppression
(Rambo 2009). Additionally, some shelters were hesitant to get publicly involved in
politics. Organizers understood that current laws were inadequate for helping battered
women but saw their operation as too fragile and their positions on political issues were
underdeveloped (Schechter 1982). In some locations (especially rural areas where the
feminist movement was not entrenched), the efforts of battered women’s advocates to
open shelters or provide crisis support required joining forces with conservative
organizations: churches, the YWCA, the United Way, the Junior League. These alliances

81

often meant softening the feminist message of the movement and working toward ending
“family violence” instead of violence against women (Rambo 2009).
Navigating the provision of shelter inevitably led to tense interactions with
external institutions, including courts, schools, and social welfare agencies. These
institutions would often undermine efforts to keep battered women’s refuges hidden from
the batterers from whom the women were seeking shelter (Schechter 1982). A need to
conceal their whereabouts cut battered women off from existing services in the
community. As a result of these experiences, battered women and their allies started to
develop public education efforts and materials aimed at increasing awareness about the
need for sensitivity and confidentiality (Schechter 1982). They also worked on detailing
problems faced when dealing with law enforcement and the lack of response by the
criminal justice system. Now identifying themselves as activists, battered women and
shelter staff would go to civic organizations, public institutions, community meetings and
the like to speak about battering and the difficulties they faced in seeking safety and
moving on with their lives.
Another tension arose over issues related to funding. Early shelters were operated
out of rented apartments, motels, or the home of an activist. Shelter occupants were often
evicted because of the number of women (and children) living in the dwelling (Schechter
1982). As shelters proliferated, the need for the service and therefore resources for
operation increased dramatically. Zoning ordinances and public housing laws made it
necessary to find reliable funding streams (Schechter 1982). One way shelters coped with
this need was to seek funding from other organizations: foundations, mental health
organization, charities, and government (Johnston 1981; Schechter 1982). But once
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shelter operators accepted funding some funders attempted to force shelters to adopt
“professional” models of treatment with a preference for hierarchical organizational
structures with credentialed staff (Tierney 1982).
To a large extent, external funding redesigned the shelter environment. During the
early 1980’s shelters became more focused on individual services and solutions for
women (Schechter 1982). The decreasing focus on peer support and women’s
empowerment led many to fear that shelters had been coopted by government and
foundation funding and local laws and ordinances (Johnson 1981, Schechter 1982,
Tierney 1982). In the 1980s, the emerging dialogue around the issue of wife battery had
returned to a mental health or social welfare model that posited problems in the family as
resulting from individual pathology rather than the family form itself (Gange 1998). This
conclusion of cooptation was somewhat accurate if the movement was defined
exclusively by shelters and service provision (Gagne 1998). However, by this time the
movement was comprised of a number of other types of organizations and a national
network of activists that grew around the shelter movement in the late 1970s. This
warning of cooptation focused on the power to control organizations, but did not answer
questions about whether or not the movement maintained the ability or legitimacy to
define the message about the problems and solutions to woman battering.
C. Developing a National Policy Focused Constituency
Shelters provided a focal point for local organization of the growing constituency
for battered women’s issues. But many recognized that shelter, while necessary, was not
enough. Battered women and their allies began to engage in political activities. The
production of publications including: “how to” manuals for shelters and advocates,
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training curriculum for social workers, law enforcement, court personnel, and
newsletters, books, organizational directories, and other works published to share
information between shelters and other organizations (Schechter 1982). These materials
pushed the ideas cultivated through services by and for battered women into public view.
Furthermore, these activities led to networking between shelters and other organizations.
It also moved the work of otherwise isolated groups across geographical boundaries,
which led to regional, national, and international consideration of battered women’s
issues at conferences and other public events.
The origins of a national battered women’s network can be traced to a series of
projects, conferences, and public hearings where the messages of the national platform
begin to take shape. In 1976, Transition House activist and formerly battered woman
Betsy Warrior published the first issue of Working on Wife Abuse, a directory of battered
women’s projects nationwide (Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). Eight editions of the
directory were published. The list was used by various groups for networking,
exchanging ideas and building regional coalitions. The National Organization for Women
(NOW) established a task force on battered women and household violence in 1976 and
several regional chapters were opened (Martin 1976). That same year, the International
Women’s Conference was held in Houston, Texas. A number of battered women’s
activists attended the conference and discussed the need for a national organization to
coordinate the movements social change efforts (Schechter 1982). The National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (NCADV) was formed shortly thereafter.
One of the primary concerns to come from networking and collaboration at this
level was the difficulty of turning the movement’s vision of a home and public free of the
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oppression of gender hierarchy into a reality (Loseke 1992). Conversations between
movement activists at this stage centered on who was to be included as participants and
allies in the struggle. At the same time, the movement was being pressured to compare
and compromise their proposals with those of other interested groups. With state
governments focusing on law and court reforms, the national conversation was almost
immediately focused on these issues as well. The movement was barely off the ground
before competing and counter arguments were being debated by academics and
practitioners in professional service occupations.
As the need for public activities became more apparent, activists were
overwhelmed with the dual tasks of providing shelter and other services, while also
developing and disseminating public information. Early state-level coalitions, like the
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence founded in 1976, formed to address
immediate service provision issues, but also to relieve shelter staff from the tasks of
challenging the systems and institutions that produced and perpetuated violence against
women (Schechter 1982). The coalition was designed to deal with these “larger” issues so
that shelters and service providers could continue meeting the immediate needs of
battered women. State-level coalitions were generally unfunded, although some received
support from member agencies. The formation of coalitions provided shared support
systems for local shelters, coordinated local activities, resources, and labor (Miller 2010).
By working with multiple groups in different communities, coalitions were able to
generate and articulate problems beyond those observed in the trenches, so to speak
(Miller 2010). These coalitions also engaged in technical assistance and public education.
State-level coalitions actively engaged policy makers by providing public information
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about woman battering and appealing directly to legislators on issues related to
criminalization of domestic violence, stalking, family court issues, and other related
matters (Schechter 1982).
In summary, the work of battered women’s organizations and the coalition of
actors comprising the BWM focused on two primary goals: immediate safety for battered
women and disrupting the institutional structures that perpetuated oppression and
violence against women in society. As a national agenda formed, the public message
focused primarily on issues related to the first goal, specifically the maintenance and
expansion of battered women’s shelters and services. The development of state and
national coalitions concentrated these concerns and focused activism around securing
funding, while advocating for as much organizational autonomy as possible. Meeting the
second goal of dismantling institutional oppression was tangentially tied to sustaining the
peer support model and encouraging awareness in ways that empowered and politicized
women and others who came into contact with the movement and its constituency.
V. Conclusion
A number of social movements laid the groundwork for challenging the right to
chastisement and for the articulation of wife battering as a public issue. Both anti-slavery
and temperance activists called into question the conceptualization of a woman’s
behavior as the cause for her husband’s exercise of corporal punishment. The public
response to the problem began to shift and the right to chastisement began to lose support
in society (and eventually the courts as well). Both temperance and women’s suffrage
activists framed the issue as the responsibility of women to ensure their husband’s moral
rehabilitation (Gagne 1998, Pleck 1987). With few exceptions, women’s caretaking of
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men’s failings was rejected by battered women’s movement actors. The women’s rights,
women’s liberation, and anti-rape movements provided an environment for women’s
political claims-making and the foundations for articulating woman battering in terms of
men’s oppression of women in a society defined by gender hierarchy. As these
movements unfolded, a grievance began to form. The allowance of violence against
women in the home without intervention, punishment or reparation for women was
framed as evidence that the use of violence against women was facilitated and/or
protected by the state and other social and cultural institutions.
BWM activists and organizations targeted social change across a diverse terrain
of social institutions. Perhaps the most recognizable component of the movement was the
battered women’s shelter. Shelters were grassroots organizations that provided a public
rejection of men’s right to control women’s lives. As battered women were brought
together in search of safety, they learned from one another about the ubiquity of battering
and the ways in which other social institutions either through action or inaction consented
to the widespread use of violence against women. Over time, these criticisms became
more specific and included an articulation of solutions consistent with the feminist
explanation of battering. From the late 1970s through the early 1990s, both state
governments and the U.S. Congress considered numerous proposals on battered women’s
issues. Over the course of these challenges and movement evaluation of institutional
response, a set of public messages about the role of the state and other institutions
developed.
The history of the BWM’s development of public messages provides the
foundation for determining whether target responses will constitute alignment with the
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movement’s prognoses. Movement actors identified opposition to alternative
interventions through their analysis of competing paradigms and existing social programs
aimed at assisting families or homeless persons. BWM actors were opposed to collapsing
woman battering with other “family problems” like child abuse. As such, efforts to
combine battered women’s intervention with existing child protection programs would be
inconsistent with the movement’s demands. Similarly, the movement was opposed to
treating battered women (or their abusers) for individual pathologies of substance abuse
or mental illness.
The ineffectiveness of these social programs was the impetus for movement
forerunners to situate the battered woman’s shelter as preferred intervention. Shelter
proponents and BWM actors also believed that battered women were the experts on what
constituted appropriate response. The failure of existing institutions was linked to the
imposition of interventions that the women themselves knew to be ineffective. As such,
movement actors were opposed to placing existing institutions in positions to design or
dictate intervention for battered women, even if the type of intervention itself aligned
with the movement’s desired outcome. While not specifically prognostic frames, the
parsing out of disagreements with the way existing institutions treated battered women
forms the foundation for disaggregating alignment or divergence between movement
prognostic frames and target response outcomes.
In the next chapter, I provide a description of policy oriented prognostic frames
that emerged from the historical context sketched here, and that were articulated by
BWM actors in movement publications and Congressional hearings on federal bills
aimed at addressing domestic violence in the period from 1977 to 1994.
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Chapter Five
Diagnostic and Prognostic Messaging: The National Policy Agenda of the Battered
Women’s Movement

I. Introduction
The basic underpinnings of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM) diagnostic
and prognostic messages were generated through the internal workings of shelters,
battered women’s advocates and service providers, and movement actors as they built
grassroots projects and collaborated with one another in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
This work was documented and disseminated through books, newsletters, and
monographs that were publicly distributed, but primarily aimed at those engaged with
addressing the problem. Movement actors also contributed to a national public dialogue
regarding both the causes of violence against women and the existing and proposed new
interventions designed to reduce it. That is, through their testimonies before the U.S.
Congress, movement actors contributed to the diagnostic and prognostic frames through
which public discourse came to address the issue of violence against women. No prior
work has isolated the public deployment of policy-oriented frames in the BWM in order
to assess movement message outcomes.
This chapter provides an analysis of diagnostic and prognostic movement frames
targeting federal policy found in two crucial public arenas: BWM actor testimonies in
hearings before the U.S. Congress and in publications of the BWM itself. Through both
arenas, the movement strove to shape public perceptions and public policy regarding
violence against women. Following a brief description of the public framing activities of
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BWM actors, I examine the correspondence of public policy-oriented diagnostic frames
with those identified in the movement’s history more broadly in Chapter 4. A similar
examination of publicly deployed prognostic frames will show that the BWM policy
message was both consistent with the overall movement platform, but also constrained by
movement actor beliefs about the limitations of the government to solve the problem of
woman battering. The result of these constraints was a more limited set of movement
prognostic messages than those found in the historical documentation. This analysis of
the diagnostic and prognostic frames aimed at federal lawmakers is the basis for
analyzing movement outcomes in the next chapter.
II. Public Framing Activities
One of the first formal interactions between movement actors and the federal
government occurred in January 1978, when the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights held a
set of hearings titled, Battered Women: Issues in Public Policy. This was the first
documented debate between movement actors, system actors, community groups, and
lawmakers at the federal level. Between 1978 and the adoption of the Violence Against
Women Act in 1994, movement actors would provide testimony in 36 hearings on topics
related to woman battering or family violence before a committee or subcommittee of the
U.S. House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate. Testimonies focused on providing a
realistic picture of the social barriers that prevented battered women from leaving their
partners, the failure of existing social institutions to provide intervention and relief, and
the uniqueness of the battered women’s shelter in both providing crisis intervention and
helping women to achieve an independent and self-sufficient life free of violence.
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In order to assess the relationship of movement frames mobilized in
Congressional hearings to the frames used by the BWM more broadly, movement
publications from the same time period were also reviewed. In total, twenty (20) issues of
Aegis: The Magazine on Ending Violence Against Women were published between 1978
and 1987. Articles from these issues were combined with monographs and books
published by movement actors and organizations to provide insight into movement
positions on policy proposals. 9 Overall, the solutions presented in movement publications
were aimed at generating and sustaining a commitment to feminist oriented solutions to
the problem. Most of the frames provided in movement publications were diagnostic in
nature and did not specifically advocate for federal policy intervention. Movement claims
about the role of existing institutions were framed as criticism of existing policies and
practices and only occasionally offered recommendations for policies that identified these
agencies as agents for ending violence against women – that is, movement publications
only rarely provided prognostic framing. Still, a number of authors addressed both the
need for improved local and state agency and policy responsiveness to battered women
and the roles of criminal justice, mental health, and social service agencies in providing
aid.
In contrast, speakers in public hearings regularly engaged in both diagnostic and
prognostic framing. Actors within the movement coalition were identified by
documenting the affiliation of authors in movement publications and speakers in
government hearings related to woman battering. In total, 162 persons were identified as
representing one of six groups: shelter or domestic violence service providers (N = 48);
survivors/formerly battered women (N = 35); self-identified movement activists (N = 31);
9

A complete list of movement publications is provided in the data references.
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local or state-level domestic violence coalitions (N = 21); national domestic violence
organizations (N = 12); national feminist organizations (N = 8); or local or state-level
women’s legal advocacy groups (N = 7). Table 3 provides a description of the affiliations
of actors in each category. Throughout this work, I do not treat framing that occurred in
publications and testimonies differently. Rather, I refer to the frames collectively as the
movement diagnosis or movement prognosis. Distinctions between the messages by
source are identified for instances where the difference contributes to the analysis.
Table 3. Categories and Affiliations of Battered Women’s Movement Coalition Actors
Category
Self-identified
Movement Activists

Affiliation
Includes contributors to Aegis: Magazine on Ending
Violence Against Women and authors producing
monographs or books intended to inform movement
activities.

Survivors

Includes self-identified battered and formerly battered
women

Shelters

Contributions from volunteers, staff, board members, and
fundraisers for battered women’s shelters from 17 states and
the District of Columbia

Local or State Coalitions Ten (10) state-level and four (4) city or county level
domestic violence coalitions
Local or State Women’s
Legal Advocacy
National Domestic
Violence Organizations

Women’s legal aid advocates from seven (7) States

National Feminist
Organizations

Center for Women Policy Studies
National Organization for Women
National Women’s Political Caucus

Family Violence Prevention Fund
National Battered Women’s Law Project
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence
National Woman Abuse Prevention Project
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It is important to note that not all of the actors identified as part of the movement
coalition shared the same perspectives. For example, while not all battered women agreed
with the movement’s political messages, the movement defined itself as one comprised of
battered women and advocating for their needs (Schechter 1982). For this reason, I have
included the writings and testimonies of self-identified battered women in the movement
coalition. Another area where some disagreement can be found is in the inclusion of legal
aid advocates in the movement coalition. However, many of these advocates were
formerly battered women or had previous ties to battered women’s shelters and presented
themselves as working in concert with the movement. It was not uncommon for
movement actors to take on roles in other institutions over time (e.g. a legal advocate
became a judge, a shelter worker became a scholar, and a battered woman became a
medical professional and spoke on public health related issues). These actors were
identified with the movement in subsequent years regardless of their occupation at the
time of testimony or publication.
Movement coalition members from each category put forward the initial policyoriented prognostic frames in the lead up to the introduction of federal legislation in the
95th Congress (1977-1978). Persons in all but two categories of movement coalition
members put forward prognostic frames in hearings during each Congressional period.
However, the carriers of the message across the majority of the hearings were
concentrated in a few categories. Battered women’s shelter and service providers made
up the largest proportion of witnesses testifying before Congress in hearings over the
course of this challenge. Survivors comprised the second largest group, but were more
prevalent as witnesses during the VAWA period (100 to 103rd Congresses). Survivors
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were followed in prevalence by representatives of local or state-level domestic violence
coalitions. Representatives of national domestic violence organizations were also present
in hearings for each Congressional session, but were not as widely represented across
hearings as coalition members in other categories. The two remaining categories,
coalition members representing legal advocacy and national feminist organizations, also
appeared in fewer hearings. Both of these categories were completely unrepresented in
hearings on domestic violence related issues leading up to three Congressional sessions.
Legal advocacy had no representation from the 97th to the 99th Congress. National
feminist organizations had no direct representation in hearings from the 98th through the
100th Congress.
There were a number of other categories of interested parties appearing in
congressional hearings. There were representatives of law enforcement, prosecution,
courts, corrections, medical professions, public health agencies, state government
agencies, state legislatures, and social service agencies. Others represented general
purpose homeless shelters and shelters provided through governmental agencies or civic
organizations (YWCA, churches, etc.). These actors were classified as system actors and
community actors, respectively. Both categories were excluded from the movement
coalition. For analytic consistency, scholars who had no other identification with shelters
or movement organizations were also excluded from the movement coalition.
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III. Diagnostic Frames from the National Policy Agenda of the Battered Women’s
Movement
The movement’s diagnosis of woman battering derived from the feminist
perspective on the cultural, social, and economic marginalization of women. BWM actors
posited that the social subordination of women increased their vulnerability to abuse in
the home and inhibited their escape from violent family lives. In Chapter 4, I presented a
number of diagnostic frames about the source and nature of this marginalization and the
types of prognostic messages the movement put forward as solutions. However, as BWM
actors began advocating for federal public policy response, there was a narrowing of
diagnostic messages. In particular, two diagnostic claims focused on the goal of
providing safety for battered women dominated interactions with federal lawmakers. The
first and primary message, which I have labeled crisis intervention frames, focused on the
absence of real alternatives for immediate housing and basic needs for battered women
who were in crisis. The second policy oriented diagnostic message, which I labeled
institutional failure frames, pointed to the inability of existing institutions, specifically
governmental agencies, to provide prevention and intervention services to battered
women.
A. Crisis Intervention Diagnostic Frames
Crisis intervention claims held that there were insufficient existing community
resources for battered women who were attempting to escape violent relationships and
homes. These claims were based on the position that any form of effective intervention
for battered women required that they first have access to immediate refuge from
violence. Safety was articulated as a necessary condition for providing women with any
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other services that may be required to facilitate regaining control of their lives. For
example, in a 1978 hearing of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, “Harriet”, a
formerly battered woman, testified about the need for battered women’s refuge:
To me, the shelter was a blessing, my only way of escaping my situation,
which before I discovered the Battered Wives Organization, seemed
inescapable. I needed a safe place to go, where I would not have to worry
about my husband finding me, as he had previously been able to do. I had
tried staying with relatives and friends, but my husband would either
assault them or convince them to support him in getting me to return
home. So I was made to feel unsupported and guilty about what I had
done. So, after realizing that I had gone through all the people I thought I
could depend on for help, I decided the situation was hopeless. I felt that I
would never be able to get away from him safely. After the last return, my
husband warned me that if I left again, I had better leave the State so that
he could not find me. I thought about how would I survive and where
would I go and where would I stay with my children (“Harriet” 1978,
SHR-0034: 350-351).
Harriet’s testimony made the case that friends and family were unreliable resources for
assisting a battered woman in crisis. Seeking assistance from her family had been
unsuccessful largely because her abuser would target those who tried to help her. It was
only after she found physical safety in a battered women’s shelter that Harriet could
begin to build a life apart from her abuser.
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From the standpoint of battered women active in the movement, immediate refuge
was only the starting point for crisis intervention. Acquiring basic needs was identified as
an important component of achieving safety both initially and in the long-term. One
survivor testified:
Once a woman has found a temporary, safe place to stay, she must begin
to think about pushing her case through the legal system. She must think
about finding affordable housing for her and her children. She must begin
applying for financial aid and/or food stamps. She must begin looking for
a job and/or training for herself, and, in order to work, she must find
affordable childcare. Completing all these tasks can take months and
sometimes years (Reaney 1991, SAP-0019: 118).
In this sense, crisis intervention was more than just achieving safety from immediate
abuse. The abuse disrupted the life of the family and required an assembly of resources to
rebuild the home-life foundation for battered women and their children.
These brief examples demonstrate the basic contours of the crisis intervention
diagnosis. Namely, battering creates an emergency situation for women and children. The
short and long-term safety of domestic violence victims was contingent on the existence
and availability of a social safety net that could respond immediately to the crisis created
by battering. The need for social intervention was in part based on the economic
marginalization of women—which keeps them from having the resources to leave a
violent home. But, the crisis was also the result of another social problem, namely, the
inability of existing institutions to respond to battered women in informed, efficient, and
effective ways.
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B. Institutional Failure Diagnostic Frames
The second BWM diagnosis articulated the ways in which existing institutions
failed to respond to battered women. In Chapter 4, I examined the ways in which
movement actors implicated existing institutions in the creation and facilitation of
women’s subordinate status in society. Dismantling the structures that made women
specifically susceptible to battering without consequence for their abusers was a global
goal of the movement. These arguments were not entirely absent from movement
testimonies before Congressional committees; however, testimony in these hearings was
generally focused on the ways in which the policies and practices of existing institutions
failed to provide an adequate response to battered women in crisis.
Survivors often described negative interactions with police, prosecutors and
courts. One survivor recalled an incident where after procuring a domestic violence
protection order, her husband refused to leave the home. When the police arrive, they
stood by and watched her husband disable her car (Wright 1987, EDL-0027: 73). Another
called the police after an assault by her husband and was taken to the officer’s church
where “they laid healing hands on me, spoke in tongues, and pulled the evil spirits out of
me so my husband wouldn’t have to beat me anymore” (Doe 1992, HJH-0003: 5). She
went on to note:
My experiences with people who were supposed to be there to help me,
the police, reinforced what, through my husband's psychological abuse, I
had come to believe; that my husband had every right to beat me, rape me
and hurt our children. No matter what he did, no matter how many times
the police were called, it seemed that he had all the rights, that he would
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be advised to get custody. I can understand how I may have seemed to the
police. I was out of control by the time they arrived, which was all part of
my husband's plan. So they listened to him and never took me aside and
offer to listen to me. Society said it was OK. (Doe 1992, HJH-0003: 58).
Another survivor testified about how racial and ethnic stereotypes affected police
response:
I was treated like I was the one who had the problem, like I was the
criminal. The police were more interested in knowing whether he had a
drug problem or if he was on drugs than him assaulting me. I was also
informed by a police officer as to why was I even filing charges, I'm a
Hispanic female and that was part of my culture. That was news to me
(Baca 1993, SJS-0015: 12).
In the view of this diagnosis, the failure of law enforcement to respond to battered
women in these moments of crisis placed them at increased risk for ongoing
abuse, both by failing to intervene in the reported crisis and by sending the
message that there would be no consequences for the abuser’s behavior. The
effect of this message for many was an avoidance of interactions with the police,
thus cutting off one of the only publicly available services for crisis intervention.
Movement actors framed family court as fraught with obstacles for battered
women seeking to protect themselves and their children. Wife beating was not considered
by law or members of the judiciary to be evidence of parental unfitness (Hendrickson and
Schulman 1982). The threat of a custody battle was often used as a means to intimidate a
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battered woman (Hendrickson and Schulman 1982). In a hearing before the Education
and Labor committee, a battered woman testified:
I had been married six years, had two daughters, and was seven months
pregnant. My husband and I had separated two months earlier and had an
informal arrangement around child visitation and support. In an earlier
separation, when I had turned to the courts for legal disposition, a Queens,
New York Family Court judge ordered support in the amount of $50 a
month and told me that my husband seemed like a nice guy, so work out
visitation between yourselves. When we separated the second time, I was
reluctant to use the court system again” (Wright 1987, EDL-0027: 73).
Another battered woman pointed out that judges “lack an understanding of the effects of
domestic violence on children, the connections between domestic violence and child
abuse, and the dynamics of domestic violence which do not end with divorce” (Price
1992, HJH-0057: 75). Courts were depicted as hostile toward battered women when they
tried to bring evidence of battering into divorce and custody proceedings.
At my own attorney’s advice, I agreed to judge’s chambers to hear our
case so as to avoid publicity for my family. But as the months and years
dragged on, I realized my attorney was not bringing up the counselor’s
report on my husband’s behavior…I finally blurted out during the trial that
I feared for my children if he had custody; that, for the first time I said it
out loud, he beat me. Surely, he would do the same to them. Instead, a
restraining order was put against me in perpetuity for attempting to tarnish
my husband’s public image” (Bauer-Hughes 1991, SAP-0019: 81).
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Many women spoke about the fear of sharing custody with their batterers and the ways in
which family courts helped men keep track of them and maintain control over their lives.
These testimonies were attempts to persuade legislators that current institutional practices
were coercive attempts to force women to stay in bad relationships and in practice
obstructed a battered woman’s ability to escape a violent home. This critique extended
beyond the criminal and civil justice systems.
As discussed in the previous chapter, movement actors were generally opposed to
locating solutions to domestic violence in mental health, medical, or social service
agencies. Much of the movement literature discussion of health and welfare solutions
focused on criticism of these agencies for treating women as children who needed
protection from their own decisions with policies that would require mandatory reporting
by health and welfare agencies. They also complained that these agencies largely ignored
domestic abuse altogether and when they did identify battering, they often tried to “fix”
the victim. One victim talked about her lack of success in getting help from her medical
provider: “I discussed what was happening with our family physician who suggested that
my husband was frustrated and had other things on his mind that were troubling him. My
doctor gave me pills” (McMahon 1979, EDL-0021: 137). Another woman testified:
The hospital doctors were rude to me, made very rude comments to me
while they were doing the physical examination, yet in their report it says
nothing in it. There's hardly any evidence that I was seriously hurt that
night, and yet had they taken a proper statement, I could have used that in
prosecution (Baca 1993, SJS-0015: 11-12).
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Another survivor demonstrated this problem in recounting her experience with couple’s
counseling:
During one of our sessions we began arguing. My batterer became so
enraged that the therapist asked him to leave. Then the therapist turned to
me and said, "He really wants to beat the shit out of you. I don't think he
would ever really hurt you, but you just better straighten yourself out
(Benguerel 1994, HJH-0038: 12)
Not only were medical and behavioral health care providers misinformed about
the nature of battering, evidenced by their attempts to “fix” the victim of abuse,
but the assistance offered by these agencies also failed to recognize the
immediacy of the crisis.
The public diagnosis of institutional failure was consistent with the overall
criticism of the medical, behavioral health, social service, and criminal justice
systems in BWM literature. In this view, social and cultural institutions including
family law, religion, education, and economic policy were designed to maintain
widespread beliefs and values about the institutions of marriage, family, and the
naturalness of sex roles; as a result, all these institutions work together to keep
women in a subordinate status (Martin 1976; Schechter 1982a; Shechter 1982b;
Women in Transition 1972). More specifically, these institutions were believed to
be set up to favor men through non-inclusion and discrimination; the result was
the entrapment of women in domestic life. Institutional entrapment was
articulated as the primary barrier to a woman’s escape from a violet home. In
public testimonies, movement actors relayed to members of Congress personal
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experiences that showed everywhere a battered woman turned for emergency
assistance, she was rejected and blamed for the violence being committed against
her. Worse, each instance of failed contact only served to cut battered women off
from any path that may provide them with the resources needed to leave a
dangerous home and find safe refuge elsewhere.
These two diagnostic frames were very much tied to the feminist diagnosis of the
global problem of woman battering — women were not provided full citizenship in social
institutions. Because of this marginalized status, many women could not procure the
resources to leave their husbands and start over. Further, they were treated with hostility
by actors in public institutions who perceived them to be transgressing the normative
boundary of the institution of family. The injustice of this situation was not widely
accepted during the early days of the movement’s agitation for public policy change. As a
result, a great deal of movement actor testimony in Congressional hearings was
diagnostic in nature. Battered women and their allies told their stories in an effort to
improve understanding about the nature of battery, the impediments to getting out of a
violent home, and the need for immediate response when one was able to leave.
Prognostic frames were extrapolated from these stories.
IV. Policy-Oriented Prognostic Frames from the National Policy Agenda of the
Battered Women’s Movement
A clear national policy agenda for addressing the crisis created by woman
battering was not immediately obvious. There was a long-standing perception that
existing intuitions were inadequate. As such, the predominant movement prognostic
frame called for the development and expansion of alternative institutions (shelters, peer-
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counseling groups, and similar organizational resources) in local communities to provide
emergency assistance to battered women. Making a claim for federal government
involvement in this solution was not easy. Even so, movement actors combined the
diagnoses identified above and the short-term goal to create immediate safety for battered
women to put forward number of prognostic messages aimed at federal lawmaking.
I structure the following discussion of BWM prognostic frames in three groups:
(1) prognostic frames demanding direct resources for battered women in crisis; (2)
prognostic frames calling for improved public knowledge and existing agency response;
and (3) prognostic frames requesting legal protections for battered women as they
navigate criminal and civil legal systems.
A. Prognostic frames demanding direct resources for battered women in crisis
1. Fund community-based crisis shelters for battered women
The most strongly supported policy intervention among movement actors in early
public messaging was the request for funding battered women’s shelters. BWM actors
were not asking the government to create new forms of refuge. In fact, testimonies were
often explicitly supportive of the characteristics that made these shelters alternative
institutions when compared to other types of homeless services and shelter operations.
Specifically advocating for shelters that would be governed by peer support with battered
women in leadership positions (Dames 1979, EDL-0021; Steytler 1978, EDL-0016),
available in local communities 24 hours a day (Steytler 1978, EDL-0016), and provide
free services to all battered women without income eligibility requirements (Fields 1978,
EDL-0016; Fields 1978, TEC-0040; Johnston 1987, EDL-0045).

104

The request for shelter funding preceded and followed every Congressional
session in this analysis. From the beginning of the period of movement message making,
this prognosis was supported by members of each category of the movement coalition
(shelter service providers: Bako 1978; Beardslee 1978, SHR-0034; Bellfield 1978, EDL0016; Fleming 1978; Fojitk 1978, SHR-0034; Hill 1978, SHR-0034; Martin 1978, SHR0034; Muniz 1978, SHR-0034; Navarro 1978, EDL-0016; Shepardson 1978, EDL-0040;
Steytler 1978, EDL-0016; battering survivors: Dales 1978, SHR-0034; “Harriet” 1978,
SHR-0034; Noffsinger 1978, EDL-0016; local and state coalitions: Clinch 1978, SHR0034; legal advocacy groups: Fields 1978; Fields 1978, TEC-0040; Sherbo 1978, EDL0016; national domestic violence organizations: Blackbear 1978, EDL-0016; Tinker
1978, EDL-0016; and national feminist organizations: Martin 1978). The prognosis
continued to receive diverse support from the coalition through the 103rd Congress (19931994).
2. Fund community-based crisis intervention services for battered women
Mirroring the request for shelter, the demand for funding to provide services for
battered women also appeared in each Congress. This prognosis largely came from the
testimonies of survivors or agents of organizations that were already engaged in securing
or providing direct services for battered women, including: shelters, local and state
coalitions, and legal advocacy groups. Movement actors articulated a need for a wide
range of services that would help meet the basic needs of battered women and facilitate
the move from crisis refuge to self-sufficiency. Some specific types of services identified
by members of the movement coalition included: food and other necessities related to
shelter (Muniz 1978, SHR-0034; Noffsinger 1978, EDL-0016), transportation (Peck
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1987, HJH-0064; Stark 1994, AGS-0008), and child care and job training (Aaronson
1991, SAP-0019; Naples 1978, SHR-0034; Reaney 1991, SAP-0019).
In contrast to its position on shelter provision, the movement coalition was split
on who should be providing these services. Most agreed that battered women lacked
access to existing resources. As a result, some argued for new service systems. But others
suggested money would be better spent on improving access to existing services rather
than developing new delivery systems. These actors often noted that funding should be
designated to shelters and other battered women’s service providers to serve as a liaison
between battered women and existing community service providers during the crisis
transition (Brygger 1990, LHR-0035; Gourdeau 1987, HJH-0064; Hart 1991, LHR-0026;
Jackson 1991, LHR-0026; Kelley-Dreiss 1987, EDL-0027; Moore 1979, EDL-0021;
Stahly 1979, EDL-0021; Whalen 1991, LHR-0026; Williams 1991, LHR-0026). I
consider how this split may have affected outcomes for the movement’s prognosis in the
next chapter.
3. Create exceptions to make battered women eligible for government assistance without
the consideration of spousal income
BWM actors called on the government to remove barriers for battered women
who were seeking resources from government assistance programs such as food stamps,
income assistance, and Medicaid (Clinch 1978, SHR-0034; Dales 1978, SHR-0034;
Fields 1978, EDL-0016; Martin 1978; Monasmith 1978, SHR-0034; Noffsinger 1978,
EDL-0016; Ramos 1978, SHR-0034). For many women the condition of poverty was
new, a result of leaving her husband (Dales 1978, SHR-0034). As such, the movement
requested extension of these programs to cover battered women based on their individual
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resources and excluding those of their husbands. The barriers to government assistance
programs were discussed in more depth in movement publications. For example, there
was a call to exempt battered women from the welfare eligibility requirement to identify
and collect child support from non-custodial parents (NCN 1978). Policies that required
continued contact with the batterer were believed to place women at risk for continued
abuse. For this reason, there was also a call for educating welfare agencies and economic
policy makers about the nature of battering and the obstacles to safety faced by battered
women (Erler 1978). Another policy idea originating in movement publications called for
broadening the population of women eligible for economic assistance for displaced
homemakers (Martin 1976; Martin 1978).
This prognosis received broad support from the movement coalition and appeared
in each congressional period with the exception of the 98th Congress (1983-84). The
message was carried primarily by agents providing direct services for battered women,
including shelters, local and state coalitions, and legal advocacy groups. Supporting
testimonies from survivors appeared in the 95th and 96th Congresses (1977-80) and again
in the 102nd and 103rd (1991-94). Representatives of the National Organization for
Women also supported this prognosis during their participation in hearings in the 95th and
96th Congresses.
4. Include domestic violence in eligible offenses for crime victim compensation programs
From the 96th to 100th Congress, both the National Coalition against Domestic
Violence and local and state coalitions made demands for including battered women in
the eligible population for crime victim compensation programs (Frederick 1980, LHR0023; Flynn, 1984, SJS-0037; Grace 1987, HJH-0064; Medley 1984, SJS-0037; Nuriel
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1987, HJH-0064; Peck 1987, HJH-0064). These programs were government funded and
provided financial restitution to victims for certain types of crime. The Victims of Crime
Act of 1984 included a prohibition against awarding compensation to victims who were
related in some way to their offender (42 USC. 10601). The impetus for this clause was
to prevent offenders from benefiting from their crimes. Movement actors argued that this
prohibition unfairly penalized battered women, who were victims of crime. They held
that direct financial compensation was not only appropriate, but necessary for women to
move beyond crisis. Compensation for medical bills, property damage, and lost wages
were seen as an important step in improving a battered woman’s capacity to achieve selfsufficiency.
Discussion of Direct Resource Demands and Movement Goals
There was broad movement coalition support for federal funding to fill a gap in
the availability of direct crisis intervention resources for battered women. Shelters and
basic needs services were intended to allow battered women access to refuge and smooth
the transition to a non-violent home. Financial assistance would facilitate getting
reestablished and on the path to self-sufficiency. Movement actors demanded that these
resources be supplied as directly as possible (Tinker 1978, EDL-0016). This request was
tied to the fear that government intervention would lead to treating battered women as a
“problem” that needed to be solved through managed social services, rather than
competent actors able to make decisions in their own interests.
The call for direct resources was primarily addressing the diagnosis of an absence
of crisis intervention resources. However, part of this deficit was the result of exclusion
of battered women from existing services. By framing these institutions as non-
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responsive to battered women, the movement was simultaneously making a case for
alternative institutions while also agitating for reform of existing programs. In their
testimonies before Congressional committees, movement coalition actors asked
lawmakers to accept that battered women needed resources (not just the desire) to escape
violent homes.
B. Prognostic frames calling for improved public knowledge and existing agency
response
1. Fund public education and media campaigns to raise awareness about domestic
violence
Movement coalition actors proposed public education on the causes, experiences,
and consequences of domestic violence in order to “change attitudes” about the “societal
conditions creating family violence” (Hill 1978, SHR-0034: 441) and improve the
response of public agencies to battered women (Naples 1978, SHR-0034). Specifically,
movement actors called for funding a national public awareness campaign aimed at
uncovering myths about woman battering and exposing it as a public rather than private
problem (Martin 1976; Navarro 1978, EDL-0016; Smith 1986, CYF-0003; Brygger 1990,
LHR-0035; “Jane Doe” 1992, HJH-0003; Buel 1993, SJS-0008). Others suggested public
education should focus on the nature and experience of battering making it more
recognizable (Naples 1978, SHR-0034; Blackbear 1978, EDL-0016; Fleming 1978, SHR0034; Hansen 1983, EDL-0038; “MJ” 1991, SAP-0019; Roberts 1994, HJH-0038).
The call for public awareness campaigns was present in all Congressional
sessions. Primary support came from members representing shelters and national
domestic violence organizations. A representative of a national domestic violence
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organization identified the federal government as the only source able to provide
adequate funds for a national campaign (Brygger 1990, LHR-0035). There was some
support from local and state coalitions and legal advocates beginning in the 99th Congress
(1985) and continuing until the end of the challenge. Survivor support was also present,
but not prolific. Over time, movement actors offered additional prevention oriented
prognostic claims, including: creating and implementing an age appropriate public school
curriculum on domestic violence (Baca 1993, SJS-0015; Buel 1993, SJS-0008; Hall
1991, SAP-0019; Lee 1987, CYF-0014), creating education programs on alternatives to
violence (Meuschke 1991, SAP-0019), the cost of domestic violence to employers
(Clapprood 1993, SJS-008), and women’s empowerment (Bauer-Hughes 1991, SAP0019).
2. Improve criminal justice response to battered women through trainings on the nature
of battering, appropriate interventions for battered women, and referring battered
women for services for personnel working in law enforcement, prosecution, and the
courts
The primary and most consistently offered prognostic message on criminal and
civil justice at the federal level concerned personnel training. Similar to the call for public
awareness campaigns, movement actors suggested that training was needed on the nature
of battering, attitudes toward battered women, and appropriate methods of crisis
intervention. The request for training in the 95th through the 98th Congresses (1977-1984)
specifically called for educating law enforcement officers (Fields 1978, EDL-0016;
Fleming 1978, EDL-0016; Monasmith 1978, SHR-0034). As Congressional challenges
continued, demands for police training included specific topics: police use of discretion
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(Oberg 1982), attitudes toward female victims of domestic abuse (Fedders 1987, EDL0027), and recognizing the difference between female offending and the battered
woman’s use of self-defense (Michaud 1993, SJS-0026; Zorza 1994, HJH-0038). In the
later years, movement actors began to include prosecutors, criminal court personnel, and
civil court personnel in the call for increased training (Buel 1993, SJS-0008; Clapprood
1993, SJS-0008; Hart 1987, CYF-0014; Orloff 1992, HJH-0057). Barbara Hart described
the training as a necessary step for the criminal and civil justice systems to provide a
competent response to battered women (Hart 1987, CYF-0014).
The demand for justice system personnel training was present in each
Congressional period except for the 99th (1985-86), where limited hearings were held.
The message was primarily carried by shelter workers, with some support from legal
advocates and survivor stories about failed interventions. Beginning with the 101st
Congress (1989-90), national domestic violence organizations also testified regarding
training across the various facets of the criminal justice system.
3. Fund training for medical and behavioral health personnel on the nature of battering,
appropriate interventions for battered women, and referring battered women for services
The criminal and civil justice systems were not the only targets for personnel
training. Members of the movement coalition also called for education of both medical
and behavioral health workforces on the identification of battering victims, appropriate
documentation of injuries, treatment interventions, and referrals to other agencies (Fields
1978, EDL-0016; Moore 1979, EDL-0021; Sheppard 1994, HAP-0051; Steytler 1978,
EDL-0016). Testimonies highlighted the failure of personnel in these fields to identify
abuse and document injury (Monasmith 1978, SHR-0034). Some witnesses suggested
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that the failure of medical and behavioral health personnel was due to a reliance on the
clinical perspective on violence, which attributed the abuse to individual behavior and
psychological problems (sometimes framing the problem as originating with the victim)
(Steytler 1978, EDL-0016; Monasmith 1978, SHR-0034; Fedders 1987, EDL-0027).
This message received less attention from movement actors when compared to the
other requests for public awareness and education. The call for training of public health
personnel was first put forward in the testimonies of shelter workers and legal advocates
in the 95th and 96th Congressional sessions (1977-80). However, the issue was largely
absent from testimonies from the 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses (1983-88). In the 101st
Congress (1989-90), national domestic violence organization representatives joined
shelters and legal advocates in a renewed demand for medical and behavioral health
personnel training. National advocates specifically backed policies that would require the
addition of domestic violence training in standard curriculums of professional schools for
medicine, nursing, and other health care professions (Baca 1993, SJS-0015; Soler 1993,
HEC-0035).
Discussion of Awareness, Education, and Movement Goals
On the surface, the call for public knowledge and awareness programs was rooted
in the diagnostic claim of failed institutional response. Policy changes impacting the way
police or medical personnel responded to domestic violence were being pursued with
varying levels of success at the state-level. Even so, survivors and service providers
continued to have problematic encounters with programs and intervention agencies
outside of those dedicated to crisis response for battered women. The call to improve
institutional response through improved public and personnel knowledge was aimed at
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improving crisis intervention. Failure to respond or poor response was believed to be a
hindrance to battered women’s safety, and thus contributing to crisis conditions. BWM
actors identified education programs as an opportunity to alter knowledge and attitudes
about gender norms and relationships. In order for existing institutions to be a help to
battered women, actors within those institutions (and society at large) needed to
understand the nature of domestic violence, including issues of power and control and the
structural (rather than psychological or emotional) impediments to a woman’s escape
from a violent home. In making these three prognostic claims, movement actors were
asking lawmakers to not only explicitly accept that public knowledge about battering was
deficient, but also that members of the movement coalition were better situated than
professionals in other fields to provide education on domestic violence.
C. Prognostic frames requesting legal protections for battered women as they navigate
criminal and civil legal systems
1. Fund legal representation for battered women in both criminal and civil court
proceedings resulting from battery
As demonstrated in the diagnostic testimonies of survivors, the courts were also
criticized for failing to respond appropriately to battered women. One of the primary
problems according to BWM actors was a lack of access to legal advice and
representation. Civil courts, including those that oversee civil restraining orders, child
custody, and divorce cases, do not routinely require parties to have legal representation.
Victims in criminal proceedings are also not typically represented by an attorney during
the prosecution of the offender in the crime. BWM actors claimed both of these situations
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were problematic for battered women, who were often without personal resources to
procure representation.
Testimonies by shelter workers and legal advocates attempted to provide evidence
that criminal and civil legal cases were complicated by the pattern of abuse between a
batterer and his victim. Although some early testimony identified the need for legal
representation (Clinch 1978, SHR-0034), the initial prognostic message was a call for
generalized advocacy for battered women to help them understand complicated legal
procedures during the adjudication of civil and criminal cases (Graham 1986, CYF-0005;
Harris 1978; Martin 1976). The issue largely disappeared from Congressional testimony
during the 96th – 98th Congresses (1979-84). In the 99th Congress (1985-86), movement
actors demanded programs for legal representation in civil cases involving the battered
woman and her abuser (Buel 1990, LHR-0035; Graham 1986, CYF-0005; Little Johns
1991, SAP-0019; Orloff 1992, HJH-0057; Whetstone 1983, EDL-0038). The call for
legal representation continued to appear in movement actor testimonies through the 103rd
Congress.
2. Create policies and procedures that allow battered women to conceal their residential
address during service utilization and civil and criminal court procedures
Another movement prognostic message concerning legal protections for battered
women focused on the need for women to conceal their whereabouts from their abusers.
As victims sought to use public intervention resources, including civil and criminal
courts, they were required to provide residential addresses. Monica Erler (1978) testified
that "searches for fathers in child support actions and requests for welfare information
from other states often mark the beginning of a new siege of harassment for a woman
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who has just escaped" from their abusers (110). Documents containing location
information were made available to abusers during the execution of agency action or
legal discovery and other court procedures. BWM advocates argued that both states and
the federal government should provide a procedure to conceal and keep confidential the
address of domestic violence victims (Erler 1978; Hendrickson and Schulman 1982;
Martin 1976; Price 1992, HJH-0057; Yupclave 1990, SJS-0024). This message appeared
in testimonies of BWM actors representing shelters and national feminist organizations in
the 95th and 96th Congresses (1977-80), in the writings of movement activists during the
97th and 98th (1981-84), and was carried by local or state coalitions in the 101st, 102nd,
and 103rd Congressional sessions (1989-94).
3. Encourage state courts to allow and consider evidence of battering in family court
proceedings related to divorce, child support, custody, and visitation litigation
Survivors often reported difficulties in introducing information about domestic
violence in divorce, support, and child custody cases and having their concerns taken
seriously. Joint custody and visitation required ongoing contact between the battered
woman and her abuser. Even where a restraining order prohibiting contact or abuse was
in place, battered women testified that they often encountered resistance to the
enforcement of the provisions of civil court orders (Stiles 1993, SJS-008). Women were
also accused of making claims of abuse to get their way in divorce proceedings (Price
1992, HRH-0057). Further, movement actors held that state laws and court practices
frequently failed to acknowledge the potential for long-term negative consequences that
may result from the exposure of children to domestic abuse (Brygger 1990, LHR-0035).
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Beginning in the 97th Congress (1981-82), advocates proposed that lawmakers
consider policy changes that would allow for the introduction of battering as evidence in
divorce and child custody cases (Hendrickson and Schulman 1982). This message
originated in movement publications and was aimed largely at state lawmakers during the
time period of the 97th and 98th Congresses (1981-84) (Hendrickson and Schulman 1982).
The actual policy change sought by movement actors was never explicitly stated.
However, local and state coalition representatives, legal advocates and survivors
testifying at Congressional hearings called for an evaluation of these issues and federal
government guidance for state courts on the best way to adjudicate these family court
cases in the 100th, 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses (1987-94) (Bauer-Hughes 1991,
SAP-0019; Buel 1990, SJS-0041; Buel 1993, SJS-0008; Colsrud 1993, LHR-0026;
Fedders 1990, SJS-0041; Orloff 1992, HJH-0057; Price 1992, HJH-0057; Shields 1990,
HJH-0013; Shriver 1991, HJH-0038; Stark 1994, AGS-0008; Stiles 1993, SJS-0008;
Wright 1987, EDL-0027).
Discussion of Legal Protections and Movement Goals
The demands for legal protections, while not fully formed policy proposals, were
premised on the idea that the status of women overall would be improved by granting
battered women a right to privacy, the power to parent their children in violence-free
homes, and to be afforded the status of crime victim. Demands for legal protections for
battered women were not as consistently or diversely supported by members of the
coalition as those for direct resources for battered women or improved public knowledge
about domestic violence. While survivors drew attention to the institutional failures that
created legal complications, few articulated specific claims for legal reforms. Survivors
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spoke primarily about ensuring the safety of their children when negotiating custody and
visitation. Legal protection prognostic frames calling for legal representation and policies
to allow concealment of residential addressees were primarily carried by movement
coalition members representing agencies that provided services to battered women
(shelters, legal advocates) and local or state domestic violence coalitions. These
prognostic frames were concentrated in Congressional hearings during the later three
Congressional sessions in hearings on policy provisions of what would become the
Violence Against Women Act.
Legal protection prognoses were clearly aimed at addressing institutional failures
in response to battering. But these frames also constituted new tools for improving crisis
intervention. Similar to the need to improve public knowledge, claims-makers were
drawing attention to the belief that fleeing a violent home or otherwise seeking help was
only the beginning of the crisis intervention response. Battered women needed the
support of social institutions both in recognizing the legitimacy of their decision to leave
in the first place and also understanding why they needed secrecy and limited contact
with their former partners. In requesting these protections, movement actors were asking
Congress to accept that relationships involving battering create challenges for civil and
criminal courts, and to acknowledge that the consequences of these challenges were
serious and that legal protections were warranted under these circumstances.
V. Secondary Frames
As already noted, the BWM, like most coalition movements, was made up of a
diverse set of actors representing different segments of the beneficiary population. Not all
battered women sought refuge in a shelter. Similarly, not all victims of domestic violence
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called for police assistance. Over the years analyzed in this work, there were numerous
prognostic messages made by members of the movement coalition. Given the diversity of
the coalition, not all of these messages received broad support. Further, some prognostic
claims emerged in response to later policy claims or following the implementation of new
policies. Thus, the challenge-frame-public discussion-policy formulation process is not a
one-directional flow, but rather a recursive process in which initial framing may later
evolve in new ways, in response to discussion and policy. The back and forth nature of
framing results in some initial or subsequent message frames becoming primary frames,
while others fade to a secondary status within movement discourse. While the focus of
this work is on the primary national policy agenda of the BWM, this section briefly
identifies additional prognostic claims made or supported by members of the movement
coalition. These messages are not critical to understanding the movement agenda, but are
important for setting up and analyzing outcomes of emergent policy frames in the next
chapter.
Alongside requests for shelter and services, some members of the movement
coalition made specific requests for funding “infrastructure” to aid in the provision of
crisis services. Infrastructure was articulated as a necessary precursor to being able to
assist battered women during crisis. Specific needs identified by actors included
acquiring and renovating buildings, vehicles, installing phone lines, and other material
needs (Hart 1980, LHR-0023; Kelley-Dreiss 1990, SJS-0041; Sherbo 1978, EDL-0016;
Steytler 1978, EDL-0016). There was also early support for creating a national council of
service providers to advise not only shelters and battered women’s services, but also to
provide education and advisement to policy makers and other prevention and intervention
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efforts. Clinch (1978, SHR-0034), a state domestic violence coalition actor, suggested
modeling the council after their own organizations, where the membership was
comprised of persons working in direct service provision.
Movement actors advocated for and supported a variety of emergent policy
proposals over time. Some of these additional prognostic frames were consistent with the
BWM’s national policy agenda. For example, the request for funding state-level domestic
violence coalitions was tied to keeping shelters and domestic violence services based in
local communities (Menard 1991, LHR-0026; Gamache 1991, LHR-0026). During
testimonies related to VAWA, a few movement actors expressed support for funding a
national crisis hotline to connect domestic violence victims with services (Baca 1993,
SJS-0015; Dalton 1993, SJS-0008; Stile 1993, SJS-008). Members of the movement
coalition also provided testimonies in support of federal penalties for crossing state lines
to violate a domestic violence protection order or to commit an act of domestic abuse
(Buel 1990, SJS-0041; Hart 1987, CYF-0014; “MJ” 1991, SAP-0019; Zorza 1994, HJH0038). Creating a federal policy on protection order violations was believed to be
necessary since current laws varied from state to state and there was no universal
enforcement of protection orders outside of the jurisdiction in which the order was issued
(Brygger 1990, LHR-0035).
Some of the prognostic frames emerging in later years were in response to
Congressional proposals that had received little to no prior attention from BWM actors. A
representative of the National Organization for Women provided testimony in support of
Congressional proposals on adding gender to protected classes in hate crime laws and
assessing criminal and civil penalties for “gender motivated” violence (Reuss 1994,
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AGS-0001) and others supported proposed increases in federal penalties for convicted
domestic violence offenders (Dalton 1993 SJS-0008; Sheppard 1994, HAP-0051). These
frames emerged simultaneously with the early drafts of the Violence Against Women Act
(1990). Neither of these issues originated within the movement literature or the
testimonies of movement actors.
I have designated these issues as secondary because they did not receive the
diversity or longevity of support in public testimonies as those documented as the
primary policy agenda. Each of these issues falls within the movement diagnosis and
prognosis of the problem and address some aspect of the overall movement goal. In some
cases, the lack of support was simply an issue of prioritizing needs based on the
experiences of individuals providing testimony. However, the avoidance or lack of
prioritization of some secondary frames by the movement coalition factor into the
trajectory of message making and framing contests with Congress over the course of the
challenge, and thus become relevant in the next chapter’s discussion.
VI. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an analysis of diagnostic and
prognostic frames comprising the primary national policy agenda of the Battered
Women’s Movement. This analysis revealed that survivors, shelter workers, coalitions,
and legal advocates working at local and state levels were the primary carriers of the
BWM message in Congressional hearings. Members of the movement coalition
identifying themselves as survivors in public hearings focused on using their personal
stories to highlight the obstacles they encountered when they tried to leave violence
partners. Those identifying as service providers or battered women’s advocates often
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disclosed a personal history of abuse, but focused their testimonies on claims making
about systemic failures and resources deficits. National organizations were present in the
early years of the challenge but focused on a more limited set of issues, namely funding
for shelters, financial assistance for battered women, and funding for public awareness
campaigns.
Although movement actors wrote a great deal about the causes of domestic
violence in movement publications, the diagnostic messages presented at Congressional
hearings primary addressed three general areas that they believed necessitated public
intervention: resources for battered women, improved public awareness and knowledge
about the problem and appropriate response, and legal protections for battering victims in
civil and criminal courts. These prognoses targeted the problem of public response to
battering, rather than alleviating the cause of domestic violence. Specifically, BWM
actors identified deficiencies in the crisis intervention safety net and called for rapid,
universally available, and community based crisis response to battered women. Some of
these deficiencies were the result of a lack of financial and material resources (shelter,
services, and money). But there were also a number of response deficiencies that
stemmed from the failure of existing institutions that were part of the larger community
safety net. Specifically, advocates cited failures in criminal justice, civil courts, and
medical and behavioral health care agencies.
These two related diagnoses yielded a number of prognostic messages about what
should be done to advance the competency of response to battered women and thus
improve the safety of women at home. BWM actors called for direct resources for
battered women in crisis, resources to carry out public awareness campaigns and
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professional training programs, and guidance on improving legal protections for battered
women in criminal and civil courts. The assessment of policy-oriented prognostic
framing by BWM actors revealed that the movement primarily viewed the role of the
federal government as a resource provider for community efforts to improve and expand
response to the crisis of woman battering.
The analysis in this chapter reveals little change in the movement’s prognostic
frames over time. This is especially the case for demands for battered women’s shelter,
services, government financial assistance, funding for public awareness campaigns,
criminal justice system personnel training, and the call for consideration of battering in
divorce and custody proceedings. The call for crime victim compensation is consistently
present from the 96th through the 100th Congress (1979 – 1988). But then no longer
appears on the movement agenda. Once deployed, each of these frames was consistently
presented throughout the challenge period.
The remaining frames had bifurcated periods of deployment. The request for
personnel training for public health professionals appears in the 95th through the 97th
Congress (1977 – 1982). It is not observed again until the 101st Congress (1989 - 1990),
but then remains on the agenda through the end of the challenge. A similar pattern of
early introduction followed by periods of absence on the agenda and reappearance in the
latter half of the challenge were observed for the demands for legal representation for
battered women and laws to provide for the concealment of one’s residential address.
The deployment patterns of movement prognostic frames may be indicative of
changes in target response to movement claims-making. Trumpy (2008) postulated that
message cooptation was complete only when the movement ceased responding to the
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targets cooptation attempts. If the challenger’s message was coopted by target response,
then we would expect the prognostic frame to disappear from or at the very least become
marginalized on the movement’s agenda at one point or another. Additional analysis is
needed to determine whether the observed persistence in frame deployment led to
influence over policy production. It is also possible that the gaps in response are the result
of target response. These dynamics cannot be fully understood without examining
message presence or absence in the context of target response frames. This will be further
explored in Chapter 6.
Analysis of the movement’s agenda is the first step toward examining message
outcomes; the prognostic frames identified here provide the basis for the subsequent
analysis. In the next chapter, I analyze the federal government’s response to movement
messaging. Specifically, I examine instances of message alignment and divergence and
analyze the resulting Congressional outcomes, once the messages comprising the
movement’s agenda were presented in Congressional hearings.
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Chapter Six
Congressional Bills and Prognostic Message Outcomes
I. Introduction
This chapter analyzes policy proposals in the U.S. Congress including as
assessment of outcomes for prognostic messages from the primary national policy agenda
of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM or the movement). The first section outlines
the pace, content and characteristics of congressional response to battered women’s
issues from the 95th (1977-1978) through the 103rd Congress (1993-1994). The remainder
of the chapter examines congressional response frames for the ten key BWM prognostic
messages considered in Chapter 5. The analysis focuses on determining frame outcomes
by investigating the alignment or divergence of Congressional response frames with
movement prognostic frames over time.
II. Congressional Bills in the U.S. Congress, 1977-1994
From the 95th Congress through the 103rd Congress, 214 bills addressing domestic
violence were introduced. The majority of bills (58%) were introduced by a member of
the House of Representatives, with the remainder introduced in the Senate. Sixty-two
(62) percent of bills were sponsored by a member of the majority in the body of
introduction. Either a committee or subcommittee chair or the ranking minority member
of the committee to which the bill was assigned was identified as the bill sponsor in
slightly less than 39% of these bills (N = 83). The pacing of bill introduction began
slowly and increased considerably in the later years with almost 80% of bills introduced
in the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses. 10

10

No domestic violence related bills were introduced during the 99th Congress. Shelter funding was
adopted for the first time in the 98th Congress, which may explain a gap in legislative initiatives. Movement
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A. Congressional Action on Bills
Congress responded to movement demands with policy proposals almost
immediately. The development and articulation of movement frames, especially those
calling for a federal government response, were first documented in the early 1970s. In
the 95th Congress (1977-1978), 10 bills were introduced by seven members of Congress:
Senators Wendell Anderson (D-MN) and Alan Cranston (D-CA), and Representatives
Corrine Lindy Boggs (D-LA), George Miller (D-CA), Matthew Rinaldo (R-NJ), Newton
Steers (R-MD), and Charles Thone (R-NE). Following introduction, five Congressional
hearings were held to discuss these proposals. Senator Cranston’s version of the
Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act of 1978 (S 2759, 1978) passed through
committee and was approved by the Senate, but failed to pass the House before the end of
the 95th Congressional session.
The most common explanation for questions about why or when lawmakers take
on a policy issue is the connection between perceived constituent support and reelection
considerations. R. Douglas Arnold (1990) notes that reelection concerns are the primary
influence on policy issue support among lawmakers. According to Arnold, election
considerations are not necessarily based on actual public opinion of the policy, but rather
on how legislators perceive the impact of the policy on future electability. When
reelection is not an issue, lawmakers will act on policies based on personal beliefs, beliefs
about policy effectiveness, or to give or repay favors to their constituents or other
lawmakers.

actor testimonies were recorded during this Congress, but appeared in hearings related to child abuse and
other matters.
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Battered women’s movement historians speculated on explanations for why
Congress responded so early in the claims-making process. Movement historian Susan
Schechter (1982) noted that movement actors were quite surprised that bills were heard in
committees and voted on in the first year of introduction. She suggested that the response
was due to a mixture of personal support and constituent pressure among Congress men
and women putting forward these proposals. Indeed, both of these explanations were
supported by the statements of legislation sponsors and co-sponsors in the five 1978
hearings noted above. Two co-sponsoring Representatives, Barbara Mikulski (D-MD)
and Mario Biaggi (D-NY) identified their personal histories as motivating their support of
federal domestic violence intervention (EDL-0016, 1978). Representative Mikulski was a
social worker prior to being elected to Congress and Representative Biaggi was a police
officer. Constituent pressure was also commonly identified as a motivating factor by bill
sponsors and co-sponsors. Representatives Miller and Boggs highlighted local and statelevel progress within their jurisdictions as the basis of their support for federal
intervention (EDL-0016, 1978). Representative Robert Kasten (R-WI) testified in the
same hearing on behalf of battered women’s organizations from his home state of
Wisconsin.
In addition to the two reasons identified by Schechter, some lawmakers situated
their support under a third area of concern—a connection between domestic violence and
related issue advocacy. Representative Mikulski cited a link with the issue of violence in
media (EDL-0016). Representative James Scheuer (D-NY) testified about the connection
of this issue to criminal justice policies more broadly (EDL-0016, 1978). Senator
Cranston noted a history of sponsoring child abuse related legislation (SHR-0033, 1978).
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And Representative Boggs was a proponent of women’s rights legislation, including
policies related to women’s access to credit and job training.
Reelection concerns may explain the prompt response of both lawmakers citing
constituent support and those making connections to other policy domains. It is also
possible that lawmakers viewed interventions for battered women as a safe issue. Federal
funding for local interventions had the advantage of the diffusion of financial
responsibility and a narrowly targeted population for intervention programs. Arnold
(1990) suggests that these characteristics make it more likely that lawmakers can respond
to the needs of groups while being less concerned about public opinion.
While the response to movement demands came early, the vast majority of bills
received little to no attention by either body of Congress. Seventy-four percent of bills
were assigned to a single congressional committee or subcommittee (N = 159), with the
remainder assigned to two or more committees. Further, proposals rarely made it out of
the committee process. Thirty-two (32) bills passed at least one Congressional body, with
26 passed by the House and 24 passed by the Senate. Across these nine Congressional
sessions, 13 bills passed both bodies and were signed into law by the president, five of
these bills originated in the Senate and eight in the House.
B. Domestic Violence as a Distinct Policy Issue
Lawmakers frequently articulated domestic violence as similar in nature to other
existing personal and family problems. More than 60 percent of bills with domestic
violence provisions were multi-issue bills primarily written to address a different
problem. For example, in the 96th Congress, S 440 incorporated a provision to add
domestic violence counseling and service referrals to the activities of proposed substance
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abuse treatment programs. Figure 5 shows the percentage of all bills with domestic
violence provisions that were single-issue domestic violence bills by Congress. Singleissue domestic violence bills were more common in the first four sessions. Multi-issue
proposals with domestic violence provisions were more common in the final four
sessions. The consolidation of policy proposals into fewer (and more expansive) bills was
an overall trend in Congress, with a sharp reduction in the total number of bills
introduced in both bodies beginning in the 96th Congress (1979-1980). Regardless, some
of the consolidation of battered women’s issues as policy provisions in multi-issue bills
proposed locating the work into existing or proposed programs or agencies like the
example above. These policy development choices shed light on how lawmakers
interpreted the problem.
Figure 5. Percentage of all bills with domestic violence provisions that were single-issue
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In the 95th Congress, all domestic violence related policy proposals were singleissue bills. In the 96th, 97th, and 98th Congresses, more than half of all domestic violence
related policy proposals were single-issue bills, but lawmakers also proposed domestic
violence provisions in multi-issue bills on topics related to adult protection, child
protection, substance abuse treatment, and unemployment. This was the case in about 3045% of all bills related to domestic violence in these three congressional sessions.
Starting with the 99th Congress, far smaller proportions of domestic violence related
proposals were carried in single-issue bills.
There were two ways that domestic violence provisions were attached to multiissue bills. In some cases, the addition of domestic violence prevention or intervention
initiatives was an attempt to locate government response within existing agencies. For
example, proposals to fund domestic violence shelters were placed in bills related to child
welfare. Shelter funding was not incorporated into child welfare activities, but rather was
placed in the bill because lawmakers sought to use the Department of Health and Human
Services as the agency of oversight. In other cases, the domestic violence provisions were
actually attached to the work agenda of proposed or existing programs aimed at
addressing different social problems. These bills merely added “domestic violence” to a
list of possible interventions to which substance abuse treatment agencies or homeless
service providers may need to attend. While the former type of inclusion spoke to the
way Congress wanted to address the problem, the latter type revealed lawmaker
assumptions about the cause of the problem. The joining of domestic violence proposals
with child protection and substance abuse treatment bills continued on and off throughout
the challenge.
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The first crime related bill with domestic violence provisions appeared in the
100th Congress and proposed the inclusion of domestic violence victims in the population
of crime victims eligible for compensation through the Victims of Crime Act (HR 1801,
1987). By the 103rd Congress, crime bills were the largest category of multiple-issue bills
with domestic violence related provisions. In the 101st to the 103rd Congresses, domestic
violence provisions also appeared in bills on homelessness and housing. Similar to the
handling of domestic violence in substance abuse treatment proposals, these bills added
counseling and services to proposed programs on homelessness. In the 102nd and 103rd
Congresses, there were a number of bills that added domestic violence prevention and
intervention to proposals defining the public health agenda of the Centers for Disease
Control.
From the 101st to the 103rd Congresses, there were a number of other multi-issue
bills incorporating domestic violence provisions, including proposals for welfare reform,
arson prevention, military criminal codes, immigration, and international aid. There were
also proposals for federal education and economic programs that integrated requests
related to prevention or intervention of domestic violence. For example, HR 3354 (1991)
proposed waiving marital status for victims of domestic violence when determining
college financial aid status. In the 102nd Congress, two bills on sexual harassment
incorporated provisions that were later attached to the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) (HR 1149, 1991; S 472, 1991). The inclusion of domestic violence proposals in
these bills was infrequent, but at times resulted in policy enactment.
Congress addressed each of the ten prognostic frames of the movement policy
agenda at least once during the course of the challenge. Following a brief reminder on the
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method for determining outcomes, the next section details findings from the inspection of
target response frames and outcomes for each of the ten movement prognostic frames in
the primary policy agenda identified in Chapter 5. This includes four frames demanding
direct resources for battered women, three calling for improved public knowledge and
existing agency response, and three frames that called for legal protections for battered
women.
III. Target Response and Movement Framing Outcomes
The outcome of each prognostic frame-target frame interaction was determined by
following the presentation of and response to prognostic frames over the course of the
challenge, from the 95th (1977-78) to the 103rd (1993-94) Congresses. Frame outcomes
refer only to the result of the framing interaction with regard to whether or not lawmakers
aligned with the perspective provided in the movement frame (acceptance) and
subsequently included a policy prescription that if enacted would constitute a new
advantage for the BWM (inclusion). Using Figure 2 in Chapter 2, each prognostic frametarget frame interaction outcome was classified as one of the following: (1) frame success
(acceptance and inclusion), (2) frame cooptation (acceptance without inclusion), or (3)
frame failure (neither acceptance nor inclusion). Because this work identified and then
examined the outcomes of specific movement prognostic messages, frame preemption
(no acceptance but some other benefit was proposed) was not among the observed
outcomes. Additional details on the methods of the analysis are provided in Chapter 3.
The majority of bills introduced by Congress did not result in actual policy
adoption. As such, the designation of success as a prognostic frame outcome is not
indicative of the common conceptualization of “success” in policy studies. Rather, in this
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work “success” refers to the acceptance and inclusion of the movement prognostic frame
in Congressional bill proposals. This research decision is not meant to diminish the
importance of actual policy adoption. Clearly an enacted policy that includes prognostic
frame acceptance and inclusion would be a more tangible benefit yielding success for the
movement. Likewise, an enacted policy that coopted the movement prognostic message
would potentially have more real-world consequence than would acceptance of a
prognostic frame that does not result in policy enactment. However, for the analytic
purposes of this dissertation, the key focus will remain on prognostic frame outcomes
rather than policy enactment. Policy enactment will be identified where applicable and
figured into the analysis of overall movement prognostic frame outcomes.
Of the 214 domestic violence related bills introduced by members of Congress,
70% addressed at least one of the frames in the movement primary agenda. I use
movement prognostic frames to structure the presentation of findings regarding target
response (i.e. regarding language in Congressional bills). The sections are numbered and
titled to correspond to the presentation of frames in Chapter 5. For each prognosis in the
primary agenda, evidence from movement publications and testimonies was compared to
each target response frame to determine whether the response constituted acceptance and
inclusion of the movement demand. Some frames yielded multiple responses from
Congress during the same session potentially resulting in multiple frame outcomes. A
table summarizing the outcomes for each prognostic frame by Congressional session is
presented at the end of each section.
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A. Response to prognostic frames demanding resources for battered women in crisis
1. Fund community-based crisis shelter for battered women
Congress offered three distinct response frames to the movement request for
community-based crisis shelters for battered women. One response was a proposal to
create grant programs to provide emergency or crisis shelter for domestic violence
victims. The initial proposal called the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act
of 1978 (HR 7927,1977; HR 9052, 1977; HR 9053, 1977; HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826,
1978; HR 11617, 1978; HR 11762, 1978; S 1728, 1977; S 2758,1978) was first
introduced in the 95th Congress. In addition to the provision for shelter, the Act proposed
a funding package for research, a public awareness campaign, and victim services. These
programs were to be located within the National Institute for Mental Health and limited
to three years of funding for each recipient. Movement actors and law makers disagreed
about which government office was appropriate for oversight of domestic violence
programs. As time progressed, alternative bills were offered that sought to either create
an Office of Domestic Violence (HR 12299, 1978; HR 3921, 1979) or incorporate these
programs under the Department of Health and Human Services (HR 1007, 1981; HR
1651, 1981; S 2908, 1982). Although the implementation criteria were opposed by some
members of the movement coalition, these proposals represent frame success for the
movement prognostic message. The target response aligned with the movement prognosis
by accepting the need for crisis shelter for battered women and provided new advantages
by creating a funding stream to meet this need.
In the 96th and 98th Congresses, a second response to the request for crisis shelter
funding appeared simultaneously with those creating funding for battered women’s
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shelter programs. One of these proposals was to make funds available for crisis shelter by
amending the types of programs eligible for application in existing funding streams. For
example, one bill proposed amendments to the Social Security Act that would authorize
payments to states to provide emergency shelter to adults in danger of physical or mental
injury (S 1153, 1979). This proposal included domestic violence as one of a number of
possible problems leading to the need for emergency shelter, but did not accept the
movement prognosis of the need for shelters specifically dedicated to serving battered
women. Similarly, a Senate bill in the 98th Congress proposed adding emergency shelter
for domestic violence victims to the programs eligible to apply for funding under the
Emergency Food and Shelter Act of 1983 (S 493, 1983). These programs were
community development grant programs aimed at alleviating the negative effects of
unemployment. As such, grant funds were earmarked for programs serving the long-term
unemployed and financially needy families. Both of these proposals constitute frame
cooptation attempts. While aligning with the movement prognosis on the need for crisis
shelter, these proposals failed to recognize the specific need for battered women’s
shelters and only provided new resources for sheltering economically disadvantaged
persons, with no focus on battered women.
In the 101st Congress, a third target response appeared in bills that proposed a
grant program to develop eight model “comprehensive” shelter programs (HR 2452,
1989; S 1056, 1989). The proposal was part of the American Family Act of 1989, which
also sought to create programs allowing parental school choice and to encourage child
adoption. As designed, the program would require shelters to not only provide
comprehensive crisis shelter services (food, shelter, immediate medical services, and
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transportation), but also a variety of other long-term counseling and support services
focused on transitional housing, parenting, nutrition, exercise, substance abuse,
educational services, employment training, home management skills, and assertiveness
training. These funds also came with a requirement for a minimum of 40 beds and a
required three month stay at the facility. The length of stay was presumably to allow for
the completion of counseling and transition programming.
It could be argued that this proposal has the same outcome as those described in
the first target response on shelter. These programs seem to meet the movement request
for shelter (and services). These response frames recognized the need for shelter
programs for battered women apart from the types of shelter and emergency assistance
offered to families experiencing other types of crises. Further, movement actors
frequently spoke about the “comprehensive” approach of battered women’s shelters to
the needs of women. But, these proposals were oriented toward creating a professional
“best practices” model of service delivery, not increasing the capacity of existing
organizations to respond to crisis situations. Aside from the reality that most battered
women’s shelters were not large enough to meet the bed requirement, minimum stays and
mandatory services were inconsistent with the BWM model of crisis intervention. This
type of shelter was viewed as an effort to institutionalize battered women (Flitcraft 1978;
Leghorn 1978). Movement actors suggested these shelters would foster “feelings of
helplessness and inadequacy” leading to social isolation of battered women (Kovak and
Celine 1982: 27). Further, the basic premise of creating a model program in specific sites
that would become the standard for federal funding undermined the idea of communitybased, peer led intervention that movement actors proposed as necessary for fostering
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women’s self-determination (Martin 1978, SHR-0034; Rural Task Force 1991; Tinker
1978, EDL-0016). Finally, peer advocacy was articulated as setting battered women’s
shelters apart from the existing social welfare response, where women assisted one
another with identifying and obtaining what they needed to achieve self-sufficiency. This
aspect of the shelter model was viewed as more important than having an agency that
could meet all of a woman’s needs onsite (Hart 1991, LHR-0026). In light of these
objections, comprehensive model shelter proposals were an attempt to coopt the
movement prognostic frame on funding crisis shelters.
With the exception of differences in the details of implementation, target response
to the request for crisis shelter resulted in the outcome of frame success in each
Congressional session. Further, public laws funding crisis shelters were adopted in the
98th, 100th, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses. In 1983, Congress adopted provisions for crisis
shelter funding in a package of amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, which located the program within Health and Human Services (HR 1904,
1983; PL 98-457, 1984). The shelter grant program was renewed during both the 100th
Congress (HR 1900, 1987; PL 100-294, 1988) and the 102nd Congress (S 838, 1991; PL
102-295, 1992). The only change to occur during the renewal was the removal of the
three year funding limit. Administration of the grant program was moved to the Office of
Justice Programs in the Department of Justice with the adoption of the VAWA (HR 3355,
1993; PL 103-322, 1994). Table 4 shows the presence of target response frames and the
outcomes by Congress for all four movement prognostic frames related to resources for
battered women. As shown in the first column, cooptation attempts of the shelter
prognosis appeared in the 96th, 98th, and 101st Congresses. In the first two attempts, there
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was a rejection of direct resources to battered women’s shelters. However, by the 101st
Congress the initial drafts of VAWA had been introduced. The push for comprehensive
shelters represented a concession to the existence of and need for these shelters, but
sought to gain more control over the type and nature of funded programs.
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Table 4. Outcomes for BWM Prognostic Frames Demanding Resources for Battered Women in Crisis
95th Congress
(1977-1978)

Shelter
Success

Services

Government Assistance
Partial Success

Victim Compensation

Cooptation

96th Congress
(1979-1980)

Success
Cooptation

97th Congress
(1981-1982)

Success

Success
Cooptation

Partial Success
Failure

th

98 Congress
(1983-1984)

Cooptation
Success (Adopted)
Cooptation

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure
Success

Failure
Success (Adopted)

Success (Adopted)
Cooptation

99th Congress
(1985-1986)
100th Congress
(1987-1988)

Failure
Success (Adopted)

Failure

101st Congress
(1989-1990)

Success
Cooptation

102nd Congress
(1991-1992)

Success (Adopted)

Success (Adopted)
Cooptation (Adopted)

Partial Success

103rd Congress
(1993-1994)

Success (Adopted)

Success (Adopted)
Cooptation

Failure

Partial Success
Cooptation
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2. Fund community-based crisis intervention services for battered women
Lawmakers responded with a diverse set of proposals to the prognosis calling for
funding battered women’s services. In total, four types of responses were offered. The
first type of response frame involved adding provisions to social service and public
welfare bills that would incorporate domestic violence counseling and services into
existing programs. Specifically, these were multi-issue bills that called for existing
programs to add counseling and services to a list of possible interventions available to the
service population. Programs targeted for this addition included: family rehabilitation
services (HR 2163, 1979; HR 2682; 1979; HR 4250, 1994; HR 7927, 1977; HR 9052,
1977; HR 9053, 1977; HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826, 1978; HR 11617, 1978; HR 11762,
1978; S 1728, 1977); substance abuse services (HR 3698, 1991; HR 3796, 1991; HR
4022, 1991; HR 6458, 1982; S 440, 1979; S 597, 1991; S 1306, 1991; S 1677, 1991; S
2192, 1992; S 2365, 1982; S 2600, 1990); homeless services (HR 4300, 1992; HR 5100,
1990; S 1513, 1993; S 2181, 1992; S 2600, 1990; S 2863, 1990); job training programs
(HR 15, 1993; HR 196, 1991; HR 740, 1991; HR 1020, 1993; S 100, 1993) and medical
and mental health programs (HR 1189, 1991; HR 2394, 1993; HR 2489, 1991; HR 2958,
1993; HR 3075, 1993; HR 5536, 1990; HR 5752, 1992; S 29, 1991; S 484, 1993; S 1429,
1993; S 3002, 1990; S 3274, 1992). Target response frames adding domestic violence
counseling and services to existing social programs appeared in the 95th, 96, 97th, 101st,
102nd, and 103rd Congresses. Congress approved amendments to the Alcohol, Drug
Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act of 1992 adding domestic
violence counseling to the services available for female offenders in the criminal justice
system, children of substance abusers in treatment programs, pregnant women in
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residential substance abuse treatment programs, and family members of persons in
substance abuse programs (S 1306, 1991; PL 102-321, 1992).
While members of the movement coalition were in favor of improving the
response to battered women by social services and other public welfare programs, these
proposals failed to address the types of crisis oriented services articulated in the
movement prognosis (transportation, housing, medical care, and income assistance for
battered women). Further, these efforts did not seek to help battered women deal with
crisis so much as they targeted the treatment of other marginalized populations: substance
addicted, homeless families, unemployed, and persons with medical problems. Therefore,
adding counseling and services to existing social programs was cooptation of the
prognosis of funding for crisis services.
The second type of target response was a proposed grant program for the
provision of direct services to victims of domestic violence (HR 2847, 1993; HR 3921,
1979; S 8, 1993; S 1380, 1991). These proposals appeared in the 96th, 98th, 102nd, and
103rd Congresses. Each of these target response frames co-occurred with a provision to
fund shelter. As such, the provisions related to funding services were similar in regards to
the distribution and implementation of funds. Movement actors expressed concerns about
which federal agency would be charged with oversight, income qualifications for
utilizing services, and time limits related to funding. Even so, these proposals constitute a
frame success for the movements prognosis in so much as lawmakers accepted the need
for services for battered women and provided a funding source to increase the availability
of such services.
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The third type of target response suggested funding direct services for battered
women by amending the types of programs eligible for application in existing funding
streams. These proposals appeared only in the 98th Congress. One bill recommended
amending an existing violence prevention grant (not domestic violence related) to allow
services for domestic violence victims (S 1003, 1983). Another proposed making
domestic violence services an eligible use of funds in community development grant
programs aimed at improving local economies (S 493, 1983). It is possible that if funded,
these programs would yield new advantages. However, as written the legislation added
“domestic violence services” to a long list of items eligible for funding by community
development funds or other violence prevention initiatives. These programs were
competitive and there was no guarantee of services. Further there was no specification
that these services actually be the crisis intervention resources sought by movement
actors. These proposals demonstrated some amount of acceptance of the movement
demand for services, but did not go so far as to recognize the need for dedicated funding.
Since no actual funding was proposed, these bills were classified as frame cooptation.
The fourth type of target response to the movement request for crisis services was
to construct proposals that allowed domestic violence organizations to compete for funds
to provide social services and public welfare programs in the community. Specifically,
target response frames proposed making domestic violence service providers eligible to
compete for monies to provide residential substance abuse treatment, parenting, and
wellness programs in the community (S 1133, 1993; S 2340, 1990). These bills were
coopting the message of service needs articulated by the movement and continued the
focus of earlier congressional sessions on pushing for the treatment of battered women.
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Turning battered women’s shelters into treatment centers for other social problems would
only serve to dilute the ability of these organizations to respond to battered women in
crisis. Further this response did not provide a guarantee for funding, only the opportunity
to be considered.
Congressional policy proposals indicated lawmaker acceptance of the movement
claim that services for battered women were needed. However, the majority of target
response frames aimed to shift the conversation away from crisis services and toward
providing treatment and counseling for battered women. These efforts at cooptation
appeared in the 95th, 96th, 97th 98th, 101st, 102nd and 103rd Congressional sessions and
were more prevalent than cooptation attempts related to shelter. Even so, all but one of
these attempts at cooptation failed. Bills funding services were adopted in concert with
those funding shelters, constituting success for the movement prognostic frame. The
simultaneous offering of grants to domestic violence programs to provide direct services
first appeared in the 96th Congress and resulted in public laws in the 98th (PL 98-457,
1984), 102nd (PL 102-295, 1992), and 103rd (PL 103-322, 1994).
3. Create exceptions to make battered women eligible for government assistance without
the consideration of spousal income
Congress was less responsive to the movement demand for access to government
income assistance and insurance programs. There were three target response frames that
addressed this issue in some capacity. The first proposal aimed to bar government
assistance programs from discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals because
of participation in domestic violence program or residence in a domestic violence shelter
(HR 12299, 1978). Battered women’s shelters were not valid residential addresses for the
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purpose of applying for government assistance with a claim of permanent separation from
one’s spouse. The proposal appeared in the 95th Congress’s Domestic Violence
Assistance Act of 1978 and again in the 96th Congress version of that same bill (HR
2977, 1979). Non-discrimination in government assistance would benefit some battered
women (specifically those who were already receiving assistance prior to separation). In
addition, being able to maintain enrollment in government assistance programs during a
shelter stay would facilitate a woman’s ability to not only seek safety during crisis, but
also to return to self-sufficiency more quickly. With both acceptance and new advantages
this target response represents a success. However, the target response only addressed
part of the movement prognostic claim and failed to increase access of women who
otherwise would not qualify for government assistance because of continued
consideration of their husband’s income. As such, these bills constitute partial frame
success.
The second target response frame related to battered women’s access to
government assistance was a proposal to reduce the length of separation required for
waiving spousal income in government assistance programs. This bill was introduced in
the 100th Congress as part of the Social Security Insurance Improvement Amendments of
1987 (S 1635, 1987). The bill aimed to reduce the length of separation from six months to
one month in cases involving a victim of domestic violence. In addition, the proposal
included a provision to disregard in-kind assistance provided by non-profit organizations
(e.g. housing) in the determination of recipient need. This proposal was a clear frame
success with both acceptance and the exact policy change requested by the movement.
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The third related target response frame proposed reserving a portion of vouchers
for government subsidized housing specifically for domestic violence victims. This
proposal appeared in the 101st and 102nd Congresses as part of the Family Housing
Options Program Act of 1989 (HR 2951, 1989), the Economic Equity Act of 1989 (HR
3085, 1989; S 1480, 1989), and a bill aimed at alleviating homelessness (HR 4621,
1990). The proposal requested reserving five percent of all housing vouchers for
domestic violence victims and made a provision to allow the use of these vouchers in
shared housing situations (e.g. living with relatives). The vouchers would be prioritized
in states with fewer existing options for shelter and transitional housing. This proposal
was less centered on providing crisis intervention resources. Even so, the resource
constituted a partial frame success, improving access to government assistance programs
for battered women.
While the movement prognostic message on this issue was present in each
Congressional period, target response frames were limited not only to a few sessions but
also to a small number of proposals. Partial frame successes were observed in the 95th
and 96th Congresses with proposals for non-discrimination in public assistance for
women in shelter. As shown in Table 4, this success was short lived and followed by
three sessions with no target response on this issue. In the 100th Congress we see the only
instance of full frame success. This bill appeared at the moment momentum was
beginning to build for the VAWA. But as the proposals related to VAWA began to
dominate the conversation in congressional hearings, the issue of battered women’s
access to government assistance programs disappeared from target response frames. No
policies related to access to public assistance were adopted.
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4. Include domestic violence in eligible offenses for crime victim compensation programs
Congressional response to the request for financial compensation for victims of
domestic violence was provided in two sessions. In 1984, Congress passed the Victims of
Crime Act (PL 98-473). The law extended rights to crime victims that included the right
to be notified of court proceedings, to be present at court hearings involving the offender,
to speak at sentencing, to pursue civil restitution, and to be notified of offender release
from incarceration. The law also established a funding stream to provide monies to
existing state-level crime victim programs to award compensation to victims of certain
types of crime (e.g. rape, robbery, homicide). In an effort to prevent offenders from
benefiting from their crimes, offenses involving victims and offenders with familial ties
were initially excluded from eligibility in state programs. Federal program also excluded
crimes involving family members (HR 5210, 1983).
During the 100th Congress, the Victims of Crime Act was amended to allow
compensation for domestic violence victims (HR 5210, 1988; PL 100-690, 1988). The
movement challenge for including domestic violence victims in crime victim
compensation programs failed for four consecutive Congressional sessions before
achieving frame success in the 100th Congress. Once this law was passed, the issue was
no longer part of the primary movement agenda.
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B. Response to prognostic frames calling for improved public knowledge and existing
agency response
1. Fund public education and media campaigns to raise awareness about domestic
violence
Congress was generally receptive to movement actor requests for funding public
education and media campaigns to raise awareness about domestic violence. Three target
response frames were proposed by lawmakers. The first response was to provide funds to
develop and deploy a public service media campaign to raise awareness about domestic
violence in print, billboards, public transit advertising and broadcast media. These frames
appeared in legislation of the 96th (HR 2977,1979; HR 3921, 1979), 97th (HR 1007, 1981;
HR 1651,1981; S 2908, 1982), 98th (HR 73,1983; HR 1397,1983; S 699, 1983), 101st (S
2340, 1990; S 2754, 1990; S 3134, 1990), 102nd (HR 1149, 1991; HR 1502, 1991; HR
2334, 1991; HR 2720, 1991; HR 4712, 1992; HR 5960, 1992; S 15, 1991; S 212, 1991; S
472, 1991; S 838, 1991; S 1335, 1991; S 3271, 1992), and 103rd Congresses (HR 688,
1993; S 6, 1993; S 8, 1993; S 11, 1993). A public awareness media campaign was funded
in the 102nd Congress (S 838, 1991; PL 102-295, 1992). While some movement actors
were opposed to dedicating resources in this manner, others believed public education on
the prevalence and nature of battering would help create a better understanding of victim
experience and thereby decrease their isolation in the community (Brygger 1990, LHR0035; Hansen 1983, EDL-0038; Roberts 1994, HJH-0038). Similar to the issues of
shelter and services, the implementation of public education and awareness campaigns
may have deviated from the intent of movement actors. However, response from the
government on this issue showed an acceptance of the movement message on the need
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for public education and provided a funding stream for carrying out this work—yielding
both a frame and policy success.
The second target response frame related to raising public awareness was to adopt
a resolution recognizing October as Domestic Violence Awareness Month. Resolutions to
declare a special month of recognition were introduced in the 100th (HJR 619, 1988; SJR
371, 1988), 101st (HJR 320, 1989; HJR 602, 1990; SJR 133, 1989; SJR 328, 1990), and
102nd Congresses (HJR 241, 1991; HJR 433, 1992; SJR 73, 1991; SJR 241, 1992). Public
laws were passed in the latter two sessions (HJR 602, 1990; PL 101-439, 1990; SJR 133,
1989, PL 101-112, 1989; SJR 73, 1991; PL 102-114; 1991). This type of recognition
shows acceptance of the claim that public awareness of the problem was needed, but the
new advantage would be limited to a symbolic gesture with no actual education campaign
attached to the initiative. Although these resolutions likely were intended as a show of
support, they were a cooptation of movement frames which called for improving public
awareness of the problem.
A third target response frame called for the Centers for Disease Control to
produce and disseminate education programs on the public health consequences of
domestic violence. These initiatives were proposed in the 102nd (HR 6081, 1992) and
103rd Congresses (S 1318, 1993; S 1320, 1993; S 2357, 1994). By focusing on health
consequences the call for public education shifted from raising awareness of the
prevalence and nature of battering to framing the victim as the target of the education
efforts. Congressional response coopted the movement prognosis by accepting the need
for public education, but not providing the advantages sought by movement actors.
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Table 5 shows the distribution of outcomes for the three movement frames calling
for improved knowledge on the extent and nature of domestic violence. Congress
responded positively to requests for resources that aligned with lawmaker’s general
propensity for programs that sought to prevent domestic violence. Over time, Congress
offered and passed alternatives to both the movement frames and their own initial
response resulting in a mixture of both frame and policy success and cooptation.
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Table 5. Outcomes for BWM Prognostic Frames Calling for Improved Public Knowledge
Public Awareness

Criminal Justice Training

Medical and Behavioral Health
Training

Failure
Success

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure
Partial Success (Adopted)

Failure

95th Congress
(1977-1978)
th

96 Congress
(1979-1980)
97th Congress
(1981-1982)

Success

98th Congress
(1983-1984)

Success

Failure
99th Congress
(1985-1986)
Failure
100th Congress
(1987-1988)

Cooptation

101st Congress
(1989-1990)

Success
Cooptation (Adopted)

Success

Success

102nd Congress
(1991-1992)

Success (Adopted)
Cooptation (Adopted)

Success

Failure
Success

103rd Congress
(1993-1994)

Success
Cooptation

Success (Adopted)

Success

Success

Failure (Adopted) 11
11

This apparently contradictory outcome resulted from complex dynamics discussed in the subsection addressing medical and behavioral health personnel
training (see issue B, item number 3 below).
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2. Improve criminal justice response to battered women through trainings on the nature
of battering, appropriate interventions for battered women, and referring battered
women for services for personnel working in law enforcement, prosecution, and the
courts
There were two types of target response to requests for training criminal justice
system personnel. The first response was a call for research funds to study state laws and
practices related to domestic violence. This proposal first appeared in the 95th Congress
in the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act of 1978 (HR 7927,1977; HR
9052, 1977; HR 9053, 1977; HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826, 1978; HR 11617, 1978; HR
11762, 1978; S 1728, 1977; S 2758,1978). These bills further specified that the study
would be coordinated by the National Institute for Mental Health in collaboration with
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and other federal agencies.
Similar proposals were offered in the 96th and 97th Congresses (HR 2163, 1979; HR
2682, 1979; HR 1651, 1981). The request for studies conducted by professionals outside
of battered women’s organizations was viewed as a rejection of movement actor expertise
on the experiences of battered women in their interactions with law enforcement and
other agencies (Leghorn 1978; Schechter 1979; Schechter 1982). As such, the movement
prognostic frame calling for criminal justice system personnel training failed to gain
acceptance among lawmakers in the first three Congressional periods.
The second type of target response to the movement prognosis on personnel
training were proposals to provide grant funding for training and technical assistance to
criminal justice system personnel. This proposal first appeared in the 98th Congress and
applied only to training law enforcement officers on handling domestic violence incidents
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(HR 1904, 1983; S 1003, 1983). Law enforcement training and assistance was funded
through a grant to the LEAA in 1984 (HR 1904, 1983; PL 98-457). Movement actors
viewed the need for training across all areas of the criminal justice system as crucial to
reforming what they viewed as institutional non-responsiveness to battered women (Hart
1987, CYF-0014). The provision of funds to train law enforcement was a partial frame
success for this movement prognosis. Movement actors continued to advocate for system
wide training. Starting in the 100th Congress, lawmakers were more responsive to the
request to fund personnel training. Proposals for training prosecutors appeared in the
100th Congress (HR 2795, 1987). Full frame success was first achieved in the 101st
Congress when lawmakers adopted a proposal funding training for law enforcement,
prosecutors, and court personnel (HR 5210, 1988; PL 100-690, 1988). Additional
proposals were introduced in the 102nd (HR 1149; HR 1502; HR 2334; HR 5960; S 15; S
212; S 277; S 472; S 3271) and 103rd Congresses (HR 1133; HR 2847; HR 3315; HR
3355; HR 4092; S 6; S 11; S 8; S 688).
During the first six years of movement challenges related to federal domestic
violence policy, the government was non-responsive to the prognosis that the criminal
justice system was failing battered women. The first instance of acceptance on this topic
resulted in a partial frame and policy success providing grant funds to train to law
enforcement officers on handling domestic violence incidents. This was only one
personnel category targeted by the members of the movement coalition. Additional funds
for training across all three categories of personnel were passed into law with the VAWA
(HR 3355, 1993; PL 103-322, 1994).

151

On the surface, these proposals represent success for movement prognostic
frames. However, that success was moderated by administrative provisions and other
preemptive policies introduced by lawmakers. Over time the intent of target response
proposals moved away from the original movement prognostic claim about improving
personnel knowledge and response to battered women. Congressional bills increasingly
situated training for personnel in provisions of the VAWA aimed at improving arrest and
prosecution of offenders. Additionally, lawmakers introduced proposals to provide direct
resources to law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies in the 100th, 101st,
102nd, and 103rd Congresses. The grant monies were to be used to encourage agencies to
centralize and coordinate criminal justice response to domestic violence (see HR 5468,
1990; HR 1502, 1991; HR 3355, 1993) encourage reporting of incidents, require
mandatory arrest of offenders, and increase prosecutions through no-drop polices (see HR
1502, 1991; HR 3355, 1993; HR 4712, 1992; HR 5468, 1990; S 2754, 1990). The
training provisions still provided frame and policy successes for the movement. However,
the addition of target response frames that provided direct resources to the criminal
justice system for creating these new programs represented a shift in response for
lawmakers away from the movement prognosis. Since both provisions were included in
the adopted VAWA in the 103rd, the outcomes of frame and policy success should be
viewed cautiously.
3. Fund training for medical and behavioral health personnel on the nature of battering,
appropriate interventions for battered women, and referring battered women for services
The earliest bills introduced in Congress to address the problem of domestic
violence framed the issue as one resulting from mental or behavioral health problems.
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Lawmakers offered proposals to develop model public health programs to create methods
to identify, prevent, and treat domestic violence. This solution appeared in the proposal
for the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act and the Domestic Violence
Prevention and Services Act in the 95th (HR 7927, 1977; HR 9052, 1977; HR 9053, 1977;
HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826, 1978; HR 11617, 1978; HR 11762, 1978), 96th (HR 2163,
1979; HR 2682, 1979), 97th (HR 1007, 1981; HR 1651,1981; S 2908, 1982), and 98th
Congresses (HR 73, 1983; HR 1397, 1983; HR 1904, 1983; S 699, 1983). The response
frame also appeared in the 101st (S 2340, 1990) and 103rd Congresses (HR 2201, 1993;
HR 3355, 1993; HR 4848, 1994; S 1318, 1993; S 1320, 1993). This proposal was rejected
by movement actors during the earlier sessions because these agencies were already
failing at this task among their own clients (Clinch, 1978, SHR-0034; Lee, 1987, CYF0014; McMahon, 1979, EDL-0021; Monasmith, 1978, SHR-0034; Steytler, 1978, EDL0016). That Congress identified these agencies as the appropriate venue for developing
new methods for addressing domestic violence rather than providing for the training
requested by movement actors indicates frame failure. Model public health programs
were adopted as part of the VAWA in the 103rd session (HR 3355, 1993; PL 103-322,
1994).
Beginning in the 101st Congress, lawmakers introduced proposals that accepted
the movement prognosis for personnel training and led to an outcome of frame success.
Specifically, these bills included funds for the development of training materials for
medical and behavioral health personnel on the prevention and intervention of domestic
violence and training on identification, treatment, and documentation of injuries for
patients (S 2340, 1990). Similar bill provisions appeared in the 102nd (HR 6081,1992; S
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2305, 1992) and 103rd sessions (HR 1829,1993; HR 2201, 1993; HR 2217, 1993; HR
3207, 1993; S 869, 1993; S 1318, 1993; S 1320, 1993; S 1506, 1993; S 2357,1994).
However, none of these provisions were adopted during the time period of this analysis.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the BWM was opposed to the “treatment” of battered
women and believed that personnel in these fields were not only inadequately prepared to
address the needs of battered women, but also directly put these women at risk by
diagnosing them as responsible for the abuse. The target responded to the movement
prognosis with repeated attempts to address the negative experiences of battered women
within these institutions by putting medical and behavioral health personnel in charge of
developing prevention and intervention. Lawmakers offered some support for personnel
training in the later years, but given their preference for public health intervention, the
result was a mixture of both frame success and frame failure, with the failed alignment
resulting in adopted policy that contradicted movement diagnostic and prognostic frames.
C. Response to prognostic frames requesting legal protections for battered women as
they navigate criminal and civil legal systems
1. Fund legal representation for battered women in both criminal and civil court
proceedings resulting from battery
Congress did not offer a response to the request for legal representation for
battered women in the 95th and 96th Congresses. No movement framing on this issue was
observed in the 97th and 98th Congresses, but the issue reappeared in movement actor
testimonies in the 99th. The movement received two types of responses to the demand for
legal representation from Congress during the later years of the challenge. The first target
response was to establish a Legal Services Administration in the Office of Justice
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Programs to administer grants to legal aid service providers. These grants would fund
legal services for low-income clients and cover a variety of areas of civil law including
housing, family issues of divorce, custody and support, domestic violence protection
orders, access to government benefits, and representation related to civil rights (HR 2884,
1989). Legal aid program grants were first introduced in the 101st Congress. In the 102nd,
bills aiming to create model state leadership programs encouraged states to incorporate
legal advocacy programs for domestic violence victims (HR 1502, 1991). In both
formulations, the target accepted the position that legal advocacy for battered women was
needed. However, both yield only partial frame success. Funding for legal aid programs
only provided representation for low-income clients. Further, state model programs were
limited in distribution and were only encouraged, not required, to offer funds for legal
representation.
The second target response to the movement call for legal representation was the
provision of funding to law enforcement agencies and prosecutor’s offices to provide lay
advocates to assist victims of domestic violence. These response frames appeared
simultaneously to those aimed at providing legal representation in the 101st, 102nd, and
103rd Congresses. Lay advocates would help victims navigate both the criminal and civil
legal process, but would not be able to provide legal advice or representation. Rather, the
goal of lay advocacy programs within the criminal justice system was to increase the
reporting of domestic violence incidents and reduce attrition rates of victim cooperation
in prosecutions (HR 1133, 1993; HR 1502, 1991; HR 3315, 1993; HR 3355, 1993; HR
4152, 1994; HR 5488, 1990; S 11, 1993; S 15, 1991). This response frame recognized
that battered women needed assistance navigating the criminal justice system. But the
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provisions included in the bill coopted the prognosis providing an alternative to legal
representation focused on meeting the needs of the system.
Table 6 shows the frame outcomes for the movement prognostic frames on legal
protections for battered women. As you can see, the call to fund legal representation
failed to generate a response from Congress until the VAWA period beginning in the
101st Congress. When Congress did respond, the outcomes were mixed. Target response
frames demonstrated acceptance of the movement claim that battered women needed
assistance navigating the criminal and civil court processes. However, the response that
most closely met the movement demand was a partial response to encourage states to
prioritize legal aid programs for battered women. This frame led to a partial policy
success when the legal aid provision was adopted as part of the VAWA (HR 3355, 1993;
PL 103-322, 1994). The coopted lay advocacy frame also led to policy cooptation as it
was included as a grant program for law enforcement agencies and prosecutors officers in
the same public law.
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Table 6. Outcomes for BWM Prognostic Frames Requesting Legal Protections for Battered Women
Legal Representation

Address Concealment

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure

Consideration in Child Custody

95th Congress
(1977-1978)
96th Congress
(1979-1980)
97th Congress
(1981-1982)
Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure

th

98 Congress
(1983-1984)
99th Congress
(1985-1986)
Failure
100th Congress
(1987-1988)
101 Congress
(1989-1990)

Failure
Success
Cooptation

102nd Congress
(1991-1992)

Partial Success
Cooptation

st

rd

103 Congress
(1993-1994)

Partial Success (Adopted)
Cooptation (Adopted)

Failure
Success
Cooptation
Failure
Success
Failure
Success (Adopted)
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Success (Adopted)
Cooptation

2. Create policies and procedures that allow battered women to conceal their residential
address during service utilization and civil and criminal court procedures
Following frame failure in the 95th, 96th, 99th, and 100th Congresses, two target
response frames were generated to address the request for legal procedures to conceal the
residential addresses of battered women. First, in the 102nd Congress lawmakers proposed
research on the ways in which an abusive spouse may gain access to the victim’s new
address (HR 5960, 1992; S 3271, 1992). From the movement perspective a call for
research on a known problem was akin to denying that the problem existed. Taken alone,
this response was a frame failure with neither acceptance of the movement prognosis nor
inclusion of new advantages consistent with the claim. During the same Congress, a
second response frame called for the U.S. Postal Service to create regulations to make it
possible to secure the confidential address of domestic violence victims (HR 1502, 1991;
HR 5218, 1992; S 15, 1991). The proposal of regulations was a movement frame success.
In the 103rd Congress, these frames were again offered in separate bills (for research see:
HR 688, 1993; HR 2847, 1993; S 6, 1993; S 8, 1993; for regulations see: HR 1133, 1993;
S 11, 1993). During the consolidation of VAWA proposals, both research and regulations
were included in HR 3355 and were adopted into public law (PL 103-322, 1994),
resulting in both frame and policy success.
3. Encourage state courts to allow and consider evidence of battering in family court
proceedings related to divorce, support, and child custody litigation
The movement request for intervention in state court handling of divorce, support,
and child custody litigation presented challenges for federal lawmaking. However, over
time two target response frames were offered in legislation to address this issue. The first
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was a “sense of congress” statement in support of considering domestic violence when
making decisions about child custody and visitation. These resolutions were generally
used to express an opinion or make a statement about an issue, but have no legal
implementation value. This resolution appeared in a variety of bills over the 101st, 102nd,
and 103rd Congresses, including: the Economic Equity Act of 1990 (HR 3085, 1989); the
Women’s Equal Opportunity Act of 1991 (HR 1149, 1991; S 472, 1991); the Strategy to
Eliminate Crime in Urban and Rural Environments Act of 1991 (S 1335, 1991); and the
Sexual Assault Prevention Act of 1992 (HR 5960, 1992; S 3271, 1992). This target
response frame demonstrates the classic situation of message cooptation. Lawmakers
expressed their acceptance of the movement frame, but did not offer any new advantage
beyond the symbolic recognition of the need for attention to the issue. The federal
government has little regulatory power over state court handling of legal family matters, a
statement of support may have been the best possible response.
However, a second target response frame on this issue suggested a program that
would provide new advantages and partial frame success for the movement. Specifically,
lawmakers proposed a combination of research on state court judicial decision making in
child custody decisions and the development of training for court personnel on the
intersection of domestic violence and child custody and visitation. These response frames
appear in the 101st (HR 2952, 1989; S 1480, 1989; S 1482, 1989) and 102nd Congresses
(HR 1253, 1991; HR 6139, 1992; S 3317, 1992). Both were adopted into public law in
the 102nd Congress (HR 1253, 1991; PL 102-528, 1992). Unlike research provisions
related to the address concealment request, these two issues were offered as a package
with the research meant to inform the development of curriculum—not as a substitution
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for action. The law also required distribution of the curriculum to state courts throughout
the country. Since court decision-making regarding family matters was exclusively a state
court issue, this provision of guidance from Congress was a frame and policy success for
the movement.
This issue was present in survivor testimonies in early Congressional hearings;
however, Congress did not respond to the prognostic frame on the consideration of
battering in family court hearings until the 101st Congress. This is consistent with the
pattern of multiple failures followed by a mix of success and attempted cooptation
observed in other victim rights oriented claims.
IV. Preemptive Congressional Response Frames
Finally, just under one-third of the bills introduced by Congress during the
challenge period proposed initiatives that did not directly attend to issues associated with
the primary policy agenda of the BWM. Many of these bills, and some of those with
provisions addressing the prognostic frames of the battered women’s movement, included
preemptive proposals that could be perceived as beneficial for battered women. These
issues were, at times, supported by members of the movement coalition. However, these
were not points on which the movement chose to direct its collective attention. During
the early years, preemptive target responses tended to focus on a variety of data
collection and research efforts and the dissemination of information to domestic violence
programs and related agencies (HR 73, 1983; HR 1007, 1981; HR 1397, 1983; HR 1651,
1981; HR 1904, 1983; HR 2163, 1979; HR 2682, 1979; HR 2908, 1982; HR 3921, 1979;
HR 7927, 1977; HR 9052, 1977; HR 9053, 1977; HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826, 1978; HR
11617, 1978; HR 11762, 1978; S 699, 1983; S 1003, 1983; S 1728, 1977; S 2430, 1984;
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S 2759, 1978). As noted earlier, movement actors were largely opposed to government
funding of research, viewing it as both a loss of their own legitimacy to define the
problem and a drain on the limited resources available for crisis intervention. Movement
actors did not reject research all together, but did not see it as part of the immediate need
for crisis response. Still, improved data collection within government agencies would
have benefitted the movement by creating empirical support on the prevalence and
distribution of the problem in the general population. Furthermore, the infrastructure
developed by the movement to disseminate information about programs and services
were underfunded.
Beginning with the VAWA proposal period in the 101st Congress, preemptive
policies were focused on three areas. First, there were proposals to create resource
centers, state coalitions, and other organizational supports to provide training and
technical assistance for domestic violence organizations that had the potential to ensure
the expansion and longevity of shelter practice (HR 688, 1993; HR 1502, 1991; HR 2334,
1991; HR 2720, 1991; HR 2847, 1993; HR 2947, 1991; HR 3355, 1993; HR 4712, 1992;
HR 5960, 1992; S6, 1993; S 8, 1993; S11, 1993; S 15, 1991; S 212, 1991; S 803, 1991;
S838, 1991; S 2340, 1990; S 2754, 1990; S 2863, 1990; S 3134, 1990; S 3271, 1992).
These proposals demonstrate a shift in lawmaker perspective from providing resources
for battered women to building organizational maintenance and professionalization.
While movement actors were opposed to the government setting standards and policies
for battered women’s organizations, the funding of coordinating infrastructure had the
potential to free up both financial and personnel resources at the organizational level.
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Second, there were a variety of civil and criminal law changes that appeared in
Congressional bills. Specifically, there were policies related to accessing and enforcing
protection orders across state lines (HR 688, 1993; HR 1133, 1993; HR 1502, 1991; HR
2334, 1991; HR 2872, 1993; HR 3355, 1993; HR 4055, 1994; HR 4197, 1994; HR 4848,
1994; HR 5218, 1992; HR 5468, 1990; HR 5472, 1990; HR 5960, 1992; S 6, 1993; S 11,
1993; S 15, 1991; S 212, 1991; S 2754, 1990; S 3134, 1990), bills to increase penalties
for criminal offenders (HR 688, 1993; HR 5468, 1990; HR 5960, 1992; S 6, 1993; S 15,
1991; S 2754, 1990; S 3271, 1992), and the inclusion of gender in the hate crimes law to
provide for civil and criminal penalties for crimes motivated by gender (HR 1133, 1993;
HR 1502, 1991; HR 3355, 1993; HR 5218, 1992; HR 5468, 1990; S 11, 1993; S 15,
1991; S 1607, 1993; S 2754, 1990). These items were all part of the final VAWA bill and
viewed as a big part of the policy accomplishment. Each of these preemptive frames
addressed issues identified by the movement as impacting the safety of battered women.
However, the issues only appeared on the movement policy agenda (as defined here)
either simultaneously with or after the provisions were introduced by lawmakers.
A third set of preemptive proposals was contained in the bills leading up to and
the law adopted as the VAWA. In addition to the provisions on domestic violence “at
home,” these bills contained a set of provisions on preventing violence against women in
public places or “on the streets” (HR 1133, 1993; HR 1502, 1991; HR 5218, 1992; HR
5468, 1990; S 11, 1993; S 15, 1991; S 1607, 1993; S 2754, 1990). The proposals
specifically targeted improving public transportation, parks, and other public areas in
ways that eliminated conditions that helped to conceal and facilitate violence against
women. The safe streets provisions included increased penalties for sex crimes,
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improving lighting and safety in public transportation and parks, and new evidentiary
rules for the prosecution of sex crimes. The safe streets response represents preemption in
that these initiatives, if effective, could decrease both the experience and tacit acceptance
of violence against women in society more broadly. However, the issue of violence
against women at the hands of strangers was outside of the scope of the movement
agenda.
Further analysis would be necessary to understand the effects of preemptive
policies on the movement agenda. Preemptive Congressional response frames do not
address the movement agenda. As such, these outcomes are beyond the scope of this
project. Still, the introduction of preemptive policies provides some sense of a trajectory
of the governmental interest in addressing domestic violence. Early preemptive proposals
question the authority of movement actors to define the problem and focus on
determining the scope, nature, and consequences of battering (a task that is still ongoing).
In the later years, preemptive frames also tend to reject the authority of the movement by
increasing focus on the prevention of future violence through indirect means rather than
providing crisis response resources that would allow battered women to contribute to the
solution.
VI. Conclusion
There is little doubt that the Battered Women’s Movement forged the contours of
the federal policy response on issues of domestic violence. Movement actors were
instrumental in bringing the issue to the attention of federal lawmakers and presenting the
primary movement agenda in Congressional hearings. They continued to provide a
consistent message over a period that lasted two decades. Further, a majority of bills
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about domestic violence offered by Congress addressed at least one of the prognostic
frames of the movement primary agenda. Even those that deviated from the movement
prognosis generally offered either an acceptance of the problem defined by members of
the movement coalition or some advantage either for battered women or the agencies that
work to prevent or intervene in domestic violence. Over the course of the challenge,
Congressional response to the movement prognosis resulted in frame and ultimately
policy outcomes that spanned the continuum of failure, cooptation, and success—at times
with the simultaneous combination of the latter two outcomes.
Frame Outcomes
The pattern of frame outcomes differed over time. Early movement frames
resulted in either: (a) frame success that at least partially addressed the movement
demand; or (b) frame failure, receiving no attention from Congress at all. Following a
policy success in the 98th Congress that provided funding for battered women’s shelters,
services, and training for law enforcement officers, there was a shift in Congressional
response. The movement’s agenda received more response from Congress in terms of the
number bills introduced that accepted the movement’s position on the need for
intervention. During this later period, frame cooptation and the simultaneous outcomes of
frame success and cooptation were more common than in the previous period.
Additionally, there were fewer instances of failure or prognostic frames being shut out of
consideration by Congress altogether.
The outcome patterns observed in this challenge do not align neatly with
Trumpy’s (2008) expectation that cooptation is complete only when the movement ceases
to respond to target cooptation attempts. In Chapter 5, I distinguished between prognostic
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frames that were present prior to and following each Congressional session and those
with gaps or more varied deployment patterns. An examination of the outcomes for both
deployment patterns provided little support for this claim. Those with consistent presence
in movement testimony (shelter, services, government financial assistance, crime victim
compensation, funding for public awareness campaigns, criminal justice system
personnel training, and consideration of battering in divorce and custody proceedings)
resulted in varied outcomes of success, combined success and cooptation, and failure.
The same combination of outcomes was also observed for prognostic frames with periods
of absence on the movement’s agenda.
There were three notable patterns of frame outcomes. First, an early pattern of
failure followed by success was common for movement prognoses that sought direct
resources or considerations for battered women as a resolution to the problem. A pattern
of multiple failures was observed in all four prognostic claims related to victim rights:
legal representation, crime victim compensation, regulations for concealing the victim’s
residential address, and the consideration of battering in court cases related to divorce and
child custody. These issues were present in the movement platform before Congress took
up the first bill on domestic violence. Yet, none of these issues received a response from
lawmakers until the 100th Congress. These issues all received at least a partial frame
success resulting in an adopted policy by the end of the analysis. One explanation for
lawmaker reluctance to provide direct resources to battered women may be a government
interest in family preservation. Each of these requests were meant to provide resources to
women to facilitate escape from a violent home and assist them in establishing new
independent lives, which was the movement goal. This would also explain the attempted
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cooptation observed in the Congressional push for counseling and treatment of battered
women instead of services that would help them escape an abusive home.
This pattern may also be indicative of hesitancy on the part of lawmakers to
enlarge the welfare state by creating new government programs or broadening the
populations eligible for low-income services. Outside of the implementation requirements
for domestic violence shelter and services, lawmakers were unresponsive to the
movement’s request for non-income based access to services. The law authorizing legal
aid maintained the program focus on serving low-income clients. The same pattern was
noted in the response to the movement request for expedited access to government
assistance programs for battered women. A few lawmakers attempted to make partial
concessions in the early sessions—but these focused on non-discrimination for women in
shelter who were otherwise financially qualified for government programs. These
proposals were followed by non-response until the 100th Congress, when a single bill
appeared in the Senate to address the issue of eligibility for married women in spite of
their husband’s incomes. Success on this issue continued to be elusive through the end of
the analysis, with few frame successes and no policy success.
A second pattern was the effort by Congress to redirect authority over the battered
women’s issue away from BWM actors themselves and toward authorities less oriented
toward women’s autonomy and responsibility. A combination of concession and
cooptation were used as a means to redirect authority over the issue. Frame cooptation,
like frame success, required Congressional acceptance of the movement identification of
a problem requiring federal intervention. Acceptance was apparent in the initial attention
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lawmakers gave to domestic violence shelters and services and later to the call for
criminal justice personnel training.
In the early Congressional sessions, the movement had success in generating
target response frames to fund crisis shelter and services. At the same time, alternative
bills attempted to absorb shelter and service funding into the existing social welfare
system by proposing options within social security programs and community
development projects that addressed crisis needs for low-income, disabled, and
unemployed citizens. Another alternative was to replace battered women’s shelters with
new comprehensive shelter programs that required large facilities and an extensive menu
of required counseling and treatment services. Both of these options would have
diminished the role of battered women to define their own needs and access resources
during a time of crisis. But the movement rejected these proposals and continued to
advocate for services that gave battered women resources rather than requiring them to
get treatment for their problem in order to access food, transportation, and other basic
necessities. Both types of proposals were enacted leading to an overall mixed outcome of
movement frame success and the absorption of battered women’s services into existing
government programs.
Early frame successes for funding shelter and services were marred by the
proposed location of program oversight in either the National Institute for Mental Health
or the Department of Health and Human Services—specifically the department that
oversaw child abuse programs. Both of these options were unacceptable for members of
the movement coalition, who argued against these plans in Congressional hearings.
Movement actors were opposed to programs that prioritized family reunification, like the
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policies and practices that guided the work of these agencies. The government interest in
family unification was centered on the welfare of the child or the recovery of the addict.
Historically, battered women were denied services or pushed to reconciliation by these
programs without regard for their own safety. The movement did not necessarily oppose
reunification in these programs, just in cases involving battered women.
A third, but similar pattern emerged in how Congress addressed the movement
prognosis for improving criminal justice system response to battered women. The
movement identified the need to educate personnel in the system on the prevalence and
nature of battering and hopefully improve the way personnel interacted with battered
women. The initial response from Congress was to investigate state policies and
procedures—to determine whether or not there was a problem. Movement frames on this
issue were successful, but there was a simultaneous move toward finding criminal justice
solutions for the problem of battering. Congress accepted the movement’s call for
change, but replaced their preferred solution with alternative programs situated in
existing criminal justice institutions. Personnel training proposals were offered (and
funded), but a variety of other resources were dedicated to new programs intended to
encourage criminal justice agencies to create new strategies to prevent and intervene in
domestic violence. The movement did not object to the treatment of domestic violence as
a crime. However, policies on coordinating police and prosecution, mandatory arrest, and
even the provision of lay advocates to victims were aimed at improving prosecution and
conviction. From a criminal justice standpoint, improving convictions may increase
victim safety. However, it would not necessarily improve the treatment of battered
women by these institutions.
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To summarize, successful Congressional response to movement messages rarely
occurred in isolation. With the exception of the outcomes for crisis intervention and
shelter, most frames yielding a response passed into public law were accompanied by the
adoption of a cooptative or alternative (failure) response frame. The cooptive target
response frames documented in this work differ from the symbolic concessions observed
by Trumpy (2008). Cooptive response frames attempted to either absorb battered
women’s demands into existing social service or mental health programs or replace
movement supported solutions with new programs or policies that often conflicted with
the movement’s overall assessment of problem. VAWA incorporated and funded a
number of these alternatives. In addition to the resources dedicated to criminal justice
initiatives, the co-occurrence of policy success and cooptation was observed in the
request for legal representation, where both legal aid services for low-income persons and
lay advocates for justice system involved victims were funded. There was also a move to
renew the effort to use the public health and social welfare model to address the issue of
domestic violence. The movement saw a need to improve the response of institutional
actors to battered women’s needs. Training for these personnel was not adopted;
however, the U.S. Center for Disease Control was provided with funds through VAWA
to develop model public health programs to prevent and treat domestic violence.
Policy Outcomes
Policy success was observed in the 98th, 100th, 101st, 102nd, and 103rd
Congressional Sessions. In fact, most of the movement prognostic frames received at
least partial success at some point during the challenge. Shelter, services, and law
enforcement training were passed in the 98th Congress. The request for services also
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resulted in a policy cooptation in the 98th, when domestic violence counseling was added
to the workload of funded substance abuse treatment programs. Shelter and service
funding was reauthorized in the 100th and again in the 102nd. Domestic violence victims
were added to the eligible populations for crime victim compensation in a reauthorization
of the Victims of Crime Act in the 100th Congressional session. In the 101st and 102nd, the
call for public awareness education was coopted when Congress passed resolutions
declaring October “Domestic Violence Awareness Month.” However, public awareness
also had policy success. A public education campaign was also funded in the 102nd.
As passed, the VAWA contained all four possible outcomes. Policy successes
included: funding for shelter and services, criminal justice and court personnel training,
and a provision to create regulations to conceal the addresses of battered women from
their abusers. Simultaneous policy cooptation and success were observed in response to
the movement request for legal representation for battered women, with the creation of a
lay victim advocate program to improve arrest and prosecution and an increase in funds
for legal aid for low-income persons. Preemptive policies included those provisions
attached to “safe streets,” interstate enforcement of protection orders, increased penalties
for offenders, and the inclusion of gender in the hate crimes law. One adopted provision
constituted a failure for the movement. Rather than addressing the movement prognosis
to provide training and education to public health professionals, VAWA provided funds
to public health agencies to develop model programs for domestic violence prevention
and intervention.
These results support the conclusion that the Battered Women’s Movement
influenced the federal policy agenda from the first bill introduced through the adoption of
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the Violence Against Women Act by identifying the primary points of intervention for a
crisis response. The federal government largely recognized BWM actors as legitimate
spokespersons on crisis shelter and services, but frequently rejected their authority over
other professional interests (criminal justice and public health). This rejection was
evidenced by either ignoring movement prognostic frames in the early part of the
challenge or by suggesting cooptive alternatives in the later period. The complete
rejection of movement prognostic frames decreased after initial frame and policy
successes. However, the nature of cooptive and preemptive response frames from
lawmakers suggested that over time, the characterization of the problem by members of
the movement coalition as one requiring a crisis response lost favor and was replaced by
alternative frames about preventing victimization and creating consequences for
offenders.
In the final chapter, I expand the discussion of these findings to draw out
implications for the conceptualization of message cooptation and the mechanisms and
dynamics leading to different outcomes. I also provide an assessment of the relevance of
this work for policy-oriented social movements more broadly.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion

I. Introduction
The motivation for this research was the appearance of conflicting claims about
the influence of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM) on federal domestic violence
policy. On the one hand, movement scholars conveyed that the BWM was coopted by
institutional response only a few short years after the initiation of federal policy work in
this area. On the other hand, scholars studying the impact of these policies continue to
attribute these policy successes to the movement. This discrepancy drew attention to gaps
in knowledge about the determination of outcomes in policy-oriented social movements
in general and the dynamics of cooptation more specifically. To address these gaps, I
posed two overarching questions: (1) to what extent do federal policies on domestic
violence represent favorable responses to the Battered Women's Movement? And (2) how
can we reconcile or otherwise assess both the claims of movement cooptation and the
perceptions of movement influence on continuing policy development in the domestic
violence policy arena? To answer these questions, the foregoing chapters analyzed the
diagnostic and prognostic messages of the movement, and the outcomes resulting from
consideration and response from the U.S. Congress. The examination of prognostic
message outcomes in the BWM not only sheds light on the manner in which the
movement influenced public policy, but also provides insight into the study and
understanding of social movement cooptation. The objectives of this work are
summarized in five more concrete questions:
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1. What were the goals of the BWM?
2. What demands did the BWM make on federal lawmakers?
3. How did federal lawmakers respond to the prognostic messages of the BWM?
4. What were the outcomes for BWM prognostic messages in Congressional policy
proposals?
5. In what ways do these outcomes represent the continuing influence of the BWM
on domestic violence policy?
Answers to these questions were derived from the longitudinal interpretive policy
analysis of BWM policy-directed claims-making and the interactions of these claims with
lawmaker proposals in the U.S. Congress. In Chapter 4, I documented the development of
the movement’s national policy agenda. With historical roots in both civil rights and
liberationist movements, the birth and growth of battered women’s shelters led to the
prioritization of safety and refuge as the first step toward ending violence against women.
The developing movement claimed that funding, public support, and institutional change
were necessary for meeting the long-term goal of changing the social structures that
created, justified, and sustained the subordinate status of women. These needs pushed the
BWM to make demands of existing social institutions, beginning at the local and state
levels. But, local demands quickly morphed into a broad national agenda. In Chapter 5, I
analyzed the movement’s national level policy-oriented diagnostic and prognostic frames
presented in public testimonies and publications. But, an analysis of movement
prognostic framing is only part of the story. Chapters 4 and 5 constructed the foundation
for examining interactions between movement prognostic frames and the response frames
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presented in the U.S. Congress. In Chapter 6, I provided an analysis of these interactions
and an assessment of outcomes for the movement’s national policy agenda.
In this final Chapter, I briefly summarize the empirical findings addressing each
of the first four objectives. I then turn to the fifth question and summarize both the
substantive and theoretical contributions of this work to understanding the influence of
social movement messaging on policy outcomes.
II. Empirical Findings
This work examined policy-oriented claims-making in the BWM over a twenty
year period, from 1975-1994, which I define as the period of this ‘policy challenge.’ The
analysis yielded findings on the development of the movement’s goals, the tapering of
those goals to a national policy agenda, the presentation of claims in publications and
hearings before the U.S. Congress (95th -103rd Congresses), and the outcomes of ten key
prognostic messages. A brief review of these findings can help answer the first four
questions presented above.
A. What were the goals of the BWM?
The BWM proffered two global goals for the movement: (1) provide immediate
safety for battered women, and (2) change institutional structures that contribute to the
social marginalization of women in society. Movement actors carried messages about
both of these goals over the course of the challenge. The analysis of the origins of the
movement’s message in Chapter 4 documented the development of specific claims that
derived from sharing individual experiences of inadequate response to and rejection of
battered women by existing social institutions. These conditions forced the organization
of alternative institutions that would address the unmet needs of battered women. The
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outsider status ascribed to these new institutions shaped both the movement’s articulation
of grievances and the way BWM actors responded to federal response frames throughout
the challenge examined here.
B. What demands did the BWM make on federal lawmakers?
In Congressional hearings, BWM claims-making overwhelmingly focused on
requesting government intervention to assist with the goal of providing immediate and
short-term safety for battered women. Members of the movement coalition claimed
expertise on this topic, citing the ongoing work of battered woman shelters and services
in their respective communities. Their request for federal intervention was mostly limited
to the need for money to continue and expand ongoing activities at the local and statelevels. Specifically, members of the movement coalition asked for direct resources for
battered women, public awareness and education efforts to improve knowledge about and
response to domestic violence, and legal protections for battered women.
The request for resources was primarily focused on funding for battered women’s
shelters and services to facilitate escape from the abuser and getting reestablished in a
violence free home. Although broadly supported as the appropriate intervention and
unanimously requested by members of the coalition in Congressional hearings, the
request for funding for battered women’s organizations was not without controversy in
the movement coalition. The primary concern was an objection to government
interference in the organization and operation of shelters and service agencies. Even so,
access to shelter was the movement’s primary strategy for providing immediate safety. It
was the most common request made by movement affiliated witnesses in Congressional
hearings. BWM advocates also argued for direct financial resources for battered women
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that would allow them to maintain independence after reaching safety. Their requests for
financial resources included both crime victim compensation and financial assistance
through government social programs.
As noted in Chapter 4, the role of battered women’s shelters and service
organizations in ending violence against women was believed to be much more than just
the provision of immediate safety. Peer support among battered women living in noncontrolling environments was believed to lead to the development of leadership skills and
the politicization of the battered woman’s personal struggle into a fight against women’s
marginalization in society. While peer support and battered women’s leadership roles
were articulated in the prognostic frames presented in Congressional hearings, the
framing of resources for battered women did not overtly connect the idea of improving
women’s self-sufficiency with the dismantling of institutional supports for women’s
inequality. Rather, movement frames demanded direct funding for battered women’s
shelter and services without programming interference to the largest extent possible. The
maintenance and proliferation of the battered women’s shelter model was theorized to be
a key mechanism in furthering women’s independence from prescribed gender and
family roles.
The call for Congress to fund efforts to improve public knowledge aimed at
preventing domestic violence and to provide personnel training for criminal justice
system actors and public health personnel (medical and behavioral) also had implications
for both movement goals. Changing attitudes and behaviors about violence against
women was a necessary part of the process of achieving equality. But again, the
movement’s articulation of policy-oriented prognoses focused on improving crisis
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response to battered women. Even those who called for general public education linked
raised awareness to improving the competency of family members, friends, neighbors,
employers, and community agencies in providing advice and assistance to battered
women. BWM advocates articulated the demand for training police, prosecutors, and
court personnel as an effort to ensure timely and appropriate response during those
moments of crisis when battered women reached out to these agencies for help.
The three remaining prognostic frames aimed to provide battered women with
legal protections and support to facilitate their exit from violent marriages and coparenting situations. The demands for access to affordable legal representation, the right
to residential address concealment, and the consideration of violence against women in
child custody proceedings were framed around how the absence of these protections
placed women (and their children) at risk for further violence at the hands of the batterer.
Although criminal prosecutions and civil court proceedings take some time to get
underway, these procedures were often a necessary component of moving from an
emergency crisis state to a more stable existence. Members of the movement coalition
focused their testimonies on how legal failures during a battered woman’s attempt to
escape a violent partner impeded the efforts of advocates to provide shelter and other
forms of assistance.
In Chapter 2, I suggested that examining movement challenges as a series of
interactions may lead to a better understanding of how and why movement messages
change over time as policy challenges play out. This position presupposed that the
objective needs of the beneficiary population could change over time, which might lead
to changes to the movement’s policy agenda. The analysis of movement framing in
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national publications and Congressional testimonies shows little change in the content of
the movement’s basic national policy agenda over time. One possible explanation for the
consistency of the movement’s message over the course of the policy challenge was that
the objective needs of battered women did not change that much. Certainly the
presentation of battered women’s stories was similar throughout the policy challenge. A
few secondary frames did appear over the course of the challenge. However, most of the
secondary movement frames addressed either innovative or evolving intervention issues,
and none took away from the long-running primary agenda.
Further, while movement prognostic frames primarily addressed the goal of
providing safety for battered women, the messages were not inconsistent with
movement’s overall goal of improving the status of women and ending gendered
violence. Taken together, these dynamics make clear that members of the movement
coalition largely viewed the role of the government as a resource provider to help
communities prepare for and respond appropriately to the crisis created by domestic
violence by addressing the immediate and short-term needs of victims. The federal
government was perhaps the only institution with the resources and reach to make a
national scale emergency response to domestic violence a reality. BWM actors did not
articulate a role for federal oversight or new interventions.
C. How did federal lawmakers respond to the prognostic messages of the BWM?
I defined federal lawmaker response frames as bill provisions attending to the
issue of woman battering or domestic violence within bill proposals in the U.S. Congress
from the 95th (1977-1978) to the 103rd Congresses (1993-1994). Bill proposals often
contained a number of response frames and were at times written to deal with a different
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problem altogether. However, the majority of the proposals addressed at least one of the
movement’s primary prognostic frames.
The timing of response to movement demands suggests increased acceptance of
actors in the movement coalition as claims-makers; but that acceptance only occurred
over time and on some issues. Early Congressional response was limited to claims related
to battered women’s shelter and services. While the movement made claims on almost all
of the primary agenda items during the first few sessions in the analysis, Congressional
response on the remaining issues was non-existent until the 100th Congress. From a bigpicture standpoint, the lack of acceptance of the movement’s agenda (beyond the limited
attention to shelter and services) suggests that Congress did not accept movement actors
as legitimate spokespersons on issues related to criminal justice, courts, and public health
interventions. Further, by responding only to these two issues, lawmakers rejected the
movement assessment of domestic violence as a crisis requiring an immediate and
comprehensive response by the federal government. As the challenge progressed, the
movement agenda as a whole received more attention from lawmakers. Congress began
to develop a multi-layered policy agenda that partially aligned with the movement’s
agenda but also incorporated alternative solutions. So while individual prognostic frames
were being incorporated into Congressional proposals, simultaneous response frames
began to deviate from the movement’s agenda.
These alternative policy proposals began to focus on issues related to criminal
justice and public safety, shifting the conversation from responding to victims in crisis to
apprehending and suppressing offenders. Congressional response frames included
provisions to send money directly to criminal justice agencies to develop and implement
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interventions. Further, Congress preemptively called for increased penalties for offenders
and the designation of gender-biased violence as a hate crime. The merging of the
Violence Against Women Act into the crime bill (HR 3355, 1993) solidified the move
from the social service and public health orientation of response frames in the early years,
to the treatment of domestic violence as a criminal justice problem.
D. What were the outcomes of the BWM prognostic messages in Congressional policy
proposals?
The unit of analysis for this work was the movement prognostic frame. As such,
the bulk of the analysis addresses the frame outcome. For each movement prognostic
message, I documented a frame outcome in each Congressional session in which the
frame was introduced by a member of the movement coalition. Frame outcomes represent
the acceptance and inclusion status of the movement prognosis in a bill introduced into
Congress, regardless of whether or not the bill was enacted. Three frame outcomes were
observed: frame success, frame cooptation, and frame failure. Members of Congress
proposed preemptive policies. However, since the analysis begins with and follows
movement frames to determine outcomes, preemptive policies were treated separately in
this work. Adopted policy outcomes were also documented at the frame level of analysis.
These outcomes were documented by Congressional session in Chapter 6. Here, I extend
the discussion of outcomes by focusing on the overall patterns of frame outcomes
leading up to policy success, cooptation, or failure.
This analysis yielded mixed results regarding movement frame outcomes. Every
message in the movement primary agenda had at least one frame success. Half of the
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movement prognostic frames had at least one attempted cooptation. None of the
movement frames had the same outcome across every session of Congress.
Early movement frame success was observed for the requests for funding shelter,
services, and public awareness campaigns between the 95th and 98th Congresses. Over the
course of the challenge, each of these prognostic claims was subjected to multiple frame
cooptation attempts. Continued claims about the specific need for battered women’s
shelter outlasted attempts to direct federal funds to states to expand existing homeless
services as well as those aimed at creating new forms of shelter programs for battered
women. But the movement requests for services and public awareness had mixed
outcomes overall, with both success and cooptation frame outcomes. These patterns held
for policy outcomes as well, with multiple policy successes for shelter funding over the
course of the challenge and the combination of policy success and cooptation for service
and public awareness frames.
Most movement frames were not addressed by Congress in the early part of the
challenge. Early frame failures included: victim compensation, criminal justice and court
personnel training, public health personnel training, legal representation, confidential
address, and requests for the consideration of domestic violence in child custody cases.
For the most part, these frames continued to have failed outcomes until the 100th
Congress, when each generated frame success, cooptation, or some combination of the
two. With the exception of the victim compensation frame, which was addressed in
legislation for the Victims of Crime Act reauthorization, these frames were all included in
drafts of the VAWA. The pattern of early frame failure yielding to later frame success

181

was the most frequent pattern observed for movement agenda items. For most frames,
policy success was achieved when VAWA was adopted.
None of the movement frames resulted in policy cooptation alone and only two
agenda items failed to result in at least a partial policy success. The call for relaxing
eligibility requirements for battered women seeking access to government financial
assistance programs managed to have partial frame success, but failed to generate
sufficient attention from Congress. The call for public health personnel training resulted
in multiple frame successes in the latter half of the challenge, but was not included in any
of the adopted policies.
The resulting Violence Against Women Act (PL 103-322, 1994) contained
provisions that encompassed all of the possible movement prognostic frame outcomes:
success, cooptation, failure, and preemption. VAWA got the scope right—providing a
broad sweeping response; but moved the focus of federal intervention toward suppressing
and punishing offenders—and garnering victim assistance to do so. This was a big win in
terms of getting the federal government to recognize the problem and dedicate resources.
There were real benefits for battered women and other movement coalition members, too.
Reforms consistent with movement and preemptive provisions. However, the Department
of Justice and Department of Health and Human Services were granted oversight, which
is a loss for the BWM preferred response.
The increased attention to domestic violence during the VAWA period (from
1990 forward), including the adoption of VAWA, followed two decades of change in the
way social and cultural institutions responded to battered women. Government funding,
including federal funding for battered women’s shelters added to the legitimacy of these
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activities and decreased stigma around helping women escape their homes. But I would
speculate that the majority of change in terms of type and amount of attention by
Congress resulted from a broadening of the constituency of actors engaged in work with
battered women and their abusers. State law changes meant changes to the practices of
criminal justice and social service agencies. As a result agents within these organizations
took a professional interest in federal policy production. Not only did they have a stake in
the outcomes of battered women, but they also needed resources and institutional support
to carry out the implementation of past and proposed policy changes. So while the
consistency and longevity of the movement’s prognostic framing efforts helped shape
federal response, the increased level of attention by Congress to these issues was the
result of pressures from multiple interests groups. The pattern of target response frames
over time, in both pacing and content, support this conclusion. An assessment of
participation of other community actors in hearings and the publications of professional
groups would be necessary to see how these dynamics played out.
III. Theoretical Implications
The main objective of this work was to explain the ways in which these
outcomes represent the prolonged influence of the BWM on domestic violence policy.
If, as historians have suggested, the movement was coopted in the early 1980s, then one
might expect negligible movement influence on policy outcomes over a decade later.
This work does not seek to answer questions about the cooptation of movement
leadership or organizations, looking instead to investigate the question of whether the
movement shaped policy outcomes regardless of objective or subjectively perceived
organizational cooptation. This examination of the interactions between the movement’s
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key policy-oriented messages and federal bill proposals provides empirical support for
the assertion that the BWM was a central player in shaping federal policy on domestic
violence over the course of two decades – including a sustained period of time after any
such cooptation of leadership would have occurred.
Domestic violence public policy outcomes are both the direct and indirect product
of the BWM. The findings of this work suggest that the BWM directly influenced federal
policy on domestic violence through initiating the challenge that moved battered
women’s issues onto the Congressional agenda. Members of the movement coalition
identified the problem as one in need of attention and took their messages directly to
lawmakers. In the articulation of these claims, the movement also had a direct influence
on creating and expanding the contours of the policy domain. As a result, BWM actors
defined the scope of institutional response. The consistent messages and participation of
members of the movement coalition guided federal lawmaker’s actions throughout the
challenge.
The analysis of movement claims-making at the frame level also revealed indirect
influences on policy outcomes. The BWM challenge of federal policy on domestic
violence created competition in the policy domain. The same activities that helped set the
government agenda on domestic violence also activated other stakeholder interests and
the involvement of others working in areas impacted by the proposals and policy
outcomes in this challenge. Further, adopted policy reforms (the outcome of movementtarget interactions) created institutionalized interest for the federal government in the
prevention and intervention of domestic violence. These institutionalized interests would
play an increasingly larger role over time, especially in proposals leading up to the

184

Violence Against Women Act. Taken as a whole, target response frames in the latter
Congressional sessions show an increasing government preference for the expertise of
institutional actors.
In spite of the influence of movement prognostic frames on the development of
policy, the overall outcomes for this challenge are mixed. The movement’s prognostic
frames defined the scope of the agenda and identified institutional concerns. Because
they filled this role, they could anticipate, but not necessarily prevent the absorption and
replacement of their prognostic frames with these competing interests. Further, while the
movement controlled the definition of the problem early and remained engaged
throughout the challenge, institutional interests accrued as policy reforms began to appear
and the challenge played out. These dynamics lead to simultaneous movement frame
success and attempted (and successful) frame cooptation later in the challenge. These
findings point to four dynamics with implications for how we understand the role of
social movement messaging in the production of policy outcomes.
A. How one defines the movement matters critically for what findings we can see.
The movement’s message was preserved and carried by a variety of actors over
time. While authors producing work for movement periodicals and books self-identified
as movement actors, witnesses in Congressional hearings generally identified themselves
by organizational affiliation, occupational group, or as a survivor of domestic battery. In
total, five distinct groups were represented in Congressional hearings, including
survivors, shelter providers, representatives of local or state-level coalitions, legal
advocates, representatives of national domestic violence organizations, and national
feminist organizations. At the end of the day, the messages carried by these actors
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differed little in scope or specification. Defining the movement as a coalition of actors
allowed for the identification of the successful entrenchment of BWM ideas about the
need for and nature of battered women’s shelter interventions within the battered
women’s beneficiary, advocacy, and service provider populations.
Conversely, had I defined the movement by identifiable national organizations,
the findings of this work would look much different. National domestic violence and
feminist organizations were a minority of witnesses carrying the BWM message in
hearings before Congress. In this scenario, the primary federal policy agenda would have
been limited to the demands for shelter and improving public knowledge through
awareness initiatives and criminal justice system training. The emergence of an
identifiable coalition of BWM actors in Congressional hearings allowed for the analysis
of the broader movement agenda—one that more fully represented the positions
articulated in movement publications. This suggests that at least for some kinds of
movements, the messages and actions of persons outside of identifiable social movement
organizations must be considered when analyzing framing and policy outcomes.
Scholars largely document social movements by the identifiable organizational
apparatus associated with recruitment, fundraising, and claims-making and movement
protest activities. Social movement organizations are rarely isolated actors in cultural and
political change efforts. And while we focus on these agencies as identifiable and
impactful actors, the cultural and political influences of social movements go beyond the
proximate contributions of organizations. What we know about movement outcomes may
be improved by a focus that takes into account ripple effects of movement emergence and
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organization, including whether or not both immediate and long-range policies meet or
diverge from the content of social movement grievances.

B. Although some movement messages are not subjected to cooptation, attempted
cooptation of movement prognostic messages occurs regularly in policy proposals. This
examination finds that not all message cooptation attempts look the same. Three types of
cooptation were observed: symbolic acceptance, absorption, and replacement.
Both Trumpy (2008) and Stratigaki (2004) pointed to the tendency of targets to
respond to movement demands with symbolic acceptance, which refers to cooptive target
response frames that show agreement with the movement prognosis, but yield no
resources to bring about the desired change. In the current analysis, this form of
cooptation occurred primarily in the later years—after initial policy reforms had passed in
Congress. Congressional bills designating Domestic Violence month accepted the
movement’s call for increased public awareness, but did not provide resources for an
education initiative or a public awareness campaign. Congress also responded to the
movement’s call for federal encouragement for consideration of domestic violence in
child custody cases in state courts with a symbolic “sense of congress” statement that
simply stated Congress agreed with the claim. Symbolic cooptation attempts were
executed and passed into law by Congress, but members of the movement coalition did
not accept these policies. Rather, testimonies in subsequent sessions continued to push for
action on these two issues. Both of these cooptive symbolic response frames were later
followed by movement frame and policy success.
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For the BWM two other forms cooptive target responses were more common:
cooptation by absorption and by replacement. Cooptation by absorption refers to the
attempt to address movement demands by adding the movement prognosis to existing
interventions. The BWM was asking for funds for a new type of intervention the battered
woman’s shelter. The earliest cooptation attempts observed in this challenge aimed to
address the movement demand for shelter and services by expanding programs created to
address homelessness or substance abuse to include intervention for battered women.
Cooptation by absorption appeared as the initial response to the request for funding
battered women services. Through their testimonies, members of the movement coalition
claimed that these existing interventions were not appropriate. Ultimately, the movement
was able to escape message cooptation through the persistent rejection of proposals to
absorb battered women’s refuge into existing programs. BWM actors continued to make
claims about the inadequate treatment of battered women by these very programs and
highlighting the uniqueness and transformative nature of peer counseling provided by
battered women’s organizations.
After the initial policy successes in funding battered women’s shelters and
services in the 98th Congress, the nature of cooptive bill proposals began to change.
Similar to Gamson’s (1975) articulation of pseudo success, cooptation by replacement
refers to those instances where target response frames accept the movement’s prognosis,
but propose an alternative solution. The most obvious example in this work is seen in the
response to the movement’s demand for legal representation for battered women with
ongoing criminal and civil court cases. Movement actors articulated the need for direct
legal representation to help battered women navigate the complexities of the legal system
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and to help protect them from further abuse by their partners through drawn out divorce
and custody proceedings. Lawmakers proposed a combination of response frames. One
response was to increase funding for legal aid programs for low income individuals,
which constituted a partial frame success. However, a second response proposed the
creation of a grant program to provide lay advocates inside of police departments and
prosecutor’s offices to help women reporting criminal battery navigate the system as a
victim/witness. At first glance, this response gives the impression of increased acceptance
of the movement prognosis and a potential compromise through innovation. But this
proposal aimed to replace the intervention articulated by the movement with a different
initiative altogether. The goal of the movement claim was to protect the legal rights of
battered women. The goal of the target response was to improve the participation of
victims in the apprehension and prosecution of their abusers. Even so, centering
interventions on victim needs, a hallmark of the BWM, became a part of the plan for
federal intervention.
The prognostic frames that avoided cooptation attempts altogether represented
areas in which Congress either controlled the targeted programs or ascribed expertise to
another professional group. Frames challenging federal regulations related to government
financial assistance program eligibility, crime victim compensation, and address
concealment all failed to generate Congressional response in the early years. While the
demand for government assistance failed to generate regulation reform, the latter two
claims eventually resulted in frame and policy success. A similar pattern of delayed
response was also observed for the prognostic frames related to education for
professionals in other institutions, namely, the criminal justice system and public health
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professions. These issues, while impervious to cooptation attempts, were a major part of
congressional proposals in the latter part of the challenge. In addition, when Congress did
respond to these movement frames, their response shifted attention to policies that
favored federally organized programs and placed prevention and intervention activities in
the hands of the professionals movement actors sought to educate about domestic
violence. So while the movement achieved frame success in most instances, the resulting
policies further weakened the legitimacy of movement actors as spokespersons on the
issue by directing authority to government agents. These findings are consistent with the
literature on contentious politics, which suggests cooptation is less likely for issues over
which the target already has authority and is more likely where political actors want to
use the movement frame to further their own interests (Gamson, 1975; McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly, 2002). As such, when it comes to movement message outcomes we need to
think carefully about what frames are being coopted and in what ways, rather than just
whether or not cooptation happened.
The irony here is that the messages that were coopted are, counter-intuitively, also
the messages that most directly drove acceptance of the movement’s framing message.
The call for increased resources for victim services were the frames most frequently
subjected to cooptation attempts. But it was precisely the movement’s focus on victims
that carried over into policy outcomes, regardless of whether enacted policies contained
frame success, cooptation, or preemption. Attempts at cooptation typically draw on
existing policy frameworks and understandings of government's role in problem
resolution. Thus, if social movements can shape those frameworks and understandings,
they stand to influence policy regardless of whether cooptation occurs or not.
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C. The terrain on which movement messages and target response frames intersect is
constantly subject to change due to both continued advocacy by members of the
movement coalition and by target responses.
One implication from Trumpy’s (2008) interaction approach to analyzing frame
outcomes was the understanding that the challenge is not over until the movement
accepts the target’s response frame. This led to the possibility that cooptive target
response frames were not final. Rather, continued movement advocacy in the face of a
cooptation attempt could lead to later success. This line of reasoning purports the notion
that resilient movements can turn cooptation attempts into success through continued
advocacy, but weak movements are at risk for accepting the target’s response at face
value and acquiescing to cooptation. If this were the case, one might predict that message
outcomes for a self-proclaimed organizationally coopted BWM would lean toward
cooptation rather than success. This was observed only in the case of the movement’s
request for funding battered women’s services. Initial Congressional response sought to
absorb domestic violence service provision into existing social programs. However, with
continued advocacy Congress proposed funding for specific and direct battered women’s
services. For other frames, frame cooptation more often followed frame success.
Policy success also changed the conditions under which the movement’s
messages were considered. Successful policy adoption in the 98th Congress provided
federal funding for shelter, services, and law enforcement training. However, this
successful proposal occurred alongside a number of alternative response frames that
attempted to coopt the movement’s framing of shelter and services for battered women.
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Following government funding of shelters, there was an initial suppression of
Congressional attention to the issue of domestic violence. However, when it came time to
renew the original legislation in the 100th Congress, there was a surge in lawmaker
attention to the issue.
In the 101st Congress, target response frames began to address previously ignored
demands made by the movement for over a decade. For the most part, these prior frame
failure outcomes were transformed into a mixture frame success and cooptation. Frame
and policy successes were observed for crime victim compensation and procedures to
secure confidential address. Neither of these issues received congressional response until
the 100th and 101st Congresses respectively. A combination of frame success and
cooptation was found for the issues of battered women’s legal representation and
encouraging state courts to consider domestic violence in proceedings on child custody.
Both of these were longstanding demands made by movement actors, but lawmakers did
not respond to these claims until the 101st Congress. In these instances, target response
frames resulting in both frame success and cooptation were introduced within the same
session.
Unlike Trumpy’s work on a single corporate target, members of Congress do not
respond to movement frames unilaterally. The observed frame and policy outcomes in
this work point to a pattern of frame and policy cooptation occurring simultaneously with
frame success and policy reform outcomes. In part, the bifurcated response is a product of
the way new laws are proposed and considered. The political process allows for multiple
responses. Further, once policy proposals are on the table the process moves onto a new
terrain of internal debate among lawmakers. By funding battered women’s shelters and
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services, the government had a vested interest in the issue. It is also possible that
increased attention to policies under federal authority or those addressing other
professional groups discussed earlier triggered the interest of other parties. Growth and
diversification in the policy domain led to alternative ideas about how to address the
problems identified in the movement prognosis.

D. As BWM advocacy transitioned through an “unsettled period” to a more “settled
period,” the ideas related to battered women’s safety were less contested in the policy
realm. But even with increased acceptance and response from lawmakers, the
movement’s preferred policy solutions were marginalized by the weight of institutional
interests by the end of the challenge.
The BWM initiated both local and federal policy advocacy during a period of
widespread social, cultural, and institutional transformation. The earliest interactions on
record between BWM actors and members of Congress occurred in the late 1970s. This
period marked the decline of the cycle of protest encompassing the Black Civil Rights
Movement and the Women’s Right’s and Liberation Movements. These movements
yielded federal laws establishing the right to non-discrimination across a diverse set of
social and cultural institutions. However, the implementation of new laws on nondiscrimination was incomplete and ongoing.
During this same period, the problem of domestic battery was drawn out of the
home and into public spaces. Shelters and community services specific to intervention for
battered women were new ideas. The first shelters were controversial, in large part
because the idea that a woman would leave her home conflicted with preexisting notions
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about family life. In addition, the beginnings of battered women’s federal policy
advocacy also corresponded to ongoing disputes about the role of the federal government
in other women’s rights issues. While the issue of women’s role in family life was not
overtly articulated as part of the national policy agenda, these tensions were present in the
testimonies of movement actors and discussed in depth in movement publications.
In the 1970s, the actors who would come to represent the BWM came together
out of necessity. There was no guarantee of community support for women who sought
refuge from a violent home. With no existing institutional support, these actors embraced
empowerment groups and alternative intuitional forms associated with the Civil Rights
and Women’s movements and forged the beliefs and values that came to guide their
political activism. Even in the absence of a strong organizational structure, the
movement’s message was consistent. This consistency was, at least in part, the result of
the movement’s origin in grassroots battered women’s service provision and the shared
culture that developed in these environments. In contrast to the methods of existing
institutions in social services, criminal justice, and public health, battered women’s
organizations provided refuge and services according to the direction of the women
themselves. Although not the central focus of this work, it is important to note that
movement prognostic frames were generated inside these alternative institutions as
battered women (and later their organizations) networked with others with similar
experiences. The connection of the movement’s policy agenda to the direct experiences
of battered women and their conflicts with existing interventions played a role in the
politicization of battered women and those working within battered women’s
organizations and the development of a widely held ideology about the cause for and
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solution to the problem. At the beginning of the challenge, the BWM’s ideas about public
policy represented both an innovative solution to a problem and an attack on the status
quo with regard to the way existing institutions handled woman battering.
These findings are consistent with Ann Swidler’s (1986, 1995) argument that
culture guides social action. Specifically, she contends that people develop a diverse set
of cultural competencies and when confronted with new or changing environments, they
will utilize artifacts, rituals, and other cultural tools to adapt to and make claims about
social change. Although this cultural knowledge is somewhat embedded in individuals
and groups, the deployment of culture is an active process. According to Swidler, the
influence of culture on action is contingent on the climate of large scale social dynamics.
Social problems are ever present, but how society attempts to resolve problems differs
over time and in patterned ways. In periods of social transformation or “unsettled
culture,” ideologies develop to provide a cohesive answer for questions about what
should be done to address a given problem or set of problems. These answers are derived
through the habits and activities of people as they attempt to deal with shifting cultural
terrain. Problem definitions are based on beliefs and values that result from these shared
activities. During unsettled periods the meanings derived from cultural beliefs and
practices drive action by introducing new ideas about how to address the problem.
However, these periods of transformation do not continue indefinitely. During
periods Swidler described as “settled,” ideology yields to tradition and common sense.
Action is determined by the way things are and have been accomplished in the past. In
settled periods, cultural tools still influence action, albeit less directly. Ideologies become
less overt and the meanings ascribed to specific actions are disarticulated from their
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origins. This can result in continued relevance of the actions driven by culture, but opens
the door for competing traditions. During periods of settled culture, strategic interests
drive action. Cultural beliefs and values then are used to justify the continuation of a
particular action or the replacement of one tradition with another.
During the early years of the movement, framing mattered in important ways.
Movement messages offered a strategy to address a problem with little to no intervention
history. Prognostic frames demanding funding for shelters were immediately accepted by
some lawmakers and led primarily to frame success. This pattern was consistent across
the challenge. In this way, the movement controlled the definition of the situation as it
pertained to the development and provision of shelter and services. Conversely,
movement messages questioning intervention in existing institutions failed to generate a
response from lawmakers.
As the social movement activity marking the period of unsettled political culture
declined, the BWM continued making demands of federal lawmakers, but the terrain on
which these contests played out changed. By the time the movement’s demand for shelter
realized federal policy success in 1984, it was no longer possible for members of
Congress to ignore domestic violence as a policy issue. This analysis demonstrated that
lawmakers were more engaged in addressing the problem both in terms of simple volume
of proposals and by covering a broader set of issues in the movement agenda. The
government was increasingly compelled to respond, not because of the movement’s
continued advocacy, but rather because the context in which the issues were being raised
and considered changed. Federal intervention intersected with ongoing policy changes at
the state and local levels in creating institutional stakeholders in government and non-
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governmental agencies engaging in service provision, law enforcement, and education.
One result of a broader set of interests was the introduction of competing traditions and
different perspectives on how to best intervene in domestic violence. The use of violence
to control women continued to be central to the movement’s dialogue and was used to
justify continuing attention to providing refuge that encouraged peer support, selfdetermination, and empowerment. However, policy proposals began to be dominated by
other institutional interests. Battered women were increasing defined by socially
prescribed identities of victim and witness rather than the preferred self-identification as
survivors. Target response frames were also moving toward addressing battered women’s
problems as they aligned with these identities.
Movement prognostic frames calling for changes to existing institutions received
more attention in the settled period in the latter half of the analysis. Although, they
continued to draw on meanings and framings from the earlier culturally-drive period, by
the time drafts of VAWA were introduced, lawmakers were responding based on a wide
set of institutional and strategic interests. The understanding of the contextual
relationship between culture and action explains why the introduction of BWM demands
in Congress yielded mixed results. The meanings derived by movement interests during
the unsettled period were combined with emerging institutional interests of government
funded programs and other professional stakeholder groups, which resulted in the
bifurcated outcomes of cooptation and success for movement messages in the second half
of the challenge. Five (5) percent of funds appropriated for the first three years of the
Violence Against Women Act went to battered women’s shelters, while 78% of funds
went to the Office of Justice Programs for law enforcement or criminal justice related
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projects (Siskin, 2001). The continued acceptance of movement messages was clear. But
when it came to inclusion, VAWA demonstrated Congressional preference for
institutional interests.
IV. Policy-Oriented Movement Message Making
Message cohesion and the persistence of movement messaging combined with the
empowerment of the beneficiary population extended the life and reach of the
movement’s message beyond the period where scholars made claims of movement
cooptation. This points to an advantage for so-called service organization based activism.
Many of the movement actors had utilized battered women’s movement crisis
intervention resources. Others were engaged in work that regularly required contact with
the beneficiary population. The results of these interactions were tangible and therefore
the message was consistent over time as their stories were retold over the course of the
challenge. This provides evidence for the success of the movement’s strategy to first
provide safety and that the experience and education provided by shelter life would
politicize battered women such that they could be agents of change in society. But the
lack of leadership and organization in this continuing advocacy may have inhibited the
ability of BWM coalition members to innovate around the message or create new
messages in response to the changing landscape of the policy domain and resulting policy
adoption.
V. Limitations of the Study
The research findings presented in this work are subject to limitations related to
data sources, researcher position, and generalizability. The use of formal documents and
the official record as data can lead to bias. Specifically, these documents are produced by
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persons or in environments where the authors have control over the content and may have
chosen to prevent the publication or witness testimony of views that were inconsistent
with the producer’s intent. For example, much of the work of federal lawmaking occurs
outside of the formal record. Lawmakers meet with and discuss policy with actors in
venues that are not systematically captured in the ways that bill proposals and formal
hearing are recorded. Further, the presence of members of the movement coalition in
Congressional hearings was the result of invitation from lawmakers, who may potentially
block those with more radical ideas about ending violence against women from
participation. Similarly, the editorial board of the Aegis or other outlets may have
rejected articles for publication by members of the movement coalition who did not share
the majority perspective on government intervention.
The use of emergent coding as a research technique carries limitations of validity
related to both researcher position and subjectivity. Prior to this work, there was no
available resource documenting the BWM policy agenda over time. The absence of
foundational literature on the topic required that I identify and verify the components of
the movement’s national policy positions. Similarly, it was rarely possible to code a
Congressional bill in total as constituting a single outcome. Most of the time (especially
in the early years) movement actors did not directly address support for or opposition to a
bill. Bills also had to be coded by provisions in order to compare Congressional response
to movement demands.
In order to guard against threats to validity, I utilized the processes of source
triangulation and substantive validation. Source triangulation is a systematic process of
looking through multiple sources of data to find common themes and categories in an
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effort to eliminate bias from researcher subjectivity (Cresswell and Miller 2010). I
identified the BWM messages from both movement publications and public testimonies,
relying on both to find the primary themes of the movement’s national policy agenda. In
an effort to reduce threats to validity resulting from the use of documents produced as the
official record, I used substantive validation and systematic methods for coding both
movement and target data as detailed in Chapter 3. Substantive validation involves
identifying researcher interpretation and clearly documenting sources for observation
(Angen 2000). Another researcher could select alternative data sources or code these
items differently. Even so, I am confident that an approach with similar theoretical and
analytic questions would result in similar findings overall.
Finally, this work should be viewed as a study of the public framing of policy
interventions for both the challenger and the target. The use of the single case study often
leads to questions about the generalizability of research findings. Social movements
differ in a number of ways. The same is true of both political interest in and the
composition of policy domains. The BWM is a specific, conceptually bound case. While
this work focused on the case of the BWM, the findings on the plasticity and multidimensionality of message outcomes may be applicable in other settings. These elements
should be should be investigated in future research.
VI. Recommendations for Future Research
These findings suggest three additional lines of inquiry. First, although this
analysis has documented the impact of movement framing on target response frames and
policy outcomes, the impact of other actors also mattered in the construction of federal
domestic violence policy. We need further research on how actors in the broader
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community and within the governing system also shape target response frames and policy
outcomes. An analysis of frame alignment and counter framing between the movement
and professional interest groups may thus lead to additional insight into the content of
target response frames. The examination should include documentation of the relative
participation and influence of these actors to members of the BWM coalition in
Congressional hearings.
Second, the simultaneous appearance of conflicting frame outcomes in single
sessions of Congress may in part be an artifact of the rough scale of this work—meaning
if I drilled down into introduction dates a chronology of introduction could reveal a better
picture of the dynamic. These data are available; however, the scope of this work did not
allow for this level of detailed analysis. Future research should examine this and proposal
characteristics in order to expand our understanding of Congressional response frames.
Third, this work examines message outcomes for a single case. Additional
research is needed to determine under what conditions these findings can be generalized.
The BWM focused on a single social problem, had an identifiable coalition of members,
and a published record of positions that made documenting movement policy messages
possible. One way to expand our understanding of movement frame and policy outcomes
is a comparative examination of policy-oriented message outcomes for other similarly
situated movements. Case selection should focus on movements for whom public
messages (and target responses) can be identified in ways that allow for comparable
documentation and those that share a similar target.
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VII. Conclusion
This work complicates previous claims that the Battered Women’s Movement
was coopted by institutional response in the early 1980s. Message cooptation appeared
alongside frame success and failure and came much later than previous claims of
movement cooptation. Not only did members of the movement coalition continue to carry
the agenda developed through community organizing around shelters and services in
federal hearings, they also saw a number of policy goals realized over the course of this
challenge. These policy successes were the result of a diverse constituency of movement
actors, a consistent message about providing safety for battered women, and a changing
political environment that accepted battered women’s shelter and services as a necessary
social intervention but also gave voice to emerging institutional interests.
Domestic violence is a rooted policy domain within the federal policy process.
However, the movement did experience cooptation through institutional response. In
addition to the cooptation of specific frames, the larger pattern of frame outcomes
uncovered in this work suggests that lawmakers never fully accepted the movement’s call
for widespread emergency response to domestic violence. As a result, claims of
insufficient resources for battered women in crisis, inadequate public and professional
knowledge about domestic violence, and a lack of legal protections for battered women
continue to dominate conversations about the public policy response to domestic
violence. For this movement, and others like it, a more nuanced understanding of
cooptation may result from looking beyond organizations and exploring questions about
the persistence and response to movement messages.
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Appendix A
Data Sources for Battered Women’s Movement Messages
Congressional Hearings
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Select Education, Committee on Education and
Labor. Domestic Violence. Hearing. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978. (HRG-1978EDL-0016).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Select Education, Committee on Education and
Labor. Domestic Violence in Vermont. Hearing. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978.
(HRG-1978-EDL-0040).
U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Child and Human Development, Committee on
Human Resources. Domestic Violence, 1978. Hearing. 95th Congress, 2nd Session,
1978. (HRG-1978-SHR-0034).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning,
Analysis and Cooperation, Committee on Science and Technology. Research into
Violent Behavior: Domestic Violence. Hearing. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978.
(HRG-1978-TEC-0040).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Select Education, Committee on Education and
Labor. Domestic Violence: Prevention and Services. Hearing. 96th Congress, 1st
Session, 1979. (HRG-1979-EDL-0021).
U.S Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Child and Human Development, Committee on
Labor and Human Resources. Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act, 1980.
Hearing. 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 1980. (HRG-1980-LHR-0023).
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U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Select Education, Committee on Education and
Labor. Hearing on Domestic Violence. Hearing. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.
(HRG-1983-EDL-0038).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Labor Standards, Committee on Education and
Labor. Impact of Unemployment on Children and Families. Hearing. 98th Congress,
1st Session, 1983. (HRG-1983-EDL-0095).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, Committee on Ways and
Means. Crime Victims Compensation Trust Fund. Hearing. 98th Congress, 1st Session,
1983. (HRG-1983-WAM-0014).
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The Victims of Crime Assistance Act of
1984. Hearing. 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 1984. (HRG-1984-SJS-0037).
U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism,
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Domestic Violence and Public Health.
Hearing. 99th Congress, 1st Session, 1985. (HRG-1985-LHR-0039).
U.S. Congress. House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families. Children and
Families in the South: Trends in Health Care, Family Services, and the Rural
Economy. Hearing. 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 1986. (HRG-1986-CYF-0003).
U.S. Congress. House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families. Children and
Families in the Midwest: Employment, Family Services and the Rural Economy.
Hearing. 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 1986. (HRG-1986-CYF-0005).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary.
Sexual Abuse Act of 1986. Hearing. 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 1986. (HRG-1986HJH-0019).
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U.S. Congress. House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families. Women,
Violence, and the Law. Hearing. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987. (HRG-1987-CYF0014).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Select Education, Committee on Education and
Labor. Reauthorization of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. Hearing.
100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987. (HRG-1987-EDL-0027).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Select Education, Committee on Education and
Labor. Reauthorization of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. Hearing.
100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987. (HRG-1987-EDL-0045).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary.
Victims of Crime. Hearing. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987. (HRG-1987-HJH0064).
U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism.
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Reauthorization of the Adoption
Reform Act of 1978 and the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act of 1984.
Hearing. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987. (HRG-1987-LHR-0038).
U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism.
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Parental and Medical Leave Act of
1987: Part 2. Hearing. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987. (HRG-1987-LHR-0068).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Government Relations,
Committee on the Judiciary. Sense of Congress—Evidentiary Presumption in Child
Custody Cases. Hearing. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990. (HRG-1990-HJH-0013).
U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism,
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Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the
Home. Hearing. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990. (HRG-1990-LHR-0035).
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Women and Violence: Part 1. Hearing.
101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990. (HRG-1990-SJS-0040).
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Women and Violence: Part 2. Hearing.
101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990. (HRG-1990-SJS-0041).
U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, Committee on the
Judiciary. Caller-ID Technology. Hearing. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990. (HRG1990-SJS-0024).
U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism,
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Behind Closed Doors: Family Violence
in the Home. Hearing. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991. (HRG-1991-LHR-0026).
U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Departments of Labor, Health and Human services,
and Education and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations. Domestic
Violence: The Struggle for Survival. Hearing. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.
(HRG-1991-SAP-0019).
U. S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, Committee on the
Judiciary. Violence Against Women. Hearing. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992.
(HRG-1992-HJH-0003).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration,
Committee on the Judiciary. Battered Women and Child Custody Litigation. Hearing.
102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992. (HRG-1992-HJH-0057).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy
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and Commerce. Public Health Service Programs. Hearing. 103rd Congress, 1st
Session, 1993. (HRG-1993-HEC-0035).
U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism,
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Witness to Domestic Violence:
Protecting Our Kids. Hearing. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993. (HRG-1993-LHR0026).
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Hearing on Domestic Violence.
Hearing. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993. (HRG-1993-SJS-0008).
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Violent Crimes Against Women.
Hearing. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993. (HRG-1993-SJS-0015).
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Violence Against Women: Fighting the
Fear. Hearing. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993. (HRG-1993-SJS-0026).
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Aging. Elder Abuse and Violence Against Midlife and
Older Women. Roundtable discussion. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994. (HRG1994-AGS-0001).
U.S. Congress. Senate Special Committee on Aging. Fighting Family Violence: Responses of
the Health Care System. Hearing. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994. (HRG-1994AGS-0008).
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Appropriations. Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1995 Part 8: Field
Hearing on Crime Prevention and Law Enforcement. Hearing. 103rd Congress, 2nd
Session, 1994. (HRG-1994-HAP-0051).
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, Committee on the
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Judiciary. Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family Matter. Hearing. 103rd Congress, 2nd
Session, 1994. (HRG-1994-HJH-0038).
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. Child Abuse on North Dakota
Reservations and Implementation of the Indian Child Protection and Family
Violence Prevention Act. Hearing. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994. (HRG-1994IAS-0014).

Movement Publications
Ahrens, Lois. 1978. "From Collective to Coopted," Aegis: Magazine on Organizing to
Stop Violence Against Women, September/October, pp. 5-9.
Ahrens, Lois. 1980. "Battered Women's Refuges: Feminist Cooperatives vs. Social
Service Institutions," Aegis: Magazine on Ending Violence Against Women,
Summer/Autumn, pp. 9-15.
Andrea Dworkin Papers, 2001-M196, Box 15, 1977. Resolutions Adopted by Delegates
to the National Women’s Conference, 1977. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University. Cited in Rambo, Kirsten S.
2009. Trivial Complaints: The Role of Privacy in Domestic Violence Law and
Activism in the U.S. New York: Columbia University Press.
Andrea Dworkin Papers, 2001-M196, Box 15, 1977. Proposed National Plan of Action,
1977. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard
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University Press.
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Appendix B
Battered Women’s Movement Timeline
This timeline provides a listing of people, organizations, events, and publications in
the history of the Battered Women’s Movement. The timeline will also highlight important
political events, shifts in political control of the U.S. Presidency, Senate, and House of
Representatives as well as major policy developments. The timeline begins with activities in
the 1960s and includes events up to and immediately following the adoption of the Violence
Against Women Act. This chronology is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather seeks to
provide context for the events covered in the current project. Battered Women’s Movement
and related movement people, organizations, and events will be presented in bold,
publications in italics, policy forums, events, and developments will be underlined, and
political administrations and policy items will appear in regular text.

1960s
1960s
1960s

1960s

1963
1964
1966

Al-Anon begins treating battered women who are married to
alcoholic men (Schecter 1982)
Haven House (shelter) opens in Pasedena, California
Criminal justice system uses crisis intervention model to treat
domestic violence—couples were referred to social workers or
psychiatrists to treat individual pathologies believed to cause
violence in relationships (Dobash and Dobash 1992)
Shelters begin accepting Title XX funds (Social Security Act)
but are required to spend monies on services leading to the
push to professionalize staff and treat women as clients
(Schecter 1982). Title XX funds were only accessible to programs
for providing emergency shelter and for in-service training for
social services and domestic violence service providers, but only if
these projects are included in the state’s Health and Human
Services approved Title XX plan. Accepting the money also
required the agency to provide matching funds that do not come
from the federal government (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
1982)
The Feminine Mystique, Betty Friedan
The U.S. Civil Rights Act passes the U.S. Congress
Founding National Organization for Women
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1970s
1970s

1970s

1970s
1970

1970
1971-1972

1971

1971
1971
1972

1972
1972
1973-1974

1973
1974
1974

NOW organizes over 300 local and state rape task force groups
(Schecter 1982)
Richmond Police Department (California) becomes the first in the
nation to make domestic crisis intervention training part of inservice training for all officers (Martin 1976)
Hayward Police Department (California) starts Project Outreach.
The project sends mental health professionals with officers on
family violence calls (Martin 1976)
Journal of Marriage and the Family (founded in 1939) adds
“violence” to journal index (Martin 1976)
Voices from Women’s Liberation, Edited by Leslie B. Tanner,
volume on Women’s Liberation that makes reference to male
violence
Sisterhood is Powerful, Edited by Robin Morgan, volume on
Women’s Liberation that makes reference to male violence
92nd United States Congress, President Richard Nixon
(Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House of
Representatives and the Senate
Founding Women’s Advocates in St. Paul, Minnesota,
organization began as a consciousness raising group,
incorporated as a non-profit organization in 1972, purchased a
property for a shelter after receiving funding from the Ramsey
County Mental Health Board in 1974 (Erler 1978)
Women in Transition, a women’s self-help group, forms in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Heinemann 1996)
Rape: The All American Crime, Susan Griffin (articulates rape as
an act of aggression)
Founding Center for Women Policy Studies (CWPS) in
Washington, D.C., organization began as a feminist non-profit
research and policy advocacy group and resource center
(Center for Women Policy Studies 1997)
Founding Pittsburgh Women’s Center, the Center opens a
shelter in 1974 (Martin 1976)
Founding Rainbow Retreat (shelter), Phoenix, Arizona
(Schecter 1982)
93nd United States Congress, Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald
Ford (Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House
of Representatives and the Senate
Al-Anon in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania opens shelter for women
battered by alcoholic husbands (Schecter 1982)
Scream Quietly or the Neighbors will Hear, Erin Pizzey (the
British Battered Women’s Movement)
Founding Transition House in Boston, Massachusetts, Chris
Womendez and Cherie Jimenez declare their Boston home a
shelter operating on principles of women’s liberation (Dobash
and Dobash 1992)
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1974

1974

1974

1974
1974

1974, August 9
1975-1976

1975
1975

1975
1975

1975
1975
1975, October 29
1976-1985
1976

Founding Casa Myrna Vazquez Shelter in Boston,
Massachusetts. The shelter is a multi-racial group that later
becomes a technical assistance center for community outreach
on matters related to Third World Women (Schecter 1982)
Rainbow Retreat establishes outpatient program to provide
counseling to women who choose not to leave their abuser
(Martin 1976)
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds a
night prosecutor program in Columbus, Ohio to provide diversion
and mediation for domestic violence offenders in lieu of
prosecution (Martin 1976)
Founding Feminist Alliance Against Rape Newsletter (Schecter
1982)
Founding Community Crisis Center in Elgin, Illinois. The
Center was not exclusive to serving battered women and
actually started as a project to assist middle class women
abandoned by their husbands. The Center incorporated and
opened a shelter in 1975. A little over half of the women served
were battered women. The shelter took a non-feminist
approach to advocacy and service provision, encouraging use
of existing services in the community; but the group
maintained the goal of creating women’s self-sufficiency. In
1980, the Center received federal grant money to write a howto guide for shelter organization and management (Community
Crisis Center 1980)
Richard Nixon resigns the Presidency
94th United States Congress, President Gerald Ford (Republican),
the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives
and the Senate
National Organization for Women establishes Task Force on
Battered Women/Household Violence (Martin 1976)
Founding Abused Women’s Aid in Crisis, New York. The
center offers referral services and group counseling sessions to
battered wives (Martin 1976)
Women in Transition publish: Women’s Survival Manual: A
Feminist Handbook on Separation and Divorce
Ann Arbor, Michigan NOW Wife Assault Task Force
publishes: Wife Beating: How to Develop a Wife Assault Task
Force and Project (Martin 1976)
Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, Susan Brownmiller
The Politics of Rape: The Victim’s Perspective, Diana E. Russell
Women’s Strike Day, a national feminist day of protest (Miller
2010)
United Nations Decade for Women (Schechter 1982)
International Women’s Year Conference, Houston, Texas, this
conference is cited as one of the events leading to the
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1976

1976

1976
1976
1976

1976

1976

1976
1976
1976, January

1976, March 4

1976, June
1976, August 26

1976, October 2-3

organization of a national Battered Women’s Movement
(Schecter 1982)
Center for Women Policy Studies launched the National
Resource Center on Family Violence and established a 6 year
project to study and improve services for battered women in
the criminal justice system (Center for Women Policy Studies
1997)
Founding Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence
following hearings at the Pennsylvania Legislature where
grassroots groups from around the State were invited to attend
(Schecter 1982)
Battered Wives, Del Martin
Working on Wife Abuse, Betsy Warrior, a directory of individuals
and groups working on battered women’s issues
U.S. Senator Birch Bahy (D-Indiana) expresses interest in
introducing legislation on family violence through the Senate
Judiciary Committee (Martin 1976)
Center for Women Policy Studies uses an LEAA grant to
publish the newsletter Response. The newsletter covers a
variety of topics related to intra-family violence and is mailed
for free to a national audience (Center for Women Policy Studies
1997)
Founding Chicago Abused Women’s Coalition, the Coalition
publishes a newsletter and provides first housing alternatives
program for women with no family or friends (Schecter 1982)
Founding Center for Battered Women, a counseling collective
in Austin, TX (Ahrens 1980)
A grant from the LEAA funds the first legal center for
Battered Women in the U.S. (Schecter 1982)
Founding La Casa de las Madres in San Francisco, California;
the shelter aimed to provide battered women’s services to
Latina women and their families (Martin 1976)
International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women, Brussels,
Belgium. A resolution on domestic violence is sent to the
governments of all countries. Similar tribunals are held in New
York and San Francisco (Martin 1976)
Founding Harriet Tubman Women’s Shelter in Minneapolis,
Minnesota (Miller 2010)
Women Support Women march held in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. This is the first mass demonstration in the U.S. on
battered women (Miller 2010)
Wisconsin Conference on Battered Women is held in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Collaboration at this conference led to
the foundation of the National Communication Network for
the Elimination of Violence Against Women newsletter
(Brygger 1982; Schecter 1982)
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1976, October 9
1977-1978

1977

1977
1977

1977

1977, July
1978
1978

1978

1978

1978

Battered Lives: A Conference Sponsored by the Abused
Women’s Coalition, Chicago, Illinois (Schecter 1982)
95th United States Congress, President James Carter (Democrat),
the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives
and the Senate
A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence is
introduced in Congress (HR 7927; HR 9052; HR 9053; HR 9267;
S 1728)
National Women’s Conference, Houston, Texas (Rambo 2009)
Transition House in Cambridge, MA produces and releases a
film titled “We Will Not Be Beaten.” The documentary film
records battered women speaking about the reality of abuse and
help seeking. Proceeds from the film go to support the operations
of Transition House (Blair 1979)
Center for Battered Women in Austin, TX opens shelter. The
decision to open a shelter was later identified as a classic example
of cooptation by professionalization (Ahrens 1978; 1980)
White House held a meeting about battering (Dobash and Dobash
1992).
The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence is
established. (Avina 1979).
The National Communication Network (NCN) and the
Feminist Alliance Against Rape (FAAR) merge newsletters
and begin joint publication of Aegis: Magazine on Ending
Violence Against Women (Schechter 1982)
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) establishes a
specialized family violence program to fund local projects focused
on improving the response of the criminal justice system to
domestic violence. To be eligible for funding, projects were
required to include public and private community groups—like
law enforcement, social services, and medical personnel in their
projects. In 1978, 16 projects were funded. In 1980, 25 projects
were funded. The LEAA was set to be phased out in 1982, so no
additional projects were funded (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
1982)
National Conference on Prosecution of Spouse Abuse, Cosponsored by the Center for Women Policy Studies and the
National District Attorney’s Association (Lerman 1981)
ACTION awards $300,000 to the Domestic Violence Project,
Inc. in Ann Arbor, MI to establish a national domestic violence
volunteer service program. The money is used to open 1
national volunteer center in Ann Arbor and 10 regional
centers. Regional centers were located in existing organizations,
most of which were absent or moderately oriented to feminist
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1978, January 3031
1978, April 14-15

1978, May 20

1978, August 3-6

1978, December 4

1979-1980

1979

1979

principles (e.g. YWCA in Washington State, the Community
Crisis Center in Elgin, Illinois) (No Author 1979b)
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights holds symposium on Battered
Women in Washington, D.C. (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
1978)
International Conference on Battered Women was held in
Amsterdam. Attendees included 128 representatives from 13
different western nations and 54 refuges or shelters. Workshops
addressed: the nature of refuge, feminist analysis of battering,
fundraising, research, publicity, and consciousness raising
(Rosiello 1978)
ABLE (Asians, Blacks, Latinos, Et Cetera) held the 3rd World
Women’s Statewide Conference in San Francisco, CA. ABLE
was a task force developed to conduct trainings on issues of the
intersection of race and women’s oppression (Segovia-Ashley
1978)
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence steering
committee meets in Portland, OR to work on philosophy and
goals for the organization. NCADV steering committee created
objectives following the US commission on civil rights battered
women symposium: a. “set up structure and process for the
NCADV;" b. "hold a national conference," and c. have an "impact
on national legislation effecting battered women." The committee
also developed membership criteria for member groups; and
divided regional areas. The national conference originally
scheduled for August 1978 was rescheduled for October 1979
(Avina 1979)
All states are required to have a “good cause” exemption to the
AFDC requirements regarding cooperation in paternity and child
support actions in order to be eligible for welfare benefits. (NCN
1979a). Good cause exemptions required third party
documentation and were based on a best interest of the child
philosophy.
96th United States Congress, President James Carter (Democrat),
the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives
and the Senate
President Jimmy Carter directs the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare to establish an Office on Domestic Violence. The
Office collaborated with the LEAA and the Center for Women
Policy Studies and focused on technical assistance programs,
public awareness activities, and demonstration grants for
comprehensive community services. In 1981, a newly elected
conservative congress defunded the initiative (Brooks 1997; U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights 1982)
Center for Women Policy Studies launched national program
to improve services for battered women (Center for Women
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1979

1980, January 20

1980, February 27

1980, November

1981-1982

1981

1981

1981

1981

1981, April 3-5

Policy Studies, 1997)
The Battered Woman, Lenore Walker. This work identifies a cycle
of violence and proposes that battering is a learned behavior. This
work also suggested that victims of battering have a “learned
helplessness” (Walker 1979)
The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention,
Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1979 (S 440) is
signed into law. The Act gave priority to research and
demonstration projects that examined the relationship between
alcohol abuse and other social problems, including domestic
violence (U.S. Public Law 96-180)
1st national meeting of the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence was held in Washington, D.C. Susan Schechter presents
a talk titled "The Future of the Battered Women's Movement." 50
women from BW programs in 49 states, D.C. and Virgin Islands.
Developed recommendations on organizing NCADV and political
priorities. NCADV response to recommendations: 1) developed
Task Force Women of Color Caucus; 2) Rural women Task Force;
3) Lesbian Task Force (Brygger 1982; Schechter 1980)
Addressing Woman Abuse Conference is held in Lake Geneva,
WI. Susan Schechter presents talk titled “Speaking to the Battered
Women’s Movement” (Schechter 1981)
97th United States Congress, President Ronald Reagan
(Republican), the Democratic Party controls the House of
Representatives and the Republican Party controls the Senate
Fight Back! Feminist Resistance to Male Violence was published.
The anthology is the first that pulls together the writing of activists
on issues related to the anti-rape and battered women’s movements
Center for Women Policy Studies sponsored National
Conference on Family Violence in the Military (Center for
Women Policy Studies 1997)
Center for Women Policy Studies publishes numerous
monographs related to response to battered women:
Prosecution of Spouse Abuse; Court Mandated Counseling for
Men Who Batter; Legal Help for Battered Women; Cracking the
Corporations: Finding Corporate Funding for Family Violence
Programs; Wife Abuse in the Armed Forces, Center for Women
Policy Studies
Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP) is first
implemented as a psycho-educational treatment approach for
batterers. Group facilitators use consciousness raising techniques
to challenge perpetrator beliefs about power and control (Pence
and Paymar 1993)
12th Annual National Conference on Women and the Law was
held in Boston, MA. Conference includes workshops on violence
against women (MacKinnon 1982)
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1981, December

1982

1982

1982
1982, March 23-25

1983-1984

1983-1984
1983-1984

1984

1984

1984

1984, October 9

1985-1986

Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence sponsors
conference titled, “Pulling Together: Being with Children in
Shelter” (Onley-Campbell 1982)
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights publishes a follow-up report
from the Battered Women Policy Symposium: Under the Rule of
Thumb: Battered Women and the Administration of Justice. The
report notes that by 1982, wife battering is a crime in every U.S.
State (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1982)
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence holds
conference on the role of Men in the Movement (Morrison
1982)
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence held its 1st
Battered Women’s Conference (Brygger 1982).
13th Annual Conference on Women and the Law is held in
Detroit Michigan. The conference includes workshops on
pornography, prostitution, and violence against women (Noonan
and Conner 1982)
98th United States Congress, President Ronald Reagan
(Republican), the Democratic Party controls the House of
Representatives and the Republican Party controls the Senate
Center for Women Policy Studies publishes: Model State Act:
Remedies for Domestic Violence
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence set goals for the
next two years that focused on establishing tools for
communicating with membership, strengthening local
coalitions, and developing a stable funding base (Brygger 1982)
The Victims of Crime Act is signed into law. The act gave priority
to grants designed to assist victims of domestic violence, sexual
assault, and child abuse (Brooks 1997)
Thurman vs. City of Torrington. U.S. District Court in Connecticut
rules that the police do not have discretion in determining whether
or not an arrest is to be made on the basis of marital status between
victim and offender (Barner and Carney 2011).
The Battered Woman’s Syndrome, Lenore Walker. This work
details research on a clinical population of battering victims to
uncover psychological effects of battering on victims and to
explain both why women stay with abusers and why they
sometimes act violently toward their abusers (Walker 1984)
Family Violence Prevention and Services Act signed into law as
part of the Amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (HR 1904). The act allows funding to be used for
shelter and domestic violence services according to individual
state plans for use of the money. Also provides for law
enforcement training grants on family violence (U.S. Public Law
98-457)
99th United States Congress, President Ronald Reagan
227

1985

1986
1986, May 13

1986, July 15-19
1987-1988

1987

1988, April 25

1988, November 18

1989-1990

1989
1989, October 6

(Republican), the Democratic Party controls the House of
Representatives and the Republican Party controls the Senate
“Violence Against Women: A Curriculum for Empowerment” is
published by BWM activists. The curriculum provides training
for shelters and support groups consistent with the BWM
philosophy of peer support, social causes of violence against
women, and the personal and political empowerment of
women (C.V.A.N Battered Women’s Shelter 1986)
Center for Women Policy Studies publishes: Resource
Collections on Violence Against Women
Coalition Against Misdiagnosis held a demonstration and
speak-out at the American Psychiatric Association Annual
Meeting in Washington, D.C. Led by Lenore Walker, the group
was protesting the treatment of battered women as pathological
(Coalition Against Misdiagnosis 1986)
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence Conference is
held in St. Louis, Missouri (Ito and Lee 1987; Pence 1987)
100th United States Congress, President Ronald Reagan
(Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House of
Representatives and the Senate
Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women’s Rights
Movement, 1945 to the 1960s, Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor
(concept of social movement abeyance)
Amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(HR 1900) signed into law, reauthorizing funds for domestic
violence shelters and services. The reauthorization removes the 3
year limit for eligibility, provides resources for law enforcement to
develop victim information materials to distribute at the scene of
family violence incidents, and creates the family member abuse
and documentation project to be carried out by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. Public Law 100294)
The Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988 (HR 5210) is adopted. The Act
provides grants to state or local governments to improve criminal
justice system response to family violence, including domestic
violence, adds relationship between victim and offender to the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports data collection, and adds domestic
violence victims to those eligible for compensation under the
Victims of Crime Act 1984 (U.S. Public Law 100-690)
101st United States Congress, President George H.W. Bush
(Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House of
Representatives and the Senate
Center for Women Policy Studies publishes: a revised edition of
Legal Help for Battered Women
Senate Joint Resolution 133 passes, designating October 1989
“National Domestic Violence Awareness Month” (U.S. Public
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1990
1990

1990, October 18

1991-1992

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991, October 3

1992

Law 101-112)
Hate Crimes Statistics Act adopted (U.S Public Law 101-275)
(Center for Women Policy Studies 1991)
Senator Joe Biden introduces the Violence Against Women Act in
the U.S. Senate (S 2754). The bill included provisions related to
reducing violence against women on the streets and in the home
and sought to establish gendered violence as a hate crime, making
it possible for women to seek compensatory and punitive damages
under federal civil rights law. The bill receives a hearing and
passes the Senate Judiciary Committee but never receives a floor
vote (Brooks 1997)
House Joint Resolution 602 passes, designating October 1990
“National Domestic Violence Awareness Month” (U.S. Public
Law 101-439)
102nd United States Congress, President George H.W. Bush
(Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House of
Representatives and the Senate
Senator Joe Biden reintroduces the Violence Against Women Act
in the U.S. Senate (S 15). This bill includes an amendment that
adds provisions related to violence against women on college
campuses. Representative Barbara Boxer introduces a companion
bill in the House (HR 1502). This bill is less comprehensive and
focuses primarily on sexual violence and violence on the streets.
No action was taken on either of these bills in 1991. Some
components of the bills were added to other pieces of legislation
with no successful adoptions (Brooks 1997).
National Organization for Women Legal Defense and
Education Fund assembles Task Force of over 170 groups
including unions, churches, and women’s health and education
groups to engage in lobbying efforts related to the Violence
Against Women Act
Center for Women Policy Studies publishes: Violence Against
Women as Biased Motivated Hate Crime; Resource Collection on
the Letter and the Spirit: Federal and State Legal and Policy
Issues on Violence Against Women
Center for Women Policy Studies submits testimony to the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in support of the Violence
Against Women Act, 1991 (Center for Women Policy Studies
1997)
Senate Joint Resolution 73 passes, designating October 1991
“National Domestic Violence Awareness Month” (U.S. Public
Law 102-114)
Senator Joe Biden holds a press conference on the results of the
Senate Judiciary Committee research project on violence against
women. He pledges to prioritize the Act in the coming session
(Brooks 1997)
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1992, May 28

1992, July 10

1992, September

1992, October 27

1992, October 27

1993-1994

1993

1993, May 27

1993, November 16

The Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, Adoption, and Family
Services Act of 1992 (S 838) is adopted. The Act amends grant
programs providing shelter and services to add preferences for
grantees collaborating with state domestic violence coalitions and
for states with a law or procedure for evicting an abused spouse
from the household. The Act also redefines the types of assistance
provided to include helping victims access civil and criminal
courts and other advocacy related needs. Funds the development of
a domestic violence prevention curriculum for school children, a
public awareness campaign, establishes a National Resource
Center to provide technical assistance to funded programs (U.S.
Public Law 102-295)
The Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Reorganization Act
(S 1306) is adopted. The Act includes domestic violence
counseling in required comprehensive services offered in funded
substance abuse and mental health programs (U.S. Public Law
102-321)
Representative Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and the House Crime and
Criminal Justice Subcommittee held a markup of the Violence
Against Women Act. In the absence of committee members
supportive of the Act, several damaging amendments were added.
No additional action was taken on the bill (Brooks 1997)
The Battered Women’s Testimony Act of 1992 (HR 1252) is
adopted. The Act empowers the State Justice Institute to collect
and analyze nationwide data on the admissibility and quality of
expert testimony on experiences of battered women offered as part
of the defense in criminal cases and to develop training materials
to assist battered women, shelters, and attorneys to use such expert
testimony in appropriate cases (U.S. Public Law 102-527)
Amendments to the State Justice Institute Act of 1984 (HR 1253)
adopted. The Act authorizes research on State judicial decisions
related to child custody litigation involving domestic violence and
to develop training materials and disseminate information to
appropriate agencies (U.S. Public Law 102-528)
103rd United States Congress, President William Clinton
(Democrat), the Democratic Party controls both the House of
Representatives and the Senate
Senator Joe Biden and newly elected Senator Barbara Boxer
introduce the Violence Against Women Act (S 11) in the U.S.
Senate. One month later the House introduces a nearly identical
bill (HR 1133), but with additional provisions related to battered
immigrant women (Brooks 1997)
Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously approved the Violence
Against Women Act, after minimal revision and amendment
(Brooks 1997)
The Violence Against Women Act is attached to the Senate Crime
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1993, November 17

1994

1994, May 19

1994, September 13

1995-1996

Bill, which passed 94-5. Most of the Act provisions stayed intact
with the exception of the removal of the battered immigrant
provisions (Brooks 1997)
The full House Judiciary Committee approves the bill and sends it
to the House floor. The bill passed 421-0, with the deletion of the
hate crime provision. The House also decides to incorporate the
Act into the crime bill (HR 3355) (Brooks 1997)
The Crime Bill is approved in both the house and senate and is
sent to the House-Senate committee for revisions. The House
approved the revised bill 325-195 with a 3.3 million cut in
funding. The Senate passed the bill 61-38 (Brooks 1997)
Arson Prevention Act of 1994 (HR 1727) adopted. The Act
includes programs to combat domestic violence as a cause of arson
and research to prevent arson caused by domestic violence in
activities eligible for funding (U.S. Public Law 103-254)
President Bill Clinton signed the Crime Bill (HR 3355) into law
approving 1.62 billion for the Violence Against Women Act,
which included both the hate crimes and battered immigrant
provisions (U.S. Public Law 103-322)
104th United States Congress, President William Clinton
(Democrat), the Republican Party controls both the House of
Representatives and the Senate
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Appendix C
Data Sources for Congressional Response Frames
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for a program of research to help better
understand, identify, and to the extent possible prevent or relieve pressures on
families. S. 2250. 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for a program of research to help
better understand, identify, and to the extent possible, prevent or relieve pressures on
families. H.R. 9808. 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence. H.R. 7927. 95th Congress, 1st
Session, 1977.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to
establish a grant program designed to develop methods of prevention and treatment
relating to domestic violence. S. 1728. 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence. H.R. 9052. 95th Congress, 1st
Session, 1977.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence. H.R. 9053. 95th Congress, 1st
Session, 1977.
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U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence. H.R. 9267. 95th Congress, 1st
Session, 1977.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R.
10826. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R.
11617. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for Federal support and stimulation of State, local,
and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist the victims of
domestic violence, for coordination of Federal programs and activities pertaining to
domestic violence, and for other purposes. S. 2759. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment of domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R. 11762.
95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to establish a Federal Office on Domestic
Violence, and a Federal Council on Domestic Violence, to provide grants for the
assistance of victims of domestic violence and for training programs, and for other
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purposes. H.R. 12299. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R.
2163. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to revise and extend the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970. S. 440. 96th
Congress, 1st Session, 1979.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R.
2682. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and
stimulation of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and
assist victims of domestic violence, for coordination of Federal programs and
activities pertaining to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R. 2977. 96th
Congress, 1st Session, 1979.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to establish a Federal Office on Domestic
Violence, and a Federal Council on Domestic Violence, to provide grants for the
assistance of victims of domestic violence and for training programs, and for other
purposes. H.R. 3921. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title XX of the Social Security Act to authorize
expenditures thereunder for the provision, in certain instances, of emergency shelter

234

to adults in danger of physical or mental injury. S. 1153. 96th Congress, 1st Session,
1979.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for Federal support and stimulation of State, local,
and community activities to prevent domestic violence and provide immediate shelter
and other assistance for victims of domestic violence, for coordination of Federal
programs and activities pertaining to domestic violence, and for other purposes. S.
1843. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and
encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence
and assist victims of domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal
programs and activities relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R.
1007. 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and
encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence
and assist victims of domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R. 1651. 97th
Congress, 1st Session, 1981.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Older Americans Act of 1965
to extend certain authorizations of appropriations made in such Act, and to make
certain revisions in the provisions of such Act. H.R. 3267. 97th Congress, 1st Session,
1981.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to restrict the Federal Government from preempting or
interfering with State statutes pertaining to spousal abuse, and for other purposes. S.
1578. 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981.
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U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to expand and extend programs relating to alcohol abuse and
alcoholism and drug abuse. S. 2365. 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act and
related laws to consolidate the laws relating to the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Administration, the National Institute of Mental Health, the National Institute
of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, and the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and for
other purposes. H.R. 6458. 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for Federal support and encouragement of State,
local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist victims of
domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal programs and activities
relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. S. 2908. 97th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1982.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and
encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence
and assist victims of domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal
programs and activities relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R.
73. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and
encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence
and assist victims of domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal
programs and activities relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R.
1397. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.

236

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide additional authorizations for programs designed to
increase employment including the Community Development Block Grant, youth
employment and education, senior citizens employment, and other similar programs,
to provide training and retraining assistance for dislocated workers, and to provide
emergency assistance for the long-term unemployed, and for other purposes. S. 493.
98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to extend and improve the provisions of the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978. H.R. 1904. 98th Congress, 1st Session,
1983.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for Federal support and encouragement of State,
local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist victims of
domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal programs and activities
relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. S. 699. 98th Congress, 1st
Session, 1983.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to extend and revise the provisions of the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act and the Child Abuse Prevention Treatment and
Adoption Reform Act of 1978. S. 1003. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for a family violence prevention and services
program. S. 2430. 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 1984.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1989
through 1992. H.R. 1801. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.
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U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act
of 1978, and the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act to extend through
fiscal year 1991 the authorities established in such Acts. H.R. 1900. 100th Congress,
1st Session, 1987.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to strengthen the criminal justice partnership between the
States and the Federal Government. S. 1250. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. A bill to amend title XVI of the Social Security
Act to increase the effectiveness and improve the administration of the SSI program.
H.R. 2795. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title XVI of the Social Security Act to increase the
effectiveness and improve the administration of the SSI program, and for other
purposes. S. 1635. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to reauthorize the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
and other related Acts dealing with adoption opportunities and family violence. S.
1663. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to punish as a Federal
criminal offense the crimes of international parental abduction. S. 2059. 100th
Congress, 2nd Session, 1988.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. National Domestic Violence Awareness Month:
Designate. H.J. Res. 619. 100th Congress. 2nd Session, 1988.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to prevent the manufacturing, distribution,
and use of illegal drugs, and for other purposes. H.R. 5210. 100th Congress, 2nd
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Session, 1988.
U.S. Congress. Senate. National Domestic Violence Awareness Month: Designate. S.J. Res.
371. 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 1988.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for an omnibus Federal, State, and local effort
against substance abuse, to provide for a cabinet-level position to centralize and
streamline Federal activities with respect to both drug supply (interdiction and law
enforcement) and drug demand (prevention, education, and treatment), to expand
Federal support to ensure a long-term commitment of resources and personnel for
substance abuse education, treatment, and rehabilitation efforts, to strengthen and
improve the enforcement of Federal drug laws and enhance the interdiction of illicit
drug shipments, and for other purposes. S. 2852. 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 1988.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to prevent the manufacturing, distribution,
and use of illegal drugs, and for other purposes. H.R. 5582. 100th Congress, 2nd
Session, 1988.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title 18 of the United States Code to punish as a
Federal criminal offense the crimes of international parental child abduction. S. 185.
101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Carl D. Perkins Vocational
Education Act of 1984 to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1990 and
succeeding fiscal years, and for other purposes. H.R. 1128. 101st Congress, 1st
Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act of
1984 to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1990 and succeeding years, and for
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other purposes. S. 658. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Carl D. Perkins Vocational
Education Act to clarify certain provisions relating to consumer and homemaking
education grants. H.R. 1820. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. Senate. National Domestic Violence Awareness Month: Designate. S.J. Res.
133. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to establish programs to strengthen America's families, and for
other purposes. S. 1056. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to establish programs to strengthen
America's families, and for other purposes. H.R. 2452. 101st Congress, 1st Session,
1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to direct the Secretary of Defense to provide
comprehensive assistance to military families who are required to relocate. H.R.
2508. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality
Act to protect foreign spouses victimized by physical abuse and extreme mental
cruelty. H.R. 2580. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. National Domestic Violence Awareness Month:
Designate. H.J. Res. 320. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to replace the Legal Services Corporation
with a Legal Services Administration in the Office of Justice Programs of the
Department of Justice, and for other purposes. H.R. 2884. 101st Congress, 1st Session,
1989.
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U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend section 8 of the United States
Housing Act of 1937 to reserve housing certificates and vouchers for homeless
families and displaced families affected by domestic violence. H.R. 2951. 101st
Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the State Justice Institute Act of
1984 to carry out research, and develop judicial training curricula, relating to child
custody litigation. H.R. 2952. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to protect
foreign spouses victimized by physical abuse and extreme mental cruelty. S. 1456.
101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to ensure economic equity for American
women and their families by providing equitable pay and employee benefits and
enhanced opportunities in business procurement and vocational education, providing
economic and retirement security for women as workers and as divorced or surviving
spouses; making quality and affordable dependent care available to all working
families; and enhancing the long-term health of women and their families through
prevention services and assistance in victims of domestic violence. H.R. 3085. 101st
Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to ensure economic equity for American women and their
families by providing equitable pay and employee benefits and enhanced
opportunities in business procurement, providing economic and retirement security
for women as workers and as divorced or surviving spouses; making quality and
affordable dependent care available to all working families; enhancing the long-term
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health of women and their families through prevention services and assistance to
victims of domestic violence. S. 1480. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill relating to domestic violence judiciary training grants. S. 1482.
101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality
Act to revise the system of admission of aliens on the basis of family reunification
and to meet identified labor shortages, and for other purposes. H.R. 4300. 101st
Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S Congress. Senate. A bill to develop and improve child protective service programs on
Indian reservations and to strengthen Indian families. S. 2340. 101st Congress, 2nd
Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act to reauthorize provisions relating to the provision of
education to homeless children and homeless youths, to establish a program of grants
to State and local education agencies for the provision of support services to such
children and youths, and for other purposes. H.R. 4574. 101st Congress, 2nd Session,
1990.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to alleviate homelessness, reduce housing
cost burdens, and increase housing opportunities for low-income families, and for
other purposes. H.R. 4621. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for a comprehensive approach to drug abuse
prevention and treatment, and for other purposes. S. 2559. 101st Congress, 2nd
Session, 1990.
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U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to combat homelessness through the establishment of housingbased family support centers, through the provisions of housing-based services to
elderly individuals with chronic and debilitating illnesses and conditions, through the
provision of residence-based outpatient mental health services, and through the use of
grants for the improvement of community development corporations, and for other
purposes. S. 2600. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act to expand and improve the program of grants for State
activities for the education of homeless children and youths, to establish a program of
grants for local activities for the education of such children and youths and for other
purposes. H.R. 4934. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Job Training Partnership Act
to guarantee access to education and job training assistance for youth residing in
high-poverty areas of urban and rural communities, and for other purposes. H.R.
4937. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. Senate. National Domestic Violence Awareness Month: Designate. S.J. Res.
328. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend and extend certain laws relating to
housing, community and neighborhood development and preservation, and related
programs, and for other purposes. H.R. 4971. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. National Domestic Violence Awareness Month:
Designate. H.J. Res. 602. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to combat violence and crimes against women on the streets
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and in homes. S. 2754. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to combat homelessness through the
establishment of housing-based family support centers, through the provision of
housing-based services to elderly individuals and individuals with chronic and
debilitating illnesses and conditions, through the provision of residence-based
outpatient mental health services, through the use of grants for the improvement of
community development corporations, and through the provision of comprehensive
services to homeless veterans, and for other purposes. H.R. 5100. 101st Congress, 2nd
Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act to expand and improve the program of grants for State
activities for the education of homeless children and youths, to establish a program of
grants for local activities for the education of such children and youths, and for other
purposes. H.R. 5128. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act
and the Public Health Service Act to reauthorize certain health, education, training,
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U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to establish a rural crime prevention strategy, to address the
problem of crime against the elderly, to combat child abuse, sexual violence and
violence against women, to enhance the rights of law enforcement officers, to
enhance the rights of crime victims. S. 1335. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide access to prenatal care, housing, nutrition, and
parenting skills for needy families, and for other purposes. S. 1380. 102nd Congress,
1st Session, 1991.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Family Violence Prevention
and Services Act to provide grants to States to fund State domestic violence
coalitions, and for other purposes. H.R. 2947. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide for
coverage of alcoholism and drug dependency residential treatment services for
pregnant women and certain family members under the Medicaid program, and for
other purposes. S. 1677. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965
to improve the eligibility of less-than-half-time students for Federal student assistance
programs, and for other purposes. H.R. 3354. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.

249

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to alleviate homelessness, reduce housing
cost burdens, and increase housing opportunities for low-income families, and for
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U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for
demonstration projects for the identification by health care providers of victims of
domestic violence and sexual assault, to provide for the education of the public on the
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identification and referral of victims of domestic violence. H.R. 3207. 103rd Congress,
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U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the
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victims of domestic violence. S. 1506. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.
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U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to prevent crime and to reform the criminal
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U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent persons who
have committed domestic abuse from obtaining a firearm. S. 1570. 103rd Congress, 1st
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U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act to
authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to administer a Federal
demonstration program to coordinate response and strategy within many sectors of
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103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Family Violence Prevention
and Services Act to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
administer a Federal demonstration program to coordinate response and strategy
within many sectors of local communities for intervention and prevention of domestic
violence. H.R. 3335. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 to allow grants to increase police presence, to expand and
improve cooperative efforts between law enforcement agencies and members of the
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safety. H.R. 3355. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.
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intimate partners. H.R. 3415. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.
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Session, 1993.
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rate of paternity establishment for children receiving welfare benefits, to provide
States with greater flexibility in providing welfare, to authorize States to conduct
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leave welfare and increase their financial security, to strengthen child support
enforcement, and to eliminate welfare payments for most groups of noncitizens. H.R.
3500. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to require the establishment of a Federal
system for the purpose of conducting background checks to prevent the employment
of child abusers by child care providers, to establish a Federal point-of-purchase
background check system for screening prohibited firearm purchasers, to provide
accurate and immediately accessible records for law enforcement purposes, to assist
in the identification and apprehension of violent felons, and to assist the courts in
determining appropriate bail and sentencing decisions. H.R. 3557. 103rd Congress, 1st
Session, 1993.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to establish a national background check procedure to ensure
that persons working as child care providers do not have a criminal history of child
abuse, to initiate the reporting of all State and Federal child abuse crimes, to establish
minimum guidelines for States to follow in conducting background checks and
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1994.
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Block Grant Act, and for other purposes. H.R. 4250. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session,
1994.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act to revise and extend programs providing urgently needed
assistance for the homeless, and for other purposes. H.R. 4578. 103rd Congress, 2nd
Session, 1994.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill entitled the Rape Victims' Protection Act. S. 2240. 103rd
Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.
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U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to require the Attorney General to develop model legislation
for the States to assure confidentiality of communications between victims of sexual
assault or domestic violence victims and their counselors, and for other purposes. S.
2315. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to control crime. H.R. 4848. 103rd Congress,
2nd Session, 1994.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to achieve universal health insurance coverage, and for other
purposes. S. 2357. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
award grants and contracts to establish community response teams and a technical
assistance center to address the development and support of community response
teams. S. 2416. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title VIII of the Public Health Service Act to
consolidate and reauthorize nursing education programs under such title, and for other
purposes. S. 2433. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to ensure economic equity for American women and their
families by promoting fairness in the workplace, creating new economic opportunities
for women workers and women business owners, helping workers better meet the
competing demands of work and family; and enhancing economic self-sufficiency
through public and private pension reform and improved child support enforcement.
S. 2514. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.

265

References
Andrews, Kenneth T. 2001. “Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The
Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965-1971.”
American Sociological Review 66 (1): 71-95.
Andrews, Kenneth T. and Bob Edwards. 2004. “Advocacy Organizations in the U.S.
Political Process.” Annual Review of Sociology 30: 479-506.
Angen, Maureen Jane. 2000. “Evaluating Interpretive Inquiry: Reviewing the Validity
Debate and Opening the Dialogue.” Qualitative Health Researcher 10 (3): 378-395.
Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Barner, John R. and Michelle Mohr Carney. 2011. “Interventions for Intimate Partner
Violence: A Historical Review.” Journal of Family Violence 26 (3): 235-244.
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1991. “Agenda Dynamics and Policy
Subsystems.” Journal of Politics 53 (4): 1044-1074.
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American
Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of
Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26: 611639.
Bevacqua, Maria. 2000. Rape on the Public Agenda: Feminism and the Politics of

266

Sexual Assault. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England.
Bohmer, Carol, Jennifer Brandt, Denise Bronson, and Helen Hartnett. 2002. “Domestic
Violence Law Reforms: Reactions from the Trenches.” Journal of Sociology and
Social Welfare 29 (3): 71-87.
Broad, Kendal, and Valerie Jenness. 1996. "The Institutionalizing Work of Contemporary
Anti-Violence Against Women Campaigns in the US: Mesolevel Social
Movement Activism and the Production of Cultural Forms." Research in Social
Movements, Conflicts and Change 19: 75-123.
Brooks, Rachelle. 1997. “Feminists Negotiate the Legislative Branch: The Violence
Against Women Act.” Pp. 63-81 in Feminists Negotiate the State:
The Politics of Domestic Violence, edited by Cynthia R. Daniels. Lanham, MD:
University Press of America.
Brownmiller, Susan. 1975. Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
Buechler, Steven M. 1990. Women’s Movements in the United States: Woman Suffrage,
Equal Rights, and Beyond. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Bumiller, Kristin. 1992. The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bumiller, Kristin. 2008. In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the
Feminist Movement Against Sexual Violence. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press.
Burstein, Paul and C. Elizabeth Hirsh. 2007. “Interest Organizations, Information, and
Policy Innovation in the U.S. Congress.” Sociological Forum 22 (2): 174-199.

267

Burstein, Paul and April Linton. 2002. “The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups,
and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some recent Evidence and
Theoretical Concerns.” Social Forces 81 (2): 380-408.
Community Crisis Center. 1980. The Shelter Experience: A Guide to Shelter
Organization and Management for Groups Working Against Domestic Violence,
2nd printing. Rockville, MD: National Clearinghouse on Domestic Violence.
Coontz, Stephanie. 2000. “Historical Perspectives on Family Studies.” Journal of
Marriage and Family 62 (2): 283-297.
Cramer, Elizabeth. 2005. “Unintended Consequences of Constructing Criminal Justice as
a Dominant Paradigm in Understanding and Intervening in Intimate Partner
Violence.” Women’s Studies Quarterly 33 (1/2): 272-289.
Cress, Daniel M. and David A. Snow. 2000. “The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization:
The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing.”
American Journal of Sociology 105 (4): 1063-1104.
Creswell, John W. and Dana L. Miller. 2010. “Determining Validity in Qualitative
Inquiry.” Theory into Practice 39 (3): 124-130.
Daniels, Cynthia. 1997. “The Paradoxes of State Power.” Pp. 1-4 in Feminists Negotiate the
State: The Politics of Domestic Violence, edited by Cynthia R. Daniels. Lanham, MD:
University Press of America.
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American
Sociological Review 48 (2):147-160.
Dobash, Rebecca Emerson and Russell P. Dobash. 1992. Women, Violence, and Social

268

Change. New York: Routledge.
Dobash, Rebecca Emerson and Russell P. Dobash. 1998. Re-thinking Violence Against
Women. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Felter, Elizabeth. 1997. “A History of State’s Response to Domestic Violence in the
United States.” Pp. 5-20 in Feminists Negotiate the State: The Politics of Domestic
Violence, edited by Cynthia R. Daniels. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2006. “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research.”
Qualitative Inquiry 12 (2): 219-245.
Freeman, Jo. 1973. “The Origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement.” American
Journal of Sociology 78 (4): 792-811.
Fried, Amy. 1994. “It’s Hard to Change What We Want to Change: Rape Crisis Centers
as Organizations.” Gender & Society 8 (4): 562-583.
Gagne, Patricia. 1998. Battered Women's Justice: The Movement for Clemency and the
Politics of Self-Defense. New York: Twayne Publishers.
Gamson, William. 1975 [1990]. The Strategy of Social Protest. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Gelles, Richard J. 2000. “Public Policy for Violence Against Women: 30 Years of
Successes and Remaining Challenges.” American Journal of Preventative
Medicine 19 (4): 298-301.
Giele, Janet Zollinger. 1995. Two Paths to Women’s Equality. New York: Twayne
Publishers.
Goodwin, Jeff, and James M. Jasper. 1999. “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The
Structural Bias of Political Process Theory.” Sociological Forum 14 (1): 27-54.

269

Grattet, Ryken and Valerie Jenness. 2001. “The Birth and Maturation of Hate Crime
Policy in the United States.” American Behavioral Scientist 45 (4): 668-696.
Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang and Sarah E. Shannon. 2005. “Three Approaches to Qualitative
Content Analysis.” Qualitative Health Research 15 (9): 1277-1288.
Holzer, Elizabeth. 2008. “Borrowing from the Women’s Movement ‘For Reasons of
Public Security’: A Study of Social Movement Outcomes and Judicial Activism
in the European Union.” Mobilization 13 (1): 195-214.
Jaffee, Daniel. 2010. “Fair Trade Standards, Corporate Participation, and Social
Movement responses in the United States.” Journal of Business Ethics 92 (2): 267285.
Jenness, Valerie. 1999. “Managing Differences and Making Legislation: Social
Movements and the Racialization, Sexualization, and Gendering of Federal Hate
Crime Law in the U.S., 1985-1998.” Social Problems 46 (4): 548-571.
Johnson, Erik W. 2008. “Social Movement Size, Organizational Diversity and the
Making of Federal Law.” Social Forces 86 (3): 967-993.
Johnson, John M. 1981. “Program Enterprise and Official Cooptation in the Battered
Women’s Shelter Movement.” American Behavioral Scientist 24 (6): 827-842.
Johnston, Hank. 1995. “A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to
Cognitive Schemata.” Pp. 217-246 in Social Movements and Culture, edited by Hank
Johnston and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Jones, Beverly. 1970. “The Dynamics of Marriage and Motherhood.” Pp. 46-61 in
Sisterhood is Powerful: An Anthology of Writings from the Women’s Liberation
Movement, edited by Robin Morgan. New York: Random House.

270

King, Brayden G., Marie Cornwall, and Eric C. Dahlin. 2005. “Winning Woman
Suffrage One Step at a time: Social Movements and the Logic of the Legislative
Process.” Social Forces 83 (3): 1211-1234.
Lawler, Edward J. 1983. “Cooptation and Threats as ‘Divide and Rule’ Tactics.” Social
Psychology Quarterly 46 (2): 89-98.
Lehrner, Amy and Nicole E. Allen. 2009. “Still a Movement After All These Years?
Current Tensions in the Domestic Violence Movement.” Violence Against Women
15 (6): 656-677.
Lipsky, Michael. 1968. “Protest as a Political Resource.” American Political Science
Review 62 (4): 1144-1158.
Loseke, Donileen R. 1992. The Battered Woman and Shelters: The Social Construction
of Wife Abuse, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking. New York: State
University of New York Press.
McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
McCammon, Holly J., Karen E. Campbell, Ellen M. Granberg, and Christine Mowery.
2001. “How Movements Win: Gender Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women’s
Suffrage Movements, 1866-1919.” American Sociological Review 66 (1): 49-70.
McCammon, Holly J., Courtney Sanders Muse, Harmony D. Newman, and Teresa M.
Terrell. 2007. “Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures: The
Political Success of the U.S. Women’s Jury Movement.” American Sociological

271

Review 72 (5): 725-749.
McCarthy, John D. and Meyer N. Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social
Movements: A Partial Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 82 (6): 1212-1241.
Martin, Del. 1976. Battered Wives. New York: Pocket Books.
Marx, Gary T. 1979. “External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some
Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes and Complications.” In The Dynamics of Social
Movements, edited by Meyer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. Winthrop Minnesota:
Winthrop Publishers.
Mattingly, Carol. 1998. Well Tempered Women: Nineteenth Century Temperance
Rhetoric. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
Meyer, David S. 2003. Social Movements and Public Policy: Eggs, Chicken, and
Theory. Irvine, CA: Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California.
Retrieved August 22, 2010 (http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2m62b74d).
Meyer, David S. and Catherine Corrigall-Brown. 2005. “Coalitions and Political Context:
U.S. Movements Against Wars in Iraq.” Mobilization 10 (3): 327-346.
Meyer, David S., Valerie Jenness, and Helen Ingram, eds. 2005. Routing the
Opposition: Social Movements, Public Policy, and Democracy. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Meyer, David and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity.”
Social Forces 82 (4): 1457-1492.
Miccio, G. Kristian. 2005. "A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence,
and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement." Houston Law
Review 42: 237-323.

272

Miller, Elizabeth B.A. 2010. “Moving to the Head of the River: The Early Years of the
U.S. Battered Women's Movement,” PhD dissertation, Department of American
Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS.
Murphy, Patricia. 1997. “Domestic Violence Legislation and the Police: The Role of
Socio-Economic Indicators, Political Factors and Women’s Political Activism on
State Policy Adoption.” Women & Politics 18 (2): 27-53.
Naranch, Laurie. 1997. “Naming and Framing the Issues: Demanding Full Citizenship for
Women.” Pp. 21-34 in Feminists Negotiate the State: The Politics of Domestic
Violence, edited by Cynthia R. Daniels. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Noy, Darren. 2009. “When Framing Fails: Ideas, Influence, and Resources in San
Francisco’s Homeless Policy Field.” Social Problems 56 (2): 223-242.
Oberschall, Anthony. 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Pagelow, Mildred Daley. 1984. Family Violence. New York: Praeger.
Pence, Ellen and Michael Paymar. 1993. Education Groups for Men Who Batter: The
Duluth Model. New York: Springer.
Phillips, Scott and Ryken Grattet. 2000. “Judicial Rhetoric, Meaning-Making, and the
Institutionalization of Hate Crime Law.” Law & Society Review 34 (3): 567-606.
Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. 1977. Poor People’s Movements: Why
They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Vintage Books.
Pleck, Elizabeth Hafkin. 1987. Domestic Tyranny: The making of Social Policy Against
Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present. New York: Oxford University
Press.

273

Rambo, Kirsten S. 2009. Trivial Complaints: The Role of Privacy in Domestic Violence
Law and Activism in the U.S. New York: Columbia University Press.
Reinelt , Claire. 1995. “Moving onto the Terrain of the State: The Battered Women’s
Movement and the Politics of Engagement.” Pp. 84-104 in Feminist Organizations:
Harvest of the New Women’s Movement, edited by Myra Marx Ferree and Patricia
Yancey Martin. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Rochon, Thomas R. and Daniel A. Mazmanian. 1993. “Social Movements and the Policy
Process.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 528:
75-87.
Sack, Emily J. 2004. Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy. Wisconsin Law Review 2004: 1657-1740.
Sanchez-Eppler, Karen. 1997. Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of
the Body. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Santoro, Wayne A., and Gail M. McGuire. 1997. “Social Movement Insiders: The Impact
of Institutional Activists on Affirmative Action and Comparable Worth Policies.”
Social Problems 44 (4): 503-19.
Saunders, Daniel G. and Patricia B. Size. 1986. “Attitudes about Woman Abuse Among
Police Officers, Victims, and Victim Advocates.” Journal of Interpersonal
Violence 1 (1): 25-42.
Schechter, Susan. 1982. Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the
Battered Women's Movement. Boston: South End Press.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman and John T. Tierney. 1983. “More of the Same: Washington
Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change.” Journal of Politics 45 (2): 351-377.

274

Schneider, Elizabeth M. 2000. Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Selznick, Phillip. 1948. “Foundations of the Theory of Organizations.” American
Sociological Review 13 (1): 25-35.
Shepard, Melanie. 2005. “Twenty Years of Progress in Addressing Domestic Violence:
An Agenda for the Next 10.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 20 (4): 436-441.
Siskin, Alison. 2001. Violence Against Women Act: History, Federal Funding, and
Reauthorizing Legislation. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford.
1986. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation.” American Sociological Review 51 (4): 464-481.
Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford. 1992. “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.”
Pp. 133-155 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by Aldon D. Morris and
Carol McClurg Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Snow, David A. and Danny Trom. 2002. “The Case Study and the Study of Social
Movements.” Pp. 146-172 in Methods of Social Movement Research, edited by Bert
Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1988. “The Consequences of Professionalization and
Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement.” American Sociological Review 53 (4):
585-605.
Steinman, Michael. 1991. “The Public Policy Process and Woman Battering: Problems
and Potentials.” Pp. 1-17 in Woman Battering: Policy Responses, edited by Michael
Steinman. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company.

275

Stratigaki, Maria. 2004. “The Cooptation of Gender Concepts in EU Policies: The Case
of Reconciliation of Work and Family.” Social Politics 11 (1): 30-56.
Sterns, Linda Brewster and Paul D. Almeida. 2004. “The Formation of State Actor-Social
Movement Coalitions and Favorable Policy Outcomes.” Social Problems 51 (4): 478504.
Swidler, Ann. 1986. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American
Sociological Review 51 (2): 273-286.
Swidler, Ann. 1995. “Culture Power and Social Movements.” Pp. 25-40 in Social Movements
and Culture, edited by Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics,
2nd Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tierney, Kathleen J. 1982. “The Battered Women Movement and the Creation of the
Wife Beating Problem.” Social Problems 29 (3): 207-220.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company.
True, James L., Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2007. “PunctuatedEquilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking.” Pp.
155-188 in Theories of the Policy Process, edited by Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Trumpy, Alexa J. 2008. “Subject to Negotiation: The Mechanisms Behind Cooptation
and Corporate Reform.” Social Problems 55 (4): 480-500.
Tuerkheimer, Deborah. 2004. "Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A

276

Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence." Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology 94 (4): 959-1031.
United States Commission on Civil Rights. 1982. Under the Rule of Thumb: Battered
Women and the Administration of Justice. Washington, D.C.: United States
Commission on Civil Rights.
Walker, Lenore E. 1979. The Battered Woman. New York: Harper &Row.
Walker, Lenore E. 1984. The Battered Woman’s Syndrome. New York: Springer.
Weldon, Laura S. 2002. Protest, Policy, and the Problem of Violence Against Women: A
Cross-National Comparison. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Welter, Barbara. 1983. “The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860.” Pp. 372-392 in
The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective, edited by Michael Gordon.
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Yanow, Dvora. 2000. Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage University Press.
Young, Michael P. 2007. Bearing Witness against Sin: The Evangelical Birth of the
American Social Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zucker, Lynne G. 1977. “The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence.”
American Sociological Review 42 (5): 726-743.

277

